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Abstract 
 
This thesis critiques liberal peacebuilding in Africa, with a particular focus on Sierra Leone. 
In particular, it examines the interface between the liberal peace and the “local”, the forms of 
agency that various local actors are expressing in response to the liberal peace and the hybrid 
forms of peace that are emerging in Sierra Leone. The thesis is built from an emerging 
critical literature that has argued for the need to shift from merely criticising liberal 
peacebuilding to examining local and contextual responses to it. Such contextualisation is 
crucial mainly because it helps us to develop a better understanding of the complex dynamics 
on the ground. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a new theory but to attempt to use the 
emerging insights from the critical scholarship through adopting the concept of hybridity in 
order to gain an understanding of the forms of peace that are emerging in post-conflict zones 
in Africa. This has not been comprehensively addressed in the context of post-conflict 
societies in Africa. Yet, much contemporary peace support operations are taking place in 
these societies that are characterised by multiple sources of legitimacy, authority and 
sovereignty.  
The thesis shows that in Sierra Leone local actors – from state elites to chiefs to civil society 
to ordinary people on the “margins of the state” – are not passive recipients of the liberal 
peace. It sheds new light on how hybridity can be created “from below” as citizens do not 
engage in outright resistance, but express various forms of agency including partial 
acceptance and internalisation of some elements of the liberal peace that they find useful to 
them; and use them to make demands for reforms against state elites who they do not trust 
and often criticise for their pre-occupation with political survival and consolidation of power. 
Further, it notes that in Sierra Leone a “post-liberal peace” that is locally-oriented might 
emerge on the “margins of the state” where culture, custom and tradition are predominant, 
and where neo-traditional civil society organisations act as vehicles for both the liberal peace 
and customary peacebuilding while allowing locals to lead the peacebuilding process. In 
Sierra Leone, there are also peace processes that are based on custom that are operating in 
parallel to the liberal peace, particularly in remote parts of the country. 
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Introduction 
 
Scope of the Study 
Since the end of the Cold War intrastate conflicts have threatened developing states more 
than inter-state ones. These conflicts have resulted in the death of millions of civilians. 
Africa has had the largest number of such conflicts and displaced people in the world.  
Despite increased international attention on the conflicts in the past two decades, civil wars 
are not a new phenomenon in Africa, for example, Congo (1960-1964), Nigeria (Biafra) 
(1967-1970), Chad (1965-1979), Angola (1975-2002), Mozambique (1975-1994) and 
Sudan (Southern Sudan) (1955-1972). Rather, what is “new” about these conflicts, 
according to Kaldor (1999: 8), is their aim “to control the population by getting rid of 
everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a different opinion)” and the strategic goal 
of “population expulsion through various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, 
as well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation”. In 
addition, states going through civil war tend to experience war economies characterised by 
rebels either self-financing the war through extraction of domestic resources such as 
alluvial diamonds or receiving external financial support from the diaspora and/or 
transnational networks (Kaldor 1999).  
  
The emergence of civil wars in Africa is generally attributed to the following factors: 1) 
the end of the Cold War that left many African states in a weaker position because 
superpowers withdrew their support which had enabled African leaders to control internal 
threats; 2) the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),  that resulted in 
the international system’s realignment; 3) the failure of the state and its institutions; and 4) 
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the inappropriateness of the Westphalian system as an international order (Franks 2004: 3). 
In Africa, civil wars are further attributed to a number of causes that are linked to state elite 
behaviour including “the politics of elite survival” (Jackson 2006) and the neo-patrimonial 
system of governance and its crisis (Richards 1996). 
 
In the 1990s, the issue of “state collapse” and “state failure” became an issue of 
international concern witnessing an ideological turn in relation to the United Nations (UN) 
peace operations. This period witnessed the emergence of an international consensus that 
failed or collapsed states and non-state actors posed a serious threat to international peace 
and security more than aggressive powerful states. This resulted in the argument that 
building effective and legitimate liberal states would deal with such a threat as well as 
promote self-sustaining peace in war-torn societies. For the past two decades, peace 
support initiatives have been based on a single model – a western liberal state model – that 
emphasises building centralised state institutions and ensuring state stability which civil 
wars tend to undermine, what has come to be called the liberal peace (Paris 2004; 
Richmond 2005; Roberts 2011; Mac Ginty 2006).1 Duffield (2001: 11) notes that the 
liberal peace aims at transforming “the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it 
encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities”. 
For Richmond the main components underlying liberal peace are (neo)liberal development, 
the rule of law, democratisation, a free market economy and human rights (2006). In 
addition, the liberal peace focuses on state elites, the state and its institutions as vehicles 
                                                           
1
  Although the liberal peace project is primarily US project and British to some degree with some 
donors such as Canada and Japan following on, the UN is implicated in this project quite closely because it 
uses the idea of liberal in the philosophical sense as it relates to issues such as democratic politics, human 
rights, the rule of law among other issues. However, the UN outside the Security Council has much been 
focused on issues of reconciliation, justice and accountability, for example, the United Nations Integrated 
Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). 
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for peace, marginalising the rest of the population. This has led Roberts to call it a “pyrrhic 
peace, because it forestalls and sacrifices broader peace for a greater number to a narrower 
peace for mainly metropolitan minority” (2011: xiii, emphasis not mine). He further notes 
that the liberal peace is “dispossessive [because] it removes from people’s possible futures 
the possibility of a peace more relevant to them, resulting in a limited peace for a limited 
minority” (2011: xiii). 
 
 For critics of the liberal peace, its dominance, focus on state elites, and emphasis on 
creating a liberal state, strong and effective state institutions in post-conflict environments 
make it difficult for the “subaltern” (the marginalised and excluded subjects) to speak for 
him/herself (Spivak 1988) or to be heard (Libin 2003). The liberal state is often assumed to 
be a panacea to the problems that post-conflict societies are experiencing – violence, 
security, development, human rights, economic growth, environment, gender inequalities 
and the lack of rule of law, among others. Indeed, the most secure foundation for a durable 
peace. Its success has often been viewed in its ability to end overt violence and establishing 
some form of order and stability in war-torn societies. 
 
Yet, recent critiques of the liberal peace have shown that in a number of cases it has proved 
to be partially counterproductive, naive, hard to sustain, disappointing and has produced 
mixed results (Paris 2004; Bellamy and Williams 2005; Duffield 2001; Fanthorpe 2005; 
Mac Ginty 2006; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007; Richmond 2006; Richmond and Franks 
2007; Richmond and Franks 2008; Taylor 2007). Roberts (2011: xiii, emphasis not mine) 
has gone further to note that the liberal peace is “a hegemony through dispossession, since 
its rationale is the accumulation of ideological conformity by means of disrupting the local 
to dispossess people of their ‘illiberal’ ways.”  
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Critical literature has identified and conceptualised the liberal peace as well as discussed 
the flaws inherent in it (chapters 2 and 3). Such critiques on the liberal peace have largely 
focused on its underlying assumptions, its methodology, hegemonic nature, and the 
inherent limits and contradictions in it. However, these critiques have come up with two 
competing visions on how peace and states should be built in post-conflict societies. The 
first school of thought is the mainstream/ objectivist problem-solving scholarship which 
argues for the need to reform the liberal peace suggesting that alternatives should come 
from within the liberal peace itself and would want it to remain the mode of intervention in 
post-conflict societies. Such scholarship takes an institutional approach that views the 
establishment of liberal state institutions as the surest means to promote lasting peace in 
societies emerging from conflict. In contrast, the second school of thought, the critical 
subjectivist scholarship critiques the mainstream liberal peace discourse and puts emphasis 
on an emancipatory approach as a means to promote sustainable peace. Critical scholars 
have been concerned about the totalising discourses of the liberal peace which have 
“depoliticised and removed [local] agency” (Richmond 2010a: 201) as well as subjugated 
indigenous insights for peace and peacemaking in post-conflict environments. They concur 
with conflict transformation scholars like Lederach (1997) who argue that peace should be 
built “from below”, emphasising the need to focus on “locally-grounded non-state agency 
and mechanisms of recovery and order” that have received little attention in political 
science and International Relations theory, “but are of significance for understanding the 
empirical conditions for political order and peace” (Moe 2010: 7). These critical scholars 
have taken a step further:  
 
by taking interest in emancipation as well as liberalism, needs and welfare as well as 
rights, the conditions for durable peace, context and culture, the unintended 
consequences of the liberal peace, including its impact on the everyday life, and how 
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local actors view/make peace as well as respond to the liberal peace (Tadjbakhsh 
2011: 3).  
 
More recently, some critical scholars (also drawing from post-colonial scholarship) have 
developed an interest in the concepts of hybrid and hybridisation, and the range of local 
agencies that emerge in post-conflict societies in the light of liberal peacebuilding 
(Richmond 2010b; 2011a, 2011b; Mac Ginty 2010a). This suggests the need to start 
thinking about contemporary peacebuilding as a process of hybridisation – a “new 
thinking” that involves thinking or investigating ways of moving beyond the liberal peace 
and the state, that is “post-liberal peace” transformations that allow the excluded and those 
in the periphery to play an active role in peacebuilding, which also means a radical 
departure from a rigid and hegemonic liberal peace, the state-centric Westphalian system 
and a denial of the universality of the liberal peace (Richmond 2010b; see chapter 4). In 
addition, it means a move into the post-Westphalian system and an acceptance that other 
“peaces” are possible. Departing from the liberal peace to the “post-liberal peace”, not only 
allows for a locally-grounded analysis that enables us to bring out other forms of peace that 
are important in contributing to the establishment of self-sustaining peace in post-conflict 
environments, but also an understanding of how local social forces are shaping 
international peace initiatives, thus helping us to understand the dynamics of post-conflict 
societies. This in turn calls for the need to deconstruct or reform oppressive structures and 
institutions as well as behaviours, and then construct and place emphasis on those that are 
capable of promoting lasting peace.  
 
Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
This thesis is a critique of post-conflict liberal peacebuilding. Drawing from the emerging 
critical scholarship, post-colonial literature, African studies literature and fieldwork in 
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Sierra Leone, the thesis explores the practical application of the liberal peace in Africa in 
the context of Sierra Leone. It specifically examines how the liberal peace is interacting 
with the “local”,2 the forms of agency that the locals are expressing as a result of these 
interactions and the hybrid forms of peace that are emerging largely due to these 
interactions as well as the “local” framework(s) of peace. By also examining the “local” 
framework(s) of peace this thesis is trying to avoid replicating Western arguments that 
local actors cannot provide, for example, peace, security, democracy, human rights and 
gender equality without external direction. This thesis complements the emerging literature 
that critiques the liberal peace emphasising the need to go beyond the liberal peace; paying 
attention to the interface between the “liberal” and the “local”, agency and context, among 
others.  
 
The research questions underpinning this thesis are: 
 
1. How is the “local” interacting with the international in Sierra Leone and whose 
interests are being served? 
2. How is the liberal peace being hybridised, accepted, resisted and subverted? 
3. What forms of peace are emerging out of these interactions? 
4. What are the “local” forms of peace in Sierra Leone? 
 
                                                           
2
  Drawing on Richmond (2010b), the local is understood in this thesis as not homogenous, but 
diverse with a range of contextual actors some who are transitionally connected, have spent some time in, for 
example, the West and have worked for international organisations such as the UN. Such people have 
experiences that would not be associated with the local (for example, some Paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone 
have been educated in the West), some do aspire to the liberal peace and others draw on, for example, 
religion, tradition and custom or ideologies such as African socialism, Pan-Africanism and Negritude. The 
local can have “transnational and transversal exposure” (Richmond 2010b: 667). 
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In addressing the above questions the thesis aims to contribute to the emerging debates on 
the need to understand local contextual matters including internal politics through 
empirical research. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a new theory but to attempt to 
use the emerging insights from this critical scholarship to gain an understanding of the 
forms of peace that are emerging in post-conflict zones in Africa which are quite different 
from the idea of a universal liberal peace that the internationals have been imposing in 
such zones. In addition, this has not been comprehensively addressed in the context of 
post-conflict societies in Africa. Yet, much contemporary peace support operations are 
taking place in such post-conflict environments. These environments are characterised by 
multiple sources of legitimacy, authority and sovereignty.3  Individuals, especially in rural 
societies, tend to subscribe more to non-state and non-territorial forms of political 
institutions which are more relevant to them than the state.  
 
Hybridity is not a new phenomenon in post-colonial societies, (from Latin America to 
Africa hybrid political systems, multiple sovereignties, legitimacy and authority have 
existed since colonial rule). What appears to be new however is the hybridisation that is 
taking place in the context of contemporary peace support operations in post-conflict 
societies. Such societies have become “laboratories” of the liberal peace within which the 
subject in the experiment is proving his/her ability to express agency in the context of 
structural constraints, despite internationals’ promises that the experiments are aimed at 
finding a “cure” for the “strangeness” that led to the subject’s predicament (Pugh 2011). 
The concept of agency has been associated with a number of terms including resistance, 
“selfhood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, initiative, freedom, and 
creativity” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 962). In this thesis I adopt Ahearn’s (2001: 962) 
                                                           
3
  For a discussion of multiple sources of sovereignty and authority in Africa see Engel and Oslen 
(2010) and Lund (2006)  
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provisional definition of agency as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act”. Such a 
definition of agency does not limit it to persons, but may also include social groups and 
ancestors.  
 
The thesis links critical literature on the liberal peace to African studies literature, 
especially one that explores pre-colonial political institutions and processes of state 
formation, the colonial state, the post-colonial state and the continued existence and formal 
recognition of tradition- and custom-oriented forms of legitimacy and authority in Africa. 
It is crucial to take such a long historical perspective since pre-colonial and colonial 
inheritance, and post-colonial experiences have to some extent influenced domestic politics 
in African states.  
 
The thesis employs hybridity as a conceptual approach in understanding the dynamics in 
post-conflict environments in the context of liberal peacebuilding (see chapter 4). 
Hybridity is increasingly becoming a key concept in the empirical study of contemporary 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. Although the idea of the liberal peace has been central to 
post-Cold War peace support operations in Africa, very little empirical work has been done 
on the interactions between the liberal peace and local cultural, political, social and 
peacebuilding practices, the forms of agency actors are expressing in these interactions, the 
forms of hybrid peace that are emerging from this and their usefulness in contributing to 
sustainable peace. This thesis sheds new light on how hybridity can be created “from 
below” as citizens do not engage in outright resistance, but express various forms of 
agency including partial acceptance and internalisation of elements of the liberal peace 
(including human rights, accountability, transparency, democracy and rule of law) that they 
find useful to them. Further, citizens also use these elements of the liberal peace to make 
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demands for reforms against state elites who they do not trust and often criticise for their 
pre-occupation with political survival and consolidation of power. It also argues that, in 
light of competing interests between various actors, and the close connection between 
central and local politics in countries such as Sierra Leone various forms of hybrid peace 
and politics have emerged, and not all of them can lead to sustainable peace. As such, it is 
crucial to embrace hybrid forms of peace that do not lead to the continued marginalisation 
and exclusion of most of the citizens. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis combines new theoretical perspectives on the liberal peace and fieldwork in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone in order to come up with options that could be essential for 
promoting lasting peace in war-torn societies. It is based on a critical theoretical and 
methodological approach since such an approach’s underlying assumptions are suitable for 
providing an understanding of how the liberal peace is interacting with the “local”, the 
forms of agency that the “local” is expressing resulting from these interactions and the 
hybrid forms of peace that emerge largely due to these interactions. In addition, the 
approach recognises that ordinary people in post-war environments play an active, agentive 
role in contemporary peacebuilding and are not mere passive recipients of the liberal peace 
model.  
 
Mainstream International Relations (IR) theories such as liberalism and realism, with their 
focus on the state and its institutions, world order, the international system, the dynamics 
of power, war and state sovereignty fail to expose embedded power structures as well as 
tend to marginalise most of the population and perspectives in conflict, post-conflict 
situations and poor countries, in general, thus effectively silencing their accounts that could 
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be essential in improving their situation. By adopting a critical methodological approach, 
this thesis places the experiences of those who live on the “margins of the state” at the 
centre rather than margins of research on peace, at the same time taking into account the 
inequalities, forms of exclusion and oppression as well as power structures that exist in 
these “margins of the state”.4  
 
In contrast to orthodox IR theories, critical theory as a method of examination, according 
to Cox “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came 
about” and as such, it “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted 
but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether 
they might be in the process of changing” (1981: 129). Cox makes a significant 
contribution to ascend of critical theory in IR. He (1981: 128) observes that, “Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose”. All knowledge, for critical theorists, is not 
neutral, but tends to reflect the observer’s interests. As such, it is always biased since the 
social perspective of the observer determines how it is produced (Jackson and Sorenson 
1999). Theory cannot be divorced from socio-political life. It is crucial to recognise the 
background and context in which it is produced and used, and also whether the user intends 
to use it to maintain or change the status quo. In this regard, it is hard to maintain the fact-
value dichotomy. A critical approach rejects the three basic tenets of positivism: “an 
objective external reality; the subject/object distinction and value-free social science” 
(Jackson and Sorensen 1999: 248). As Seale (1999: 21) notes, “Positivist social scientists 
                                                           
4
  The margins of the state are “places where state law and order continually have to be established”, 
where the state’s control of the people and territory is contested and limited, where non-state actors take the 
state’s responsibility of security, social control and order, and where people are considered to be not well 
socialised into the law and order of the state (Asad 2004: 279; Das and Poole 2004). As Das and Poole (2004: 
8) note, the margins of the state are “simultaneously sites where nature can be imagined wild and 
uncontrolled and where the state is constantly refounding its modes of order and lawmaking. These sites are 
not merely territorial: they are also, and perhaps more importantly, sites of practice on which law and other 
state practices are colonised by other forms of regulation that emanate from the pressing needs of populations 
to secure political and economic survival.”  
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have attempted to replicate the success of the natural scientists in controlling the natural 
world, and so have been committed to approaches perceived to be characteristic of natural 
science”. Theories, in this case, are separated from observable facts so that their truth “can 
be tested in a world of these independently existing facts” (Seale 1999: 21). However, 
critical theorists argue that the prevailing order should not be viewed as rational, inevitable 
and unchangeable, but a “construction of time and place” and thus historical, for instance, 
“the international system is a specific construction of the most powerful states” (Jackson 
and Sorensen 1999: 248).  
 
Cox distinguishes between problem-solving and critical theory. Problem-solving theory, 
Cox (1981: 128) notes, “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework of 
action.” Since problem-solving theory is closely tied to the existing order, it tends to 
reinforce it. In addition, it does not question the origins of that order and the degree to 
which this order contributes to the problem. In this regard, it cannot lead to knowledge of 
human emancipation. Critical theory is also differentiated from problem-solving by its 
interest in human emancipation, the need to criticise as well as remove various forms of 
domination that inhibit human freedom, social justice and equality. For Cox (1981) it is 
interested in emancipation since it questions the status quo and aims at bringing about an 
alternative order. This relates to recognising a person’s autonomy, free will, enhancing 
their freedom from conditions of oppression and self-determination, among others. Unlike 
problem-solving theory that tend to serve particular interests (for example, state and 
nation), critical theory attempts to capture those aspects of culture, custom, tradition, 
history and local contexts that can lead to human emancipation and in the context of this 
study, to sustainable peace in post-war societies.   
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The use of critical theory in this study is important for supporting arguments advocating 
the need to go beyond the liberal peace in order to come up with a framework that creates 
space for voices other than those of state and international elites. Such an approach allows 
for peacebuilding that “neither dismisses nor denies structural factors, but allows a range of 
voices to speak” (Lowe and Short 1990 cited in England 1994: 81). Current international 
concern and responsibility for the “people” in post-conflict environments of the developing 
world is secondary since internationals put much emphasis on strengthening post-war 
states which they recognise as legitimate actors in the international system neglecting most 
of the population’s needs. This inability of the liberal peace to engage with the “people”,  
culture, needs, politics and peacebuilding practices can contribute to the creation of “a 
‘predatory’ peace to the benefit of the elites and a global noble caste and leaving untold 
poverty and suffering in its path” (Escobar 2004: 214).  
 
By advocating a critical approach I do not mean that the state is not important since its role 
as the provider of security and social welfare is still essential. However, it is crucial to 
identify local knowledge, responses and understandings that offer alternatives to the 
prevailing liberal peacebuilding framework as well as peacebuilding initiatives that are 
legitimised by the consent of local actors and also based on the state’s ability to become a 
provider of welfare and basic services. By stressing the agency of individuals and 
communities in post-conflict societies, I hope to move away from the perspective of such 
actors as objects and victims who are not in a position to deal with constraining structural 
forces including, custom, tradition, economics, politics or environment. As such, this thesis 
“deconstructs” the liberal peace discourse that tends to construct peace in universal terms 
without reference to local forms of peace and how local responses to the “universal peace” 
are shaping the peace process on the ground.  
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Sierra Leone is the case study of this thesis. My choice of Sierra Leone is due to the fact 
that it is a major case of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding in Africa that has 
witnessed the United Kingdom (UK), the US, the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), European Union (EU), World Bank and the UN, among others 
employing intrusive approaches. Although peace remains fragile in Sierra Leone, its 
experience as a “collapsed state” that “came back from the dead” makes it an interesting 
case study (Chege 2002: 148). Today, Sierra Leone is regarded as a success story of 
contemporary peacebuilding. Yet, most of the underlying causes of the conflict including 
poverty, unemployment, corruption and social injustice remain largely unaddressed. 
 
The Qualitative Approach 
This thesis advocates a critical position that attempts to identify the preferences, capacities, 
responses and agency of the people in post-conflict environments and how the forms of 
agency they are expressing as a result of their interactions with the liberal peace are 
shaping the peacebuilding process on the ground. As such, it rejects the mainstream 
position that views post-war societies as merely objects of interventions. It adopts a 
research methodology that does not treat them as objects of research, but subjects who can 
be engaged with. Such an approach that emphasises dealing with the direct experience of 
research participants in specific contexts allows them to speak for themselves and may 
help establish peacebuilding initiatives that are more relevant to them.  
 
This study uses a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach enables me to obtain in-
depth information on local actors’ experiences, beliefs, perceptions, viewpoints, values and 
feelings about post-war peace interventions in Sierra Leone, and questions relating to these 
cannot be answered by quantitative research since it puts emphasis on quantification in the 
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collection and analysis of data (Bryman 2004). Qualitative research, according to Bryman 
(2004), is a research strategy that tends to put more emphasis on words than quantification 
in both the collection and analysis of data.5 He further notes that qualitative research is 
distinguished from quantitative research in the following: 1) it “predominantly emphasises 
an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which the 
emphasis is placed on the generation of theories”; 2) it “has rejected the practices and 
norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular in preference for an 
emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world”; and 3) it 
“embodies a view of social reality as constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ 
creation” (2004: 20). As such, it offers a relativist epistemology (Rathbun 2008). From this 
approach, knowledge is said to be subjective and contextual. In addition, a researcher 
should be considered as part of the research setting who “must engage in reflexive and 
self-critical dialogue” (Gray 2009: 168).   
 
Criticisms of Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research has been criticised for being “unscientific”, too subjective and 
imprecise which means, its data is subjected to various interpretations, for not being easy 
to replicate, for lacking transparency and for having problems of generalisation (Bryman 
2004; Gray 2009). For critics, the data collected through the use of qualitative techniques 
such as interviews is subjective and imprecise due to its over reliance on “the researcher’s 
often unsystematic views about what is significant and important, and also upon the close 
personal relationships that the researcher frequently strikes up with the people studied” 
(Bryman 2004: 284). Since qualitative research is based in one context, it has been 
                                                           
5
  Bryman (2004: 19) uses the concept of research strategy to mean “a general orientation to the 
conduct of research”. 
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criticised for lacking generalisability – the idea that findings from a specific context do not 
apply broadly to other localities.  
 
Reliability and validity have been central concepts in debates over the credibility of 
qualitative research. Joppe (2000 cited in Golafshani 2003: 598) defines reliability as  
 
…The extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation 
of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a 
study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is 
considered to be reliable.  
 
The definition raises the question whether research findings are replicable. Creswell and 
Miller (2000: 124) define validity as “how accurately the account represents participants’ 
realities of the social phenomenon and is credible to them”. In response to these criticisms, 
Golafshani (2003) has argued that concepts of validity and reliability are rooted in a 
positivist perspective and emerged from a quantitative tradition. The quantitative research 
criteria have had a significant influence on these criticisms of qualitative research (Bryman 
2004). To avoid biases and enhance varied constructions of realities, at the same time 
acknowledging that no research methodology is completely objective, I engaged in 
multiple research techniques including observation, interviews and conversations (multiple 
triangulation), researched in multiple sites, what Gray (2009) calls “space triangulation” as 
well as interviewed actors from diverse backgrounds operating at various levels of society. 
 
Multiple Fieldwork Sites 
I conducted fieldwork at multiple sites in western, southern and eastern areas of Sierra 
Leone (Freetown – western area, Kenema and Kailahun – eastern areas, and Bo, Mattru 
Jong and Sierra Rutile – southern areas) from the end of November 2009 to mid-December 
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2009 and November 2010 with the aim of obtaining a wide range of perspectives, reactions 
and perceptions relating to the participants’ experiences regarding post-war liberal 
peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives in the country. Researching in multiple sites 
enabled me to reach the “margins of the margins” (Tsing 1993), in this case, Kailahun, 
Mattru-Jong and Sierra Rutile. My choice for these sites was to a larger extent based on 
questions of accessibility and the availability of local contacts willing to help me access 
respondents including ex-combatants and Paramount Chiefs.  
 
In addition I considered other factors: 1) Freetown is the administrative capital of the 
country and also a key political, economic and social centre. International actors are based 
in Freetown and a number of local NGOs have their head offices in the city; 2) Kenema is 
the third largest city and capital of the Eastern province, and in Kenema the district 
council, city council and the chiefdom interact on a day-to-day basis. In addition, it was 
one of the areas that were severely affected by the civil war; 3) As for Kailahun, it was by 
chance. My host invited me to attend a community leadership workshop he was conducting 
with community leaders at Kailahun district headquarters. I accepted his invitation 
considering that the Sierra Leonean civil war started in the district and that it was “the last 
to achieve peace” (Taylor-Smith 2009: 23)6 as this would allow me to access a number of 
community leaders at the workshop. It lies on the “margins of the margins” sharing borders 
with Liberia and Guinea; 4) Bo is the second largest city in Sierra Leone. Similar to 
Kenema, it is under a chiefdom with the district council, city council and the chiefdoms 
interacting on a day-to-day basis; 5) Sierra Rutile featured prominently in my interviews 
during my first fieldwork in 2009 that was largely based in Freetown so I needed to go and 
research on what had been raised in the interviews regarding poverty, exclusion, 
                                                           
6
  Taylor-Smith points out that it was the last to achieve peace in the sense that the district was the last 
to be declared to be “safe and arms free during the peace process” (2009: 23). 
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marginalisation, “ignorant” landowners selling their land to a foreign rutile mining 
company (Sierra Rutile) and who could not think of any other legitimate authority except 
their chiefs; and 6) Mattru-Jong is the Bonthe District headquarters and houses a local 
council that has been labelled a “rainbow” district council since councillors are from the 
three main political parties in the country, at the same time, it has witnessed an intense 
conflict between the Paramount Chief of Jong Chiefdom and the district council chairman.  
 
In these sites I either lived with a host family or at a guest house close to a host/contact 
which enabled me to interact a lot with them and other people. This proved to be useful 
since my day-to-day interaction and relationships with my host families, their extended 
families, friends and neighbours offered me an opportunity to understand the context for 
my research. This included the everyday struggles for survival of ordinary Sierra 
Leoneans, their resilience, coping strategies, humanism, hospitality and their disapproval 
of corruption by government officials, at the same time, tolerating forms of corruption that 
are beneficial to the extended family. I was also able to gain some understanding of their 
commitment to community and building relationships, public expressions of religious 
tolerance and hidden tensions between Christians and Muslims, their lack of trust of state 
elites/politicians and their frustration with the government’s failure to provide basic 
services such as sanitation, good feeder roads, water, electricity and health services. In 
addition, host families/contacts in all the field sites were very useful in helping me reflect 
on the issues as well as to understand some of the cultural and customary issues which 
were important in gaining access to Paramount Chiefs, sub-chiefs and Tribal Authorities 
(TAs),7 for instance, the payment of a “shake hand” to chiefs.8  
                                                           
7
  In Sierra Leone, Tribal Authorities represent twenty tax payers and are found in all chiefdoms. 
Depending on the size of the chiefdom, a chiefdom can have more than 1 000 Tribal authorities, for example, 
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It is also crucial to note that, my travel by road from Monrovia (Liberia) to Freetown on 
the 27th of November 2009 helped me to interact with ordinary people in public transport, 
observe and experience the situation on the ground. The journey from Bo Waterside (Sierra 
Leonean border) to Kenema (80 miles) was 13 hours, a result of a combination of an un-
roadworthy taxi and a bad road. Yet, it was useful in helping me observe and reflect on the 
“struggles after the struggle” of ordinary Sierra Leoneans, despite the liberal peace’s 
promises of a peace that is beneficial to everyone. The taxi had more than five breakdowns 
and had to be push-started several times when its engine stalled. At times we had to walk 
because it could not make it uphill road since the road had potholes or was slippery. As we 
were about to reach Kenema, a front tyre burst.  
 
We were 11 passengers inside the taxi, an old Peugeot 504 station wagon with two 
passengers in the front seat, eight in the back and one in the boot. In addition, there was 
one passenger, two “car boys” and luggage on the roof.9 There was a time the driver failed 
to negotiate a pot-hole resulting in the taxi veering off the road into a muddy ditch. We 
struggled for more than 30 minutes to get it out of the ditch until an NGO 4x4 vehicle 
came to our rescue. I decided to take pictures of the taxi in the ditch. Local passengers 
encouraged me to do so pointing out that I should show the pictures to the world so that it 
knows that “this is how we are living. We are suffering”, at the same time expressing their 
frustration and anger with a corrupt government which was failing to build good roads. 
Indeed, qualitative research in Sierra Leone gave me an opportunity to connect with 
respondents at a human level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the Nongowa Chiefdom in Kenema (group interview, Tribal Authorities, 28 November 2009). In addition, 
Tribal authorities act as chiefdom councillors and elect the Paramount Chief.    
8
  A “shake hand” is a gift in the form of money that a person gives to the chief when he/she meets 
him for the first time, before he/she informs the chief his/her purpose of visit.  
9
  A “car boy” is a man/young man who among others assists the driver when the car/truck develops a 
mechanical problem. In Freetown they are called “apprentices” and include commuter bus conductors. 
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Data Collection Techniques in the Field 
The fieldwork involved observing, empathising, talking and listening to people as well as 
the use of a wide range of documentary sources including newspapers, government and 
NGO documents. The qualitative research approach I employed entailed the use of 
multiple methods that allowed respondents to speak for themselves and provide a 
contextual explanation of the post-conflict situation in the country. This allowed me to 
capture respondents’ feelings, perceptions and experiences in post-war Sierra Leone. 
Although the use of multiple methods is “demanding and expensive in time and resources”, 
the advantage of using it is that it helps produce “stronger theories than multiple 
replications and permutations of the same method” (Klandermans, Staggenborg and 
Tarrow: 2002: 316). In addition, the use of multiple methods of data collection also helped 
me to avoid biases such as, my own positionality10 and dominant respondent bias in group 
interviews as well as identify gaps in the data. The research used ethnographic techniques, 
particularly participant observation, unstructured interviews, conversations and group 
discussions/interviews to gain an understanding of the people’s experiences of 
peacebuilding. 
 
Interviews 
 In total I conducted seventy one face-to-face individual interviews with a wide range of 
participants including an academic, a teacher, Paramount Chiefs, sub-chiefs, TAs, ex-
combatants, international organisations, government officials, political parties, individuals, 
journalists, youth leaders, religious leaders, women activists/leaders, trade unions and local 
NGOs (see appendix 1). The selection of participants was quite purposely aimed at 
gathering information from a wide range of people in order to understand their experiences 
                                                           
10
  For instance, I come from a highly patriarchal society that is biased towards women and during my 
fieldwork, I had to talk to women activists and discuss with them issues related to their social position.  
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of peacebuilding initiatives in the country, customary peacebuilding approaches, the 
interactions between the “local” and the liberal peace, the forms of agency and hybrid 
peace(s) that are emerging in these interactions.  
 
As with unstructured interviews, I raised questions about participants’ own experiences 
which allowed them to respond freely with me raising new questions as I followed up their 
responses, at the same time, ensuring that this was in line with my research objectives.11 
The interview process was quite flexible as the aim was to gain a “genuine access to the 
world views” of the participants (Bryman 2004: 322). The interviews typically lasted 
between 10 minutes and one hour but sometimes up to two hours, and covered a broad 
range of issues depending on the respondent’s experience or expertise, including human 
rights, democracy and good governance, rule of law, economic liberalisation, media, civil 
society and security as well as their views about the state and internal politics, customary 
approaches to peacebuilding in the country. In addition to face-to-face interviews, I had 
email interviews with two Sierra Leoneans who I had not managed to interview during my 
fieldwork. 
 
Group Discussions/Interviews 
Lewis (1992: 413) defines a group interview as “a group conversational encounter with a 
research purpose”. Due to the communal nature of “up country” life in Sierra Leone a 
number of individual interviews ended up being group interviews.12 This included my 
interviews with two Commercial Bike Riders Associations, a TA and a Local Unit 
Commander – police (LUC), a deputy youth leader and an employee of a community radio 
                                                           
11
  Most interviews were conducted this way, except for group discussions in Kailahun (see appendix 
2). 
12
  Sierra Leoneans use the term “up country” to refer to places including towns outside of Freetown. 
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station in the three rural sites.13 The group interviews ranged between two and six 
participants. On the 12th of November 2010, I had group discussions in Kailahun involving 
community leaders attending a community leaders training. A total of seventeen 
participants attended the workshop and with the support of the workshop organisers we 
divided them into three groups (two groups had six participants and the third had five 
participants). Each group was given 15 minutes to respond to six questions (see appendix 
2). Afterwards, each group made a presentation in plenary and followed by discussions, 
though the discussions were short due to limited time. I also had a group interview with 
five participants from an opposition political party, People’s Movement for Democratic 
Change (PMDC) in Bo. 
 
Lewis has noted that group interviews have several advantages over individual interviews 
including helping “to reveal consensus views, may be used to verify research ideas or data 
gained through other methods and may enhance reliability of [respondents’] responses” 
(1992: 413). However, in the case of my research, group interviews which involved men 
and women had a limitation since women were silent in most of the interviews. For 
instance, in Kailahun women were less involved in the discussions than men with the risk 
that most of the ideas were coming from a dominant group. As with my group interview 
with PMDC officials, out of the five participants in the group I interviewed, one was a 
woman who was quiet most of the interview, despite a male participant inviting her to 
contribute. In this case, individual interviews with women helped me to do deal with this 
weakness of the group interview technique. In addition, a number of respondents were 
deeply suspicious of me as a researcher. As such, in some group interviews when a 
                                                           
13
  I wanted to do an individual interview with an LUC of the police at one of the sites however he 
invited three other police officers to join him. I noticed that the junior officers could not freely express 
themselves which could have been due to the power relations between them and the LUC. 
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participant said something that other(s) felt was sensitive he/she was told to be careful 
since “you do not know who you are talking to”. In this case, the issue of trust was 
essential in getting information from respondents, for example, during a group interview 
with three members of the Commercial Bikers Union in one of the districts, the vice-
chairman of the association often warned others about giving sensitive information. Such 
warnings affected the tone of the participant’s discussion. 
 
Overt Participant Observation 
Participant observation is another valuable research technique that I utilised in the 
collection of data. Schutt (2004: 277) defines participant observation as a “qualitative 
method for gathering data that involves a sustained relationship with people while they go 
about their normal activities”. As noted above, during most of my fieldwork I lived with 
families which helped me to interact with them a lot in their day-to-day activities and these 
interactions including deep conversations with ordinary Sierra Leoneans had a lot of 
influence on my analysis. In places like Bo where there is a serious shortage of water I had 
to use the infamous bucket bath just like other “family members”. Indeed, sharing their 
experiences with them was useful since it led them to accept me and to freely express 
themselves about their situation. As Koegel (1987 cited by Schutt 2004: 282), “By 
observing people and interacting with them in the course of their normal activities, 
participant observers seek to avoid the artificiality of experimental designs and the 
unnatural structured questioning of survey research”. In addition, such an approach does 
not pre-suppose a researcher’s position of control. I also used this method at a traditional 
reconciliation ceremony in Mattru-Jong and the launch of the Political Parties Registration 
Commission (PPRC)’s strategic plan for 2010-2013 in Bo that was attended by various 
political parties and a number of state officials. In addition, at the PPRC meeting I gave a 
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five minute talk on my research as well as raised issues on politics, tolerance and peace in 
order to make my talk relevant to the context.  
 
Gaining Access 
In recruiting participants, I contacted Dennis Gbambor James, a Sierra Leonean and a 
former classmate at the University of Leeds who put me in contact with his friends and 
family in the country, who then introduced me to other prospective participants. This had a 
snowball effect.14 In addition, I recruited some of the NGO participants via email, 
especially those with email addresses on their websites as well as via the Transitional 
Justice Network Forum which I subscribe to. However, I found the use of contacts in 
recruiting respondents quite helpful since most of the NGOs I contacted via email did not 
respond. I had no difficulties in obtaining interviews from those individuals and NGOs I 
got introduced to by local contacts. The existence of reciprocity, a system of mutual 
obligations in Sierra Leone meant that the snowball approach for recruiting participants 
was quite suitable. In addition, the question of trust was essential in such a post-conflict 
situation. The use of contacts to gain access enabled me to access hard-to-reach 
participants such as former combatants as well as chiefs and two government officials 
whose offices were based at State House. One ex-combatant told me that he agreed to the 
interview because of the good relations he had with my contact.  
 
I avoided tape-recording as a number of people felt very uncomfortable with being 
recorded. Instead I took notes during interviews. Although note-taking was tedious and 
also it was difficult to capture all that was said in an interview, it allowed respondents to 
                                                           
14
  Schutt (2004: glossary/index 1-30) defines snowball sampling as “A method of sampling in which 
sample elements are selected as they are identified by successive informants or interviews”. 
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freely express themselves. The main challenges in the fieldwork included the need to build 
trust with respondents, especially ex-combatants as well as working out on biases and lies 
from some respondents. For instance, a Member of Parliament (MP) who claimed that, 
what motivated him to become an MP was the need to represent the interests of the 
suffering people in his constituency and that he has been working hard to achieve this, only 
to find out from the electorate in his constituency that he lived in Freetown and had not 
done anything to improve their situation since he became an MP in 2007.  
 
In order to avoid the danger of producing biased samples that would negatively affect the 
outcome of my research, I did not employ one recruitment method and also that my 
research targeted a wide range of respondents, as noted above. In addition, I had a number 
of contacts who referred me to different groups of people. A central principle of my 
research, as noted above, was triangulation, using multiple sources to verify the 
information collected.  
 
In addition to the above methods, during my fieldwork I did not have an opportunity to 
interview other important actors in the liberal peace project in Sierra Leone such as the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Integrated 
Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). I had to make use of reports and 
information on their websites.  
 
Data Analysis 
During my fieldwork I did data analysis as I collected the data. In this case, I used an 
iterative process, a reflexive process that was aimed at gaining insights and meaning-
making. I had to think and reflect on emerging themes as respondents narrated their stories 
about their experiences in post-war Sierra Leone. In this case, I was able to identify issues 
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that needed follow-up, at the same time, reflecting on the relevance of the information I 
collected to my research agenda – which I consider part of data analysis. Conversations 
with my host and contacts helped me a lot to reflect on the issues. Data analysis, in this 
case, was an ongoing process meaning that I did not wait until the end of fieldwork to start 
analysing it. As Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 2) notes, “We should never collect data 
without substantial analysis going on”. Once I collected data I identified common themes 
and patterns that emerged from it, and organised them into coherent categories. Some of 
the common themes that emerged were poverty, marginalisation, behaviour of political 
elites and chiefs, custom, corruption, political violence and ethno-politics. I had to do 
further analysis in order to identify additional patterns, meaning and connections between 
categories.  
 
This process is usually called coding. It involves reducing large chunks of data to 
manageable proportions – a form of “data simplification or reduction” (Coffey and 
Atkinson 1996: 2). I relied on manual analysis marking the text physically writing 
keywords on the margins. For Miles and Huberman (1994 cited Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 
27) codes are “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to ‘chunks’ of varying 
size – words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a 
specific setting […]”. The process forced me to read interview notes line-by-line making 
sense of the issues raised. Since no single approach to coding data exists, I did not use a 
single source of categories, but two: the fieldwork data (including participants’ 
perceptions, concerns and interpretations) and theoretical knowledge. In addition, I 
compared and contrasted among interview texts. This was due to the need to look at “who 
is saying what and in what context” (Barbour 2008: 217). I had to link the codes together 
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in order to figure out the common themes emerging from the text constantly referring back 
to the original interview texts ensuring rigorous analysis. In addition to this, I also analysed 
documents including government publications, NGO reports and policy documents, and 
newspaper articles. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Bryman (2004: 505) notes that we cannot ignore ethical issues in research because they 
“relate directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the disciplines that are 
involved.” My fieldwork involved accessing and interviewing a wide range of participants 
including former combatants, youth and women’s leaders who are marginalised and 
vulnerable, the use of contacts to access respondents as well as the use of interpreters in a 
post-conflict situation where the scars of the conflict are still visible. In such a study, 
respondents’ physical, social and psychological well-being may be adversely affected by 
their participation in the research including physical harm, humiliation, exclusion, shame 
or even death. As a researcher I also needed to consider how to deal with threats to my 
safety and well-being in such a fragile context. As such, it was important for me to 
consider carefully how to avoid harm to respondents or third parties, protect their rights, 
sensitivities, interests and privacy as well as my own safety.  
 
Since I was dealing with a number of participants who were vulnerable and marginalised, 
the research was guided by four main ethical issues: 1) voluntary participation; 2) 
participant well-being; 3) identity disclosure; and 4) confidentiality. Although my contacts 
negotiated for my access to participants I personally sought the respondents’ consent and 
also informed them about the purpose of my research as well as making them aware that 
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the discussions were confidential and their identities would not be disclosed, except if they 
consented to it. Initially, I had wanted respondents to read an information sheet that I had 
done regarding the purpose of my research and then sign a consent form, however, a 
number of them were not comfortable with signing the form and felt it contradicted the 
idea of anonymity. In addition, many people were not interested in reading the information 
sheet. Rather than continuing to give participants an information sheet to read, I decided to 
share with them the purpose of my research verbally. 
 
In addition, I applied what Kovats-Bernat (2002) has called a localised ethic which 
involved taking into account the local population’s advice and recommendations in making 
decisions about the types of conversations (and silences) that were important. For instance, 
a number of respondents were not keen to talk about secret society affairs, even their role 
in the provision of security, order, welfare and governance in their communities. In 
response, to my question regarding the role of secret societies in peacemaking and 
development, a Paramount Chief pointed out that if he told me about their activities 
“human rights people” would come after them so he had rather not talk about them. In 
addition, a TA told me that the government wants to ban them and also that there are risks 
involved for individuals who divulge information about them. As such, I decided to avoid 
raising questions relating to secret societies in my interviews and had to rely much on what 
has been written about them by other scholars and the media. In order to protect the 
respondents, I do not use their names, except where one consented to it or gave the 
information at a public meeting. 
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Limitations of the Study  
The thesis has its own shortcomings. Fieldwork was carried out in the southern and eastern 
areas (the opposition, SLPP stronghold) and the Western area of Freetown, the 
administrative capital of the country and also a key political, economic and social centre, 
and this meant the views and perspectives of villagers from the north (the ruling party, 
APC stronghold) were not captured. This compromises the extent to which the research 
can be generalised. As such, I do not claim that my research findings can be used as a basis 
for generalisations about post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone as a whole. As a 
“stranger” (an outsider), I was limited in terms of language, culture, traditions and 
customs, among others. For instance, most people in the hinterland spoke either Creole or 
Mende (sometimes respondents mixed Creole and English), even at public meetings. In 
order to get an understanding of the issues being discussed I often asked a contact or 
participant at a public meeting seating next to me to explain them to me. As for interviews 
with participants who did not speak English, I made use of one Creole interpreter and three 
Mende interpreters. The interpreters were also valuable in helping me to reflect on the data 
collected, although it was difficult to know whether they were censoring some of the 
information. The use of interpreters was done with the consent of participants. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 provides a broad historical overview of political organisation in the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial periods and the challenges that a number of post-colonial 
African states are facing including that of building viable states and sustainable peace. It 
also defines concepts including democracy, law, human rights and development.  Chapter 
2 discusses the concepts of peacebuilding and statebuilding. It argues that the two concepts 
are distinct and should not be conflated. Drawing from Richmond (2005), it provides a 
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framework of the liberal peace. Chapter 3 is a review of literature on the liberal peace 
agenda in post-conflict environments bringing out the polarisation between mainstream 
and critical scholars. Chapter 4 discusses the emerging critical literature that argue for the 
need to shift from merely criticising the liberal to engaging with local contextual matters 
through examining local and contextual responses to the liberal peace including identifying 
the forms of peace that are emerging as the liberal and the “local” interact. The chapter 
also offers a theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter 5 discusses historical factors that 
laid a weak foundation for the modern state in Sierra Leone. It examines scholarly debates 
on the immediate causes of state failure/collapse and the civil war and its aftermaths. In 
chapter 6, drawing on the theory chapters and fieldwork I discuss the practical application 
of the liberal peace in Sierra Leone, the local dynamics, hybrid forms of peace that are 
emerging or may emerge as the liberal peace interacts with local political and social forces 
and local forms of peace. It notes that dynamics on the ground have hindered the full 
realisation of the liberal peace. In addition, in more remote areas customary peacebuilding 
has operated in parallel to mainstream peacebuilding. Finally, largely drawing on the case 
study the concluding part offers the conclusions of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1: From Pre-colonial to Post-colonial Governance in 
Africa 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical overview of political organisation in the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial periods and the challenges that a number of post-colonial African 
states are facing including that of building viable states and sustainable peace. It will show 
that since the colonial encounter, Africans were not given an opportunity to define the world 
from their own position and existential realities, but this was done for them and continues in 
modern Africa. It is also important to understand how externally imposed policies including 
liberalisation policies have contributed to the restructuring of African societies and how this 
has contributed to instability in these societies.   
 
This chapter focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, that is, Africa in the South of the Sahara 
(hereafter called Africa). This does not mean that there have not been any close historical 
links between parts of North Africa and parts of West-Africa, or between countries such as 
Sudan and Egypt (Nugent 2004). However, the dynamics of North Africa are quite different 
(Nugent 2004) and it has strong linguistic and cultural links with the Arab world. While 
acknowledging that Africa is a vast continent with a diverse population, religion, custom, 
ethnicity, culture, economies, politics, and so on, I also recognise the existence of certain 
commonalities in these African societies, for instance, in the areas of customs and traditional 
practices which to a greater extent influence  political organisation in most of these societies.  
 
In this chapter, traditional institutions/authorities/societal structures are not understood as 
fixed and essential entities, but continue to be reshaped through decades of interaction with 
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the state, and other social and external forces.15 A discussion of this in the context of Sierra 
Leone would be insufficient without situating it within the broader debate on traditional 
belief/societal structures/institutions/authorities in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The first section relies on basic generalisations about traditional African political 
organisation, although a number of cases will be cited from Sierra Leone. By these 
generalisations it is hoped that I will be able to provide an understanding of the common 
elements in traditional systems of government found across Africa. The second part of the 
chapter discusses the nature of the colonial state. It also offers generalisations about its nature 
and the impact of colonialism on African societies. The fourth section discusses the nature of 
the post-colonial state, its crisis from its inception and external intervention. In this context, 
the use of the term “state” in the singular as in colonial state or post-colonial state reflects the 
similarities found in these states that significantly influence their political culture. 
 
Pre-colonial Political Institutions and Governance in Africa 
Colonisation in Africa witnessed alien state systems being imposed on the existing local 
political institutions. Yet, these pre-colonial institutions have survived the colonial and post-
colonial onslaught, though they have continued to exist in hybrid forms due to their 
interactions with external political and religious institutions, especially, from the West and 
Middle East. Political organisation in pre-colonial Africa was quite diverse with various 
societies that had different polities, culture and traditions, among others.  
 
                                                           
15
  In this thesis the concept traditional will be used interchangeably with customary. 
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States and Stateless Societies in Pre-colonial Africa 
Anthropologists, historians and political scientists studying the nature of early political and 
social organisations in Africa have divided them into two broad categories: 1) societies that 
had centralised power structures under kings and powerful chiefs; and 2) societies that were 
highly fragmented without centralised institutionalised political organisation (also called 
“stateless societies”) ruled by small chiefs, clan or lineage leaders (Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard 1940; Thomson 2000). 
 
In this regard, a state is defined in relation to the existence of centralised leadership and 
authority, judiciary and administrative machineries (a government) and “in which cleavages 
of wealth, privilege, and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority” (Fortes 
and Evans-Pritchard 1940: 5). While pre-colonial states had four units of governance – the 
chief (who was the central authority), an inner council (which advised the chief), the council 
of elders (which constituted heads of lineages) and a village assembly – “stateless” societies 
had only two institutions, namely, the council of elders and the village assembly (Ayittey 
1992). This is clear evidence that the so-called “stateless” societies had political institutions, 
though limited. As Thomson (2000) observes, the political system of such “stateless” 
societies were an outcome of attempts to build institutions that met the local communities’ 
needs and interests, and not a sign of backwardness as those who view absence of state 
institutions would want to believe. Thomson further notes that, “Considerable evidence of 
sophisticated forms of representation, justice and accountability among these communities 
has been unearthed” (2000: 8).  
  
State formation in Pre-colonial Africa 
A number of factors have been attributed to state formation in various pre-colonial African 
societies, among these are: 1) external trade – that led to the existence of an economic surplus 
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which enabled these societies to sustain their administrative machinery, for example, the 
trans-Saharan trade contributed to state formation and the building of states in Mali and 
Ghana (Thomson 2000); and 2) warfare and coercion as means to accumulate and maintain 
power, as in the case of the Kpaa Mende of Sierra Leone (Alie 1990).  
 
Most of these states had no fixed boundaries.16 As Thomson notes, “Power broadcast from 
the centre of a kingdom would dissipate the further a village was from the capital, and would 
ebb and flow according to the fortunes of the central administration” (2000: 9). These states 
were not hegemonic since low population densities made it difficult and expensive for 
governments to exert political authority to everyone within their domain (Herbst 2000; 
Thomson 2000). And without fixed boundaries it was easy for people disgruntled with their 
leaders to relocate and settle in areas outside the control of central authority. The process of 
state formation in pre-colonial Africa (and colonial as well as post-colonial Africa) has been 
quite different to that of Europe.  
 
In Europe state formation and consolidation resulted in fixed boundaries and governments 
that had overall political authority over their territories with war playing a significant role in 
the maintenance or expansion of territory (Herbst 1990; Huntington 1968; Thomson 2000; 
Tilly 1975). In reference to Europe, Tilly notes that, “War made the state, and the state made 
war” (1975: 42). Similarly, Huntington puts it: “War was the great stimulus to state building” 
and this arose as a result of two things: the need for security and an interest in expansion 
(1968: 123). War-making and empire building were crucial mechanisms for state formation 
in Europe. Three of the positive outcomes of war on state consolidation in Europe are: 1) 
efficiency in revenue collection; 2) an improvement in the leaders’ administrative 
                                                           
16
  Alie (1990) has noted that territorial states of the Mende of Sierra Leone had fixed boundaries. 
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capabilities; and 3) the growth of nationalism (Herbst 1990). The process of war-making and 
empire building also resulted in either the destruction or significant improvements of less 
powerful states. In addition, threats of war enabled European states to bargain with their 
citizens for taxes. States were able to collect tax with much efficiency and without much 
public resistance since citizens tended to tolerate increased taxation during wars with other 
states given that “a threat to their survival will overwhelm other concerns they might have 
about increased taxation” (Herbst 1990: 120). As such, for Herbst threats to security resulted 
in citizens tolerating tax increases whenever their state was at war. And the more revenue the 
state had, the more it was going to prevent defeat. As with regard to the contribution of war to 
nationalism in Europe, Herbst observes that since there was a continuous external threat to 
citizens’ security there developed a common association between population and its state (a 
social contract) since they came to recognise that the sure way of dealing with an external 
threat was for them to be united as a nation.  
 
The 1648 peace treaty of Westphalia ended inter-state wars that have been waged for three 
decades in Europe and gave birth to the idea of a state as a sovereign territorial unit – the 
modern state. Milliken and Krause (2003: 4) note that in conceptual terms, the success of the 
European states in dealing with political order can be understood in three different, though 
interconnected ways: 1) in liberal terms as a process of establishing a social contract either 
between the rulers and their followers, or followers among themselves, with individuals 
accepting that their unlimited freedoms be limited and the state providing security to them so 
as to “live within a civil order that guaranteed security and which enjoyed therefore a certain 
political legitimacy”; 2) from a political economy perspective, as an efficient mechanism that 
promoted and protected property rights and the securing of markets that enhanced capitalism; 
and 3) “it can be seen as a more-or-less inadvertent process by which state elites, seeking to 
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consolidate their hold on power, acted as the equivalent of protection rackets, offering (often 
minimal) security in return for extraction, thus unleashing a long process that contributed to 
the development of the modern state”. Milliken and Krause (2003) further note that the above 
three interconnected narratives of the state do represent three core functions of the state: the 
provision of security, welfare and representation. This was not the case in Africa. However, 
this does not mean that ideas such as security, welfare, development, democracy, rule of law 
and human rights did not exist in pre-colonial Africa.  
 
Democracy 
Traditional political institutions in Africa have often been portrayed as undemocratic with the 
following characteristics: “secrecy, mystical religious beliefs, and outright autocracy” (Moran 
2006: 27). Although scholars do not agree on the meaning of democracy, there appears to be 
a consensus among them that ancient Greece (Athens in particular) is the source of Western 
democracy and political thought.17 In Athens democracy meant “rule by the people” as 
opposed to “autocracy” (rule by one man) and “oligarchy” (rule by the few) (Beetham and 
Boyle 1995). In theory, the form of democracy in Athens involved the direct participation of 
all citizens in the political process of Athens including speaking and voting in assembly. In 
practice not everyone participated since citizenship was restricted to “free-born males; […] 
exclud[ing] women, slaves and resident foreigners [...]” (Beetham and Boyle 1995: 6). This 
meant that only males could speak and vote in the assembly. The central defining 
characteristic of democracy here is the direct participation of all citizens – direct democracy.  
 
                                                           
17
  For a detailed discussion of classical and contemporary analyses of democracy see Blaug and 
Schwarzmantel (eds), (2000). 
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Since the classical times the idea and actual practice of democracy has changed. Dowden 
(1993: 607) describes the method of democracy that Julius Nyerere of Tanzania advocated as 
“an idyllic pastoralist democracy where everything was discussed and decided by consensus”. 
The key element of this form of democracy is consensus. Schumpter has critiqued what he 
calls the classical model of democracy which he defines as that “institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself 
decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its 
will” (1950: 250). For him, since people can make undemocratic decisions, decisions and 
policies should be left to their representatives. Schumpter defines the democratic method as 
“that institutional arrangement for arriving at a political decision in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1975: 269).  
 
Democracy in this case, is understood as the ability for people to elect their rulers. It also 
involves competition for people’s vote by individuals running for the most powerful political 
office. The key element of this idea of democracy is competitive elections. Schumpter’s 
perspective on democracy can be said to be a form of liberal democracy that emphasises “the 
democratic rule component” (Bollen 1993: 1209).  Two dimensions of liberal democracy 
have been emphasised: 1) the democratic rule; and 2) political liberties (Bollen 1993).  Bollen 
defines liberal democracy as “the extent to which a political system allows political liberties 
and democratic rule” (1993: 1208). He notes that, 
 
Political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to 
express a variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or 
participate in any political group. Democratic rule (or political rights) exists to the 
extent that the national government is accountable to the general population, and each 
individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through representatives 
(1993: 1208).  
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However, except for the definition of democracy that identifies democracy with consensus, 
the other definitions of democracy and liberal democracy noted above are historically and 
culturally specific to the West. Given this, a number of African scholars and politicians have 
examined certain political practices in pre-colonial African societies that could be considered 
democratic, among these are: “popular will, free expression of opinion, consensus and 
reconciliation, consultation and conferring, and the trusteeship, and [...] [the] limited nature 
of political power” (Gyekye 1997: 135). In this chapter, democracy (in the context of pre-
colonial governance) will be understood in this sense. Considering the fact that pre-colonial 
political organisations in Africa were not as developed or mature as the modern ones as well 
as keeping ancient Greek democracy in mind, the discussion of democracy here will focus on 
basic democratic features derived from the political practices of some communities in Africa. 
An examination of locally existing resources that could be crucial for building lasting peace 
in war-torn societies is in line with the emerging critical literature on the liberal peace (see 
chapters 3 and 4) and conflict transformation scholars’ argument that local socio-economic 
and human resources can play a critical role in creating conditions for durable peace (see 
Lederach 1997). The sections below will discuss several elements of democracy found in a 
number of African traditional societies that could be essential in post-conflict zones of Africa. 
 
Indigenous Checks against the Abuse of Power 
For critics of traditional African political practices, such political practices are undemocratic 
in nature since they lack competitive elections which enable people to choose their rulers. In 
most pre-colonial African societies citizens did not go through an election process in order to 
choose their rulers, given that the right to rule was hereditary, with a few people choosing the 
king or chief. For example, among the Mende of Sierra Leone, an Electoral College 
comprising of several prominent people in the state elected the king (Alie 1990). Although 
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among the Sherbro of Sierra Leone, the king’s position was not hereditary, but elected, the 
election was limited to a council of titular chiefs and was conducted in poro (men’s “secret 
society”) bush (Alie 1990). As such, these societies do not escape the above criticism for the 
reason that a few privileged people were allowed to elect the king. This non-elective 
character of the most powerful office in Sierra Leone’s traditional political systems (and 
other parts of Africa) is considered an anti-thesis of democracy.  
 
Critics have pointed out that without being elected into office by citizens, chiefs and kings 
had no political legitimacy since this could only be achieved through competitive elections 
that allowed citizens to choose their leaders. As for Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), besides a lack 
of competitive elections, competition for power was considered illegitimate and could be 
fatal. This criticism limits the understanding of democracy to the ability of people to elect 
into office their representatives through competitive elections.  
 
A number of African scholars have noted the existence of other democratic values and 
practices in most African societies including the limited character of the political authority of 
most African chiefs or kings (Wiredu 1996; Gyekye 1997, Mentan 2007). Although in a 
number of African societies, the chief or king, in theory, had enormous power, he was not 
always despotic and dictatorial since there were mechanisms that acted as checks and 
balances on his power. Various councils and institutions checked the chiefs or kings’ power 
and prevented corruption. The focus here will be on two institutions that checked the power 
of the chiefs or kings, particularly in Sierra Leone: the institution of the “secret society” and 
the chief or king’s council. 
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“Secret Societies” 
A vital social feature in Sierra Leone is the existence of “secret societies” such as, the Poro 
(men’s “secret” association) and the Sande/Bundu (women’s “secret” association).18  In 
Sierra Leone, the Poro is the dominant men’s society and is found among the Mende, 
Sherbro, Kpelle and Temne ethnic groups.  These “secret societies” emphasise secrecy in 
everyday life and formal associations (Murphy 1980). Traditionally, “secret societies” are 
powerful institutions that have played various political, medical, social, religious and legal 
functions including education, performing religious rituals, judicial and maintaining 
traditions. In the political context, one of their functions is to check the power of the kings or 
chiefs. Among the Temne, the senior Poro officials were part of the council that comprised of 
the king and his ministers which made top-level decisions (Alie 1990). Alie has also noted 
that among, the Sherbro, Poro officials played a vital role of instructing a new king on ethnic 
law and custom. In addition, Poro “inner circle” whose members included the king and top 
Poro officials had two functions, that of executive council and tribunal of their society (Alie 
1990).  
 
As such, the king or chief could not make unilateral decisions as he would face resistance 
from the “secret societies”. For instance, Fanthorpe notes that Paramount Chiefs who owed 
their positions to British patronage often made moves to consolidate their positions using any 
means available, however, Poro societies would coordinate resistance to such chiefs (2007). 
A good example in Sierra Leone is that of the widespread riots in the hinterland against 
Paramount Chiefs’ governance between November 1955 and March 1956 which according to 
                                                           
18
  Some scholars have questioned the use of the concept “secret society” to refer to such societies since 
initiates of these societies do not conceal their membership (Fanthorpe 2007) and every adult in his/her rural 
community is supposed to be a member of a “secret society”. For Abraham (1978) it is not conceivable for a 
society to be secret to its members, except to the non-initiates who are mainly children and outsiders. 
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the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces were coordinated by the 
men’s “secret societies” (1956).  
 
A number of criticisms have been levelled against secret societies, among them, is what Piot 
(1993: 354) calls a Marxist critique of secrecy which views it as “a means for social control 
in a system of power relations”. For instance, Murphy who has done research among the 
Kpelle society of Liberia has concluded that secret knowledge is both property and power 
among the Kpelle elders. By withholding secret knowledge elders are able to control the 
youth (or other subordinate groups). This, according to him, “supports the elders’ political 
and economic control of the youth” (or other subordinate groups) (Murphy 1980: 193). While 
this criticism enables us to understand how this could have led to youth alienation that 
contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone (chapter 5), it fails to investigate indigenous 
motivations for secrecy. There are other studies that have shown that in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, for instance, the weak have also used secrecy as means to control the powerful  with 
various forms of agency emerging (Shaw 2002, 2000; Moran 2006).19 Secrecy, Shaw (2000: 
38) notes, is also “important as part of a discourse of power and personhood in everyday 
situations”. She further notes that some practices of withholding secret knowledge are in 
response to domination the world over. Such strategies of concealment and evasion should be 
viewed as weapons of the less powerful against the dominant groups (Shaw 2000). In Sierra 
Leone it is largely attributed to the country’s violent past, particularly the Atlantic slave trade 
                                                           
19
  Shaw (2000) notes that among the Temne, relations of domination and subordination are dependent 
on asymmetries of power and this means the presence of different types of agency for those with various 
kinds of power. A person who withholds secret knowledge is considered powerful. Among the Temne, she 
identifies what she calls indirect agency or mediatory agency: “The agency of Temne husbands and “big 
men” is [...] paradoxical, because their most powerful actions are those indirectly accomplished (and often 
invisibly) through others. The agency of Temne wives and junior men, on the other hand, is also paradoxical, 
because their manifest actions are often subsumed by the agency of another, who acts through them. Yet this 
mediatory capacity of subordinates also enables the subordinates to block the agency of those who act 
through them: women, for example, can do this by refusing to cook or farm for their husbands” (Shaw 2000: 
45). 
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and colonial rule (Shaw 2002; Ferme 2001). It is crucial here to explore the positive aspects 
of this institution that could be useful in effectively checking the powers of local/national 
leaders at the same time dealing with their negative aspects that can lead to the 
marginalisation of weaker groups. 
 
Councils 
In a number of African traditional societies various councils checked the power of chiefs or 
kings, and prevented abuse of power and corruption. As with regard to the Temne, Alie 
(1990) observes that political power was shared among the O’bai (the King) who was the 
central figure, the Kapr Mesim (Prime Minister) who was the king’s chief adviser and 
intelligence officer and the Kapr (ministers). The chief could not take important decisions 
without first consulting the council which also included “secret society” officials. Similar 
observations have been made about the Akan of Ghana (Gyekye 1997) and the Oyo of 
Nigeria (Ergas 1987). Although in these societies governance centred on the person of the 
chief or the king, he/she could not decide on important issues without the advice and consent 
of his/her advisers. 
  
Consensus 
Besides councillors freely expressing themselves without fear of being vilified or executed, 
consensus was essential for decision-making. It has been noted that in the event that 
councillors disagreed with the king or chief, councillors would “talk till they agree[d]” 
(Clutton-Brock cited by Nyerere 1966: 103). This idea of talking until people agreed implies 
the existence of opposed views that required being reconciled (Wamala 2004). Consensus 
over substantive decisions was a central feature in most traditional African political 
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systems.20 Among the Mende of Sierra Leone consensus-building and participation was 
achieved through the practice of “hanging heads” – “a public sphere based, on a dialogics of 
compromise forged through both overt and covert consultation, of communal and sectarian 
interest, of civility” (Ferme 1999: 185, 1998). However, this does not mean that consensus 
was always attained, nor were such African societies living in harmony all the time (Wiredu 
1997). For instance, Ferme (1998) notes the existence of violent elements in practises such as 
“hanging heads”. This according to her includes “the suppression of decent that is necessary 
to reach the fiction of social consensus” (Ferme 1998: 557). She further notes that while 
violent elements exist in such processes as “hanging heads”, “their open-ended and 
provisional form is often better suited to hold conflict at bay than the finality of vote counts 
in competitive elctions” (Ferme 1998: 557).  
 
Consent by the People 
Although in a number of traditional African societies chiefs were chosen by a few people, as 
noted earlier and on the basis of hereditary entitlement, people had a say about a chief who 
was acceptable to them. In the context of the Temne of Sierra Leone, Ali (1990: 14) notes 
that, the chief was “subjected to various restrictions and taboos, and was expected to conduct 
himself in conformity with the injunctions and norms of secret society in charge of his 
position” to curb abuse of power.21 These injunctions are evidence that accountability and 
some form of social contract existed between the ruler and the governed in such societies.  
                                                           
20
  Eze (1997: 321) argues that consensus cannot be viewed as the ultimate goal of democracy, but as one 
moment of its outcomes. For Eze, democracy should be seen as a “market place of competing” ideas not just 
“consenting or consensing” ones (emphasis not mine). In addition, Eze is of the view that central authorities can 
still abuse the consensus system. 
21
  For an interesting discussion of the Akan of Ghana and their relation to their chiefs see Gykeye (1997). 
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Human Rights 
There appears to be a considerable amount of consensus that the historical origins of the 
human rights norms enshrined in the various international declarations and legal conventions 
such as, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), is in the West and are a 
result of Western histories, social and political thought. However, there is no consensus on 
the philosophical origins of the concept.  On one hand, there are scholars who have argued 
that conceptions and the philosophy of human rights existed in non-Western cultures as well, 
although some of the Western conceptions of human rights may not be similar to traditional 
understanding of human rights in Africa. On the other hand, there are scholars who deny the 
existence of human rights conceptions in pre-colonial African societies pointing out that 
those who claim that human rights exists in Africa confuses human rights with human dignity 
(Howard 1986; Howard and Donnelly 1986). Howard (1986: 23) notes that arguments for the 
existence of human rights in Africa fail to understand “the structural organisation and social 
changes in African society” resulting from colonialism and the continent’s incorporation into 
the capitalist world economy. Conceptions of human dignity in both social and political 
contexts, according to Howard and Donnelly (1986: 802), relate to “particular understandings 
of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) 
relations with society”. In contrast, human rights are claims that an individual can make 
against the state (Howard 1986). According to this view, all human beings have these 
entitlements by virtue of being human.   
 
Questions have also been raised regarding the applicability and validity of conceptions of 
human rights in Africa (Shivji 1989). For Howard (1986), although human rights conceptions 
have origins and a philosophical basis in the West, they have a universal applicability. She 
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further notes that, “All African societies are now state societies; local communal groups are 
subordinate to the national state” (1986: 218) and as such, human rights conceptions can now 
be applied to African societies.22 In this regard, the concept of human rights is viewed as an 
outcome of modern Western civilisation. 
 
A Communitarian Approach to Human Rights 
Contrary to the above, a number of scholars have argued that concepts of human rights are 
not universal, but culturally specific and as such, not unique to Western societies (wa Mutua 
1994, 1996; Motala 1988; Pollis and Schwab 1980). However, for these scholars the idea that 
individuals have rights against the state only exists in Western capitalist states, a result of the 
West’s historical circumstances (Pollis and Schwab 1980). Whereas in some societies human 
rights are grounded in the individual, in other societies they are rooted in the “group” (Pollis 
and Schwab 1980). These scholars have noted that human rights as envisaged in the West are 
not accepted in the developing world, including Africa since their philosophical basis is 
different and opposite (Shivji 1989).  According to this view, African traditional societies are 
communitarian in nature (as reflected in their philosophies of life, such as, ubuntu in Bantu 
speaking Africa), and in such societies, personhood is said to be rooted in a context of 
relationships (Mbiti 1969; Ramose 1999).23  
 
An individual is said to co-exist with others and at no level of existence is he/she exclusively 
alone and vice versa. The “I” is the result of the “we” and vice versa. Person and community 
are, in this case, defined relationally. Rosalind Shaw (2000) writing about the Temne of 
Sierra Leone points out that the full Temne term for “person”, “town-person” (w-uni ke-pet) 
                                                           
22
  For a similar argument see Donnelly (1982). 
23
  Ubuntu can be understood to mean humanness or being human. Some of its values include respect, 
sharing, caring, tolerance and empathy. It is a Zulu/Ndebele word which is used with the same meaning in a 
number of African languages and is more pronounced in Southern Africa where it is used in everyday 
interaction. 
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suggests the idea of personhood as rooted in a context of relationships. Shaw observes that 
“Temne evaluations of a person often use parts of the body as tropes for the capacity to relate 
to others: even though these tropes describe attributes, they are attributes that derive from a 
relational rather than an essentialist, attribute-based understanding of personhood” (2002: 
40). Hence, in such societies, a person can only become conscious of his own being, 
privileges, and duties towards himself and others through other people.  In other words, a 
person is not an island unto him/herself, he or she needs others. In addition, individuals in the 
community interact with each other for the benefit of the whole. Such individuals have 
agreed values, beliefs and objectives and often act to promote them in order to enhance 
stability, harmony and cohesion.  
 
Criticisms have been levelled against three claims that proponents of this communitarian 
view consider crucial for distinguishing between social organisation in African societies and 
that of the West. The three claims are: 1) the communal orientation of African societies 
which makes people in these societies to be more concerned with group rights than individual 
rights; 2) group consensus as a key to decision-making in politics;24 and 3) the economic 
aspect – the automatic re-distribution of wealth and the absence of the idea of private 
property, and with the haves being respected in so far as they distribute their wealth to the 
have-nots (Howard 1984; also see Kaballo 1995; Donnelly 1982).  
 
For the proponents of the communitarian view, economic as well as political rights were 
guaranteed in these societies. However, for the critics such claims fail to recognise, that 
culture is not static and it changes due to alterations in social and economic structures 
                                                           
24
  For instance, Wai (1980: 116) notes that there were checks and balances on the ruler with power 
generally dispersed as a means to “allow for a modicum of social justice and values concerned with individual 
and collective rights”. On a comprehensive discussion of the existence of political, economic, legal, religious 
and other rights in an African traditional society, the Akan of Ghana, see Wiredu (1996, chapter 12). 
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(Kaballo 1995; Howard 1984). For example, Kaballo (1995: 190) notes that in the modern 
context “African societies are not any more communal, consensual or egalitarian”. I consider 
such a view to be too simplistic and may be applicable to urban settings where globalisation 
has had a lot of impact on social organisation than the more conservative rural settings in 
most African communities where these values are still upheld, though to some extent affected 
by the changes critics have highlighted. Contrary to Howard (1994) and Kaballo (1995) there 
exists in a number of urban settings rural emigrants who have formed voluntary associations 
(some of them along tribal/kinship lines) that tend to integrate rural and urban expectations 
exhibiting some of these values including communal and consensus.  
 
Kaballo further argues that the idea of the distinctiveness of local values and traditions should 
be acceptable, only if it is compatible with “basic human rights standards” as they can easily 
be used as justification for authoritarian rule (1995: 191). Similarly, Howard notes that 
“Constant references to communal society can be, and are, used to mask systematic violations 
of human rights in the interests of ruling elites” (1984: 175). Does the fact that ruling elites in 
modern Africa have used notions of cultural relativism to mask their human rights abuses 
mean that this should be used as a justification for the non-existence of the concept and 
practice of human rights in traditional African societies?  
 
Law in Pre-colonial African Societies 
There are claims that there was no such thing as law in pre-colonial African societies. Such 
claims to some extent have been influenced by the writings of European missionaries, 
historians, philosophers, anthropologists and colonial administrators. For example, Hegel 
wrote that in Africa, 
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[…] history is in fact out of the question. Life there consists of a succession of 
contingent happenings and surprises. No aim or state exists whose 
development can be followed; and there is no subjectivity, but merely a series 
of subjects who destroy one another (1975: 176). 
 
Hegel never identified anything positive about Africans whose character he said was   
“difficult to comprehend, because it is so totally different from our own culture, and so 
remote and alien in relation to our mode of consciousness” (Hegel 1975: 176). While it is 
difficult to know what actually was the case in pre-colonial Africa given that no written 
records are available and oral tradition can be distorted, classical theorists, European 
missionaries, travellers and traders who argued that there was no law, history, democracy, 
human rights, and so on in African societies prior to European colonial rule tended to express 
their ethnocentric biases.  
 
Elias (1956: 25) identifies four schools of thought among Europeans regarding the debate on 
the existence of law in pre-colonial African societies – perspectives from the missionary, the 
administrative officer, the social anthropologist and the judicial official. The early Christian 
missionaries to Africa often described indigenous laws and custom as elements of 
“paganism” and pointed out that it was their duty to eliminate them in the name of Christian 
civilisation (Elias 1956: 25). Such early missionaries could not recognise or appreciate the 
role of custom, law and other practices in resolving conflicts as well as maintaining peace and 
order in African societies. As for the Administrative Officer, according to Elias, due to his 
pre-occupation with the administration of criminal justice, he tended to give the impression 
that all African laws were criminal. This conceptualisation of law could not provide a clear 
understanding of law in these societies. The third school of thought is that of anthropologists 
who even though they had studied Africa societies, did not have systematic legal training, 
thus were limited to two kinds of mental attitude: 1) “That of the older anthropologists [...] 
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who, basing themselves upon current Anglo-Saxon law concepts [...] see little or no law in 
African societies and are emphatic that ‘custom is king’”; and 2) “That of the more modern 
group of social anthropologists who, with their knowledge of comparative institutions and of 
current juristic thought, are prepared to say that African law is law though there are 
understandable differences between some of its provenances and those of other types of law, 
differences rooted in the social environment and economic milieu in which it has had to 
operate and to evolve all through ages”, for example, Schapera (1938 cited in Elias 1956: 29).  
 
As for the older anthropologists, there was no law in African pre-colonial societies, but 
custom, thus, treated law and custom as synonymous (Elias 1956). Finally, Elias notes that, a 
number of judicial officers confirmed the existence of law in African societies with some 
pointing out that the legal ideas and processes in these societies had little similarity with 
those of the West. For Eze (1984 cited by Nmehielle 2001) the failure to acknowledge the 
existence of law in traditional African societies is a result of the following: 1) either 
insufficient information or failure to appreciate the correct nature of these societies prior to 
colonisation; and 2) Western scholars’ conceptualisation of law as originating from the state.  
 
In order to ascertain whether law existed in Africa’s pre-colonial societies it is crucial to 
define law. Wiredu defines law as “promulgated or acknowledged rules that are enforced or, 
at least, intended to be enforced by a recognised authority having sanctions, usually physical 
force, at its disposal” (1996: 61). Law, in this case, relates to rules that a government make 
and enforce aimed at regulating the conduct of people within a given society. This definition 
is biased towards states.  
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For John Austin (1885 cited by Elias 1956: 37) law is “a rule laid down for the guidance of 
an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him”. This understanding of 
law relates to the idea of a sovereign who is able to enact law and coerce compliance. Elias 
(1956) calls this the “command theory of law” and notes that pre-colonial African societies 
with centralised governance systems satisfy the idea of a political sovereign as the basis of 
law. However, this idea of law “properly so-called” does not apply to African societies that 
are classified as “stateless societies” (Elias 1956).  
 
For some scholars, the court is the basis of law: “The law of a State or of any organised body 
of men is composed of the rules which the courts – i.e. the judicial organs of that body – lay 
down for the determination of legal rights and duties” (Gray 1921 cited Elias 1956: 39).  Like 
the definition above that links law with a political sovereign, this definition implies that 
“stateless” societies had no law since formal systems of courts did not exist in them.  Elias 
points to the indefensibility of this definition: 1) much depends on how “court” is 
conceptualised – “whether it is a special building in which a robed judge and wigged 
barristers dispense justice, or whether it is any sitting at which disputes are settled and the 
social equilibrium of the community is restored by its accredited functionaries”; 2) a number 
of conflicts, even in modern societies with formal courts tend to be settled without the 
involvement of courts, judges and wigged barristers (Elias 1956: 39) – often called out of 
court settlement or negotiated settlement. In addition, in post-conflict environments NGOs 
are increasingly using alternative dispute resolution (ADR) (linking it with human rights) as a 
means to settle conflicts (with the exception of criminal cases) without the involvement of 
courts or judges. The definitions of law that I have discussed above are too narrow since they 
exclude a number of pre-colonial societies which had no government and a political 
sovereign to enact and enforce rules. Gert (2003: 11, emphasis not mine) defines a law as 
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 a rule that is part of a system of rules regulating the behaviour of all the members of a 
society whether or not they want to be subject to this system. All those subject to this 
system know that their behaviour is supposed to be guided by it and that they may be 
judged by the system and perhaps even punished for not following it. 
 
 
Gert’s definition of law does not connect it to a political sovereign. And what is crucial in this 
definition is that members of a given society recognise that a certain system of rules regulates 
their behaviour and such rules are binding on them. I adopt Gert’s definition of law as it is 
broad enough to allow the existence of law in other forms of human social and political 
organisations such as “stateless societies” and it also shows that law can exist outside the 
modern framework of a state.  
 
Custom should be distinguished from law since it is “a mere social conformity the breach of 
which does not entail any form of penalty [...]” (Elias 1956: 294). In African societies law 
could be distinguished from custom. For example, as Elias observes, “the drumming and 
feasting that often accompany a customary marriage have been misunderstood by some 
writers as forming part of the legal requirements, whereas the discharge of, or promise to 
discharge, the marriage payment by the prospective groom is alone of the essence of the 
contract” (1956: 294). In such societies whether “stateless” or “states” it is crucial for 
scholars to pay more attention on “processes rather than institutions” as the judges who are 
dealing with cases whether criminal or not tend to be more “intent on the maintenance of the 
social equilibrium than a strict declaration of legal rights and duties of the litigants without 
regard to the social consequences of their verdict” (Elias 1956: 298).  
 
Elias further notes that, “Instead of spinning out abstract theories of law, their aim is usually 
the pragmatic one of removing the causes of social tension, of binding or rebinding estranged 
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parties in a give-and-take reciprocity, of the re-incorporation of an erring member in the 
social structure” (1956: 298). Since the emphasis was on maintaining social harmony, more 
emphasis was put on reconciliation rather than vengeance. However, extreme forms of 
behaviour such as, witchcraft and murder were not accommodated. Since such forms of 
behaviour were regarded as antithetical to social harmony. In most cases perpetrators were 
either banished or killed.  
 
It is quite unimaginable how societies in pre-colonial Africa would have operated without 
rules regulating people’s conduct and having those rules enforced. These laws were not 
written, but passed on from one generation to another orally and the lack of written texts 
should not be used as evidence against the existence of law in these pre-colonial societies. 
Since law in African societies was never recorded, it is generally known as customary law 
and operates on the framework of social harmony and stability, and to a greater extent social 
constraints enhanced social security, cohesion and order. This does not mean to romanticise 
pre-colonial African societies since other bad things happened such as slavery and inter-tribal 
wars. 
 
Development and the Market 
Rodney (1972: 9-10) views development in human society as a many-sided process: 1) 
development at the individual level, means “increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, 
creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being”, and the achievements of 
these various aspects of personal development is “very much tied in with the state of the 
society as a whole”; 2) at the level of social groups it means “an increasing capacity to 
regulate both internal and external relationships” – in the past it meant infringing upon the 
freedoms of other social groups and the ability to protect a society’s independence from 
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others, and involved the development of tools useful for their survival which enhanced social 
development; 3) at the economic level it happens when members of a given society “increase 
jointly their capacity for dealing with the environment”.  
 
The capacity for a society to develop in this sense is dependent on a number of factors, 
among these are: 1) the degree to which its members understand the laws of nature (science); 
and 2) the extent to which they put their understanding of the laws of nature into practice by 
inventing tools (technology) and the manner in which they organise work (Rodney 1972: 10). 
Conceptualising economic development in this wider sense would mean that economic 
development has existed in human societies since the origins of human beings, given that 
human beings have increased much their capacity for enhancing a living from nature, 
including their ability to progress from using stones as tools to using iron and from being 
hunters and gatherers to farmers, and settling close to their farms and establishing farming-
community villages (Rodney 1972). Economic development as understood in this wider sense 
cannot be denied to such pre-colonial societies in Africa, although prior to the introduction of 
external trade most African communities tended to focus on producing goods that met their 
needs.  
 
As Hopkins notes, “Trade in Africa, as elsewhere, is as old as man himself, and the concept 
of the market is appropriate to early as more recent times” (1973: 5). Further, he notes that 
subsistence and exchange activities were integrated, and still continue to be integrated. 
Several reasons have been advanced for the “backwardness” of the domestic economy in pre-
colonial Africa as well as the absence of markets in these societies: 1) that the domestic 
economy was pre-dominantly subsistence, “which was uniform, unchanging and therefore 
uninteresting”; 2) ancient technology, extended family and communal land tenure system 
 53 
 
acted as impediments to the development of the agriculture sector; 3) the dominance of anti-
capitalist value system inhibited the progress of key entrepreneurial groups; 4) since African 
political systems were either egalitarian or “conservative gerontocracies based on ascribed 
status”, they made it difficult for more entrepreneurial groups to accumulate savings; and 5) 
exchange was conducted with the aim of maximising social values rather than economic ones 
(Hopkins 1973: 9). Hopkins further notes that factor markets did not exist meaning that 
“there was no regular institutionalised means of selling land, hiring labour, or raising money” 
(1973: 9).  
 
Two themes explained pre-colonial Africa’s underdevelopment: 1) the “myth of primitive 
Africa” – relating to Africans’ inability to organise themselves as shown, for example in the 
writings of Hegel on Africa; and 2) the “myth of Merrie Africa” which portrays pre-colonial 
Africa as the biblical Garden of Eden in which everything was in abundance making 
livelihoods for Africans much easier (Hopkins 1973). Contrary to these assertions, Rodney 
has argued that underdevelopment in Africa is an outcome of the close encounter between 
Europe and Africa which resulted in Europe (which had a higher level of development than 
Africa) exploiting Africa through capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. For Rodney, prior 
to this encounter pre-colonial African societies were developing independently. However, 
capitalist relations of production resulted in a global political economy that saw Africa 
becoming underdeveloped and Europe increasing its development: “underdevelopment was 
the creation of development” (Esteva 1992: 11). Europe’s expansionist development led to 
the increased exploitation of Africans, the exportation of surplus products and labour through 
slave trade. Consequently, African societies were deprived of the benefit of their natural 
resources and this contributed to economic stagnation in them.  However, this blame should 
not be entirely levelled against European capitalism and colonialism.  
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Colonisation Rule and Representations of the Other 
Colonialism saw an alien form of governance that was largely undemocratic being imposed 
on Africans against their will. In 1885 the Berlin Congress resulted in Western colonial states 
partitioning Africa into territorial units. The partitioning was done in an arbitrary manner to 
the extent that a number of unrelated areas and peoples were joined together. This period 
witnessed the imperial powers of Italy, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and 
Belgium occupying and exporting Western notions of government on the continent. 
Consequently, many African rulers lost control of their territories and many African societies 
were restructured. In the process, African traditional political institutions were undermined. 
The imperial powers justified their control of Africa and the destruction of African traditional 
political and social institutions on the grounds that this would bring civilisation, promote 
development and education, bringing order by ending the slave trade and stopping endemic 
warfare on a continent that was largely “barbaric” as well as promote political rights.  
 
Although, Smuts (1930) noted that Europeans by imposing Western forms of governance 
wanted to apply the principle of equal rights, in practice colonial states did not accept the 
colonised as equal citizens who had political rights to be protected and promoted. Africans 
were often portrayed as children who needed the protection of Europeans. As a result, the 
colonisers could not recognise the agency of indigenous communities in deciding their future 
and how they wanted to organise politically and socially. Indeed, agency was often located 
with the colonising power, whereas, the non-Western other was described as childlike who 
needed the protection of the West from his/her barbaric instincts. For instance, describing 
indigenous Africans Smuts noted that, “This type has some wonderful characteristics. It has 
largely remained a child type, with a child psychology and outlook. A child-like human 
cannot be a bad human, for we are not in spiritual matters bidden to be like unto little 
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children” (1930: 75). Indeed, Smuts failed to realise that Africans could interpret the world 
and its realities in different ways from Europeans since their values, traditions, experiences 
and cultures were different from those of Europeans. Africans’ knowledge systems, values, 
experiences, etc, could have been irrelevant to Europeans like Hegel and Smuts, but relevant 
to them.  
 
Because of European domination over other parts of the world, European writers like Hegel 
were made to believe that Europe was the centre of the globe and a point of reference of 
everything, and regarded other parts of the world as objects rather than subjects (Lange 
1998). For instance, for Hegel, slavery was the only vital connection between Africa (the 
object) and Europe (the subject). This representation of Africa was used to justify violence 
against those who resisted being civilised.  
 
Africa was then “invented” in the image of Europe (Mudimbe 1988). Consequently, “An 
Africa invented for European purposes could no longer serve the interest of its own people. 
Taken off of its political, economic, and cultural terms Africa became an object to be used, 
abused, and then shoved to the historical curb” (Asante 2001: xiv).  
 
Colonial Rule and the Chiefs 
Besides the use of violence and coercion as means to gain legitimacy from the locals, colonial 
domination, according to Boone (1994), was entrenched in a “politics of collaboration” 
between the colonisers and chiefs. In British colonies, the colonial state’s failure to establish 
legitimacy and authority in the countryside saw it shifting from “direct rule” to “indirect 
rule”. The new policy, according to Smuts, was “to foster an indigenous native culture or 
system of cultures, and to cease to force the African into alien European moulds” (1930: 84). 
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Chiefs and native councils were granted the authority to run affairs in their own areas, 
however, under the supervision of the colonial rulers. As a result, chiefs and native councils 
no longer derived their authority from the people, but from the colonial government. For 
Betts, colonial rule in this case turned the chief from a “native authority” to an 
“administrative agent” (1990). It was thought that the new system would keep “intact as far 
as possible the native system of organisation and social discipline” (Smuts 1930: 99).  
 
There exists two broad view points in regard to the relationship between chiefs and the 
colonial state: one that views the state (colonial and post-colonial) as having fully 
encapsulated traditional authorities (Mamdami 1996; Herbst 2000) and the other which 
challenges this view (von Trotha 1996; Ray and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; Nugent 
1996).  
 
The “Invention” School 
Chieftaincy, according to the “invention school”, is a colonial invention (Hosbawm and 
Ranger 1993; Hobsbawn 1993; Mamdani 1996). For Mamdani, colonial rule defined power 
and authority as “customary” which in much of post-colonial Africa has not only been at “the 
centre of coercive day-to-day practices”, but also “orchestrated and organised the mass 
slaughter that led to the genocide” in Rwanda (2001: 277, 1996). According to this school of 
thought, custom is socially constructed by state elites to suit the interests of the state 
including, “control, extraction and subordination” (Kyed 2007: 13). For such critics, this has 
led to the worst forms of violence in colonial and post-colonial Africa. In addition, the 
“customary law” that was “recognised in colonial legislation, and developed and ‘applied’ in 
the newly established ‘native’ courts” is criticised for being “supportive of the project of 
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colonial rule, and entrenching the position of elders over juniors, men over women” (Roberts 
1984: 3). Mamdani has concluded that there is a need for a critical rethinking of custom.   
 
Criticisms of Mamdani’s View 
Mamdani’s view that customary authority is unaccountable is a little bit simplistic since it 
views African communities as incapable of resisting illegitimate authority. While I do not 
deny that custom has its own biases, I do not agree with the view that it is unaccountable 
given that it is community-based and needs the community to give it legitimacy, and 
legitimacy does not just come from laws. Mamdani also essentialises custom as native, 
barbaric and backward. Mamdani’s criticism disguises the fact that colonialism and global 
structures of injustice have played a role in creating conditions for civil wars in Africa. As 
Jackie Smith (2008: 1) notes, “Contemporary violent conflicts are not purely localised 
phenomena but rather they are deeply embedded within a global context of complex political 
and economic relationships”. Besides this, Mamdani’s criticism of customary authority 
removes the role of national elites in causing and sustaining conflicts in Africa. As such, it 
lays blame on ordinary Africans for having “dysfunctional” institutions. He appears to be 
advocating centralised, strong modern states for Africa with strong leaders as means to deal 
with the ills that a number of African states are facing. But is this what Africans want? It does 
not necessarily mean that such states and strong leaders can work for the good of the people.   
 
Why Chiefs Have Been Viewed as Inventions  
Chiefs during the colonial era, according to Spears, were said to be “inventions in two senses: 
first, the men colonial authorities appointed often lacked traditional legitimacy, and second, 
the positions to which they were appointed were either created by the colonial administration 
or had been so corrupted by its demands to collect tax, raise labour and regulate agriculture 
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that they no longer represented legitimate patterns of authority” (2003: 3). From this 
perspective, in its attempt to gain legitimacy among the local population, the colonial state 
invented custom or tradition, then, co-opted chiefs who then ended up acting as its agents, 
thus administering and controlling the locals producing a form of power that Mamdani (1996) 
has called “decentralised despotism”.  
 
According to this school of thought, the local population became subjected to authoritarian 
rule from the chiefs who now enjoyed state recognised authority. For instance, it is noted that 
chiefs used coercive measures to collect tax from their followers and to recruit them as farm 
and mine labourers. Critics of the recent political embracing of chieftaincy in Africa view this 
as regressive since, state recognition of chieftaincy is antithetical to the democratisation 
process on the continent for it reproduces “the decentralized despotism that was the form of 
the colonial state in Africa” and making it hard to empower the rural populace, who as a 
result would remain subjects rather than become citizens (Mamdami 1996: 25).  
 
The idea that colonial bureaucracy in Africa “invented tradition” so as to control and 
subordinate the colonised, thus bolstering colonial rule is largely drawn from Ranger (1983). 
Ranger has noted that, “Since a few connections could be made between British and African 
political, social and legal systems, British administrators set about inventing African 
traditions for Africans” (1983: 212). And the “invented traditions” that the colonial 
administrators imported from Europe “not only provided whites with models of command but 
also offered many Africans models of ‘modern’ behaviour” (Ranger 1983: 212). In addition, 
according to Ranger, it resulted in the production of “neo-traditional” cadres meant to serve 
the colonial states. In this regard, the “invention” school treats locals, chiefs in particular, as 
passive recipients, powerless, spectators, mere victims or collaborators in the invention of 
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their tradition or custom. In his later works, Ranger critically revises his earlier position, 
since according to him the analysis had put much emphasis on the agency of the colonisers in 
inventing African identities (2002).  
 
For Ranger, colonial hegemony was not really absolute and various agents challenged the 
invented traditions. In other words, the colonised participated actively in inventing and 
constructing the new traditions. While Ranger portrays the colonised as active participants in 
the invention of their identity, he does not look at how the interaction between the colonised 
and the coloniser contributed to the shaping of the identity of the coloniser, as well. Similarly, 
critics of chieftaincy as invented ignore this and make a representation of the coloniser as 
always having possessed power/knowledge and that of chiefs as being powerless. In post-
colonial Africa, the same representations of chiefs and ordinary rural people as powerless are 
being made in reference to post-colonial states that neither reformed nor abolished 
chieftaincy.  
 
The “invention” school provides its criticism of chieftaincy from a dualistic perspective in 
which the state is presumed to hold power, and chiefs and their followers as powerless, and at 
the same time, chiefs are presumed to wield power over their followers. Thus, this ignores 
chiefs and subordinated rural populations’ agency to resist their situation. As such, the 
approach does not help us think about the various forms of resistance of the powerless against 
the powerful (those who have an influence on their lives), how such resistance shaped 
colonial or post-colonial rule. 
 
Thus, the “invention of tradition” thesis is an elitist model of power that understands power 
as “highly centralised” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 947). “Power”, as Roberts (1984: 4) 
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rightly puts it, “resides at different levels, takes on diverse forms, and runs in all directions”. 
Roberts, further notes that, “while ‘customary law’ in the sense of the repertoire of rules 
applied in the colonial courts did provide instrument of rule, it also offered avenues of escape 
and resistance for the ruled” (1984: 4, emphasis not mine). If this was the case, then the 
“invention” school has failed to distinguish “judicial customary law” – “customary law” that 
the “native” courts recognised – from “real” customary law, that is, customary law as 
practiced in the everyday lives of the people (Roberts 1984). As with regards to governance, 
in response to the struggles for legitimacy and authority between the state elites and chiefs, 
the ruled are not passive and can resist by adopting “a strategic pose in the presence of the 
powerful” (Scott 1990: xii) and engage in strategies of passive resistance. Scott has described 
this as ‘hidden transcripts’ which “represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of 
the dominant” (1990: xii; see chapter 4).  As such, there are challenges in viewing customary 
governance and “customary law” entirely in terms of dominance (Roberts 1984). The failure 
to recognise these resistances can result in the failure of projects aimed at reforming such 
institutions.  
 
Critics of the “Invention” School 
Critics of the “invention school” point out that, “the case for colonial invention has often 
overstated colonial power and ability to manipulate African institutions to establish 
hegemony” (Spear 2003: 3; von Trotha 1996; Ray and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; 
Nugent 1996; Skalnik 1996). They acknowledge that colonial and postcolonial “principles of 
devolution, hierarchy and the administrative district changed the bases of power and 
authority” of African chiefs (von Trotha 1996: 82). However, this did not mean that chiefs 
had no agency. Spears points to the agency of the colonised noting the following:  
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Local discourse played a vital role as people continually reinterpreted and reconstructed 
tradition in the context of broader socio-economic changes. And colonial policies often 
stimulated rather than stilled conflict in the ongoing politics of neo-traditionalism. Far 
from being created by alien rulers, then, tradition was reinterpreted, reformed and 
reconstructed by subjects and rulers alike (2003: 4). 
 
Further, Spears notes that, “To the extent that colonial authorities depended on local 
authorities to effect and legitimate their rule, then, their power was limited, and they became 
subject to local discourses of power that they neither fully understood nor controlled” 
(2003:9). Contrary to the “invention of tradition” thesis the second school of thought brings 
to our attention the power and agency of both the coloniser and the colonised. In addition, it 
argues that chiefs have been able to maintain legitimacy in post-colonial Africa as well, since 
this legitimacy is rooted in a culture and tradition drawn from the pre-colonial period. As van 
Binsbergen notes, “By virtue of occupying a pivotal position in the historic cosmology shared 
by large numbers of villagers and traditionally-oriented urban migrants, the chiefs represent a 
force which modernising state elites have found difficult to by-pass or obliterate” (1999: 98). 
As such, the chief cannot be viewed as powerless or lacking agency since, “It is not only the 
state which co-opts the chief as additional power base. On the strength of the respect their 
traditional position commands, chiefs have also successful penetrated the state’s 
administrative and representative bodies, thus acquiring de facto power bases in the modern 
political sector” (van Binsbergen 1999: 98, also see van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996).  
 
Thus, two power bases provide chiefs with legitimacy and authority: “From tradition chiefs 
derive their sacred and other customary powers. From the modern state chiefs attempt to 
capture resources in the forms of development projects, taxes, etc” (Ray and van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal 1996: 7). Yet, this double basis of power creates a mutual dependence between 
chiefs and the state (van Rouveroy van Nieuwal 1996). Further, chiefs continue to play an 
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intermediary role between the state and their followers. At the same time, they have access to 
economic resources, for instance, land, that are independent of the state and as such, should 
not be treated as “mere assistants” of the state since by not relying on one source of income 
the chief is less dependent on state salary (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996).  
 
In the “shadow of the state” in many African countries, chiefs play an important role in 
settling disputes at the local level and at the same time, as administrators and allocators of 
plots of land to their followers, though the state has attempted, but in vain to restrict their role 
to “mere” reconciliation and dispute resolution (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 42). In 
addition, chiefs exercise both moral and ritual authority over their followers and even state 
officials. Indeed, chiefs have become hybrid authorities. In this regard, if chiefs are really bad 
to their followers as proponents of the “invention of tradition” claim why then do they 
continue to command authority in rural areas?  
 
Dualistic Forms of Political Authority 
One outcome of indirect rule in Africa was the creation of a “dualism of power” structures 
(Englebert 2002: 51) as well as a plural legal order (European colonial law and indigenous, 
and in some societies such as Sierra Leone, Islamic law in addition to the two). Sklar (1993) 
uses the concept “mixed government” to identify these dualistic forms of political authority. 
The concept of legal pluralism has been used to refer to the existence of plural legal orders. In 
the context of dualistic forms of authority two realms exists – the realm of “state sovereignty 
and the realm of traditional government, both systems effectively govern the same 
communities of citizen-subjects” (Sklar 1993: 87). Under such arrangements competition and 
negotiations for legitimacy and sovereign authority between state elites and chiefs often 
occur. At times it leads to the co-option and regulation of chiefs, as happened during the 
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colonial era, for instance, under the British’s indirect rule and the French’s policy of 
assimilation. This of course also meant the formal recognition of traditional leaders and 
institutions. At times the competition also meant either the repression or the lack of 
recognition or the abolition of customary institutions and practices. However, without 
legitimacy the rural masses have often resisted the imposed state. 
 
Limitations of Colonial States: External Actor, Sovereignty and Nation 
Besides lacking internal legitimacy, the colonial state had other shortcomings. Although it 
enjoyed some of the defining attributes of stateness (territory,25 population, power, law and 
state as an idea), it lacked three crucial traits for a modern state, namely, external actor, 
sovereignty and nation (Young 1994: 43). The colonial state was not an actor in the 
international system (Young 1994). As such, it remained in the periphery in world politics 
and governance, and would act as supplier of primary commodities for the more developed 
states without determining the international trade rules. Sovereignty is understood in two 
senses: internal and external. In the case of external sovereignty, the state is viewed as “an 
international legal person” and as regards to internal sovereignty, the state has “unlimited 
theoretical dominion over its subjects” (Young 1994: 28). Since imperial states had full 
control over the government of the colonies (with the help of their agents of rule), according 
to Young, African colonial states lacked internal sovereignty (1994).  
 
As noted earlier, in many parts of Africa a number of unrelated areas and peoples were joined 
together resulting in such societies struggling for nationhood. Gyekye provides two meanings 
of the concept of nation: 1) refers to a group or community of people sharing a common 
                                                           
25
  The idea of territory in colonial Africa was ambiguous since boundaries were drawn arbitrarily without 
even consulting a single African political authority and as a result, various groups ended up living in the same 
state. However, there were a few cases in Africa (for example, Swaziland, Lesotho and Somalia) in which new 
nation states matched the pre-colonial societies.  
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history, culture, language, “and possibly a territory but believe that they hail from a common 
ancestral background and are therefore closely related by kinship ties”; and 2) refers to a state 
comprising of several nations in the first sense (Gyekye 1997: 79). In the first sense, 
according to Gyekye, members of a nation focus on relationship building through solidarity, 
empathy, harmony, sympathy, mutual recognition and understanding, among other ethos. In 
this sense, there is a connection between ethnic community and nation. This idea of a nation 
denotes an ethno-cultural community and is not equivalent to a state since it does not have 
well-defined and recognised frontiers, and a government with a central authority, but it can 
become a state (Gyekye 1997). The second sense of a nation lacks the crucial characteristics 
of a nation in the first sense since it consists of a wide range of languages and cultures 
(Gyekye 1997). In short, it is not a homogenous entity.  
 
Unlike in Europe where nation-states were a result of local social forces, as noted earlier, the 
modern nation-state in Africa emerged from colonial oppression. As Gyekye (1997: 82) 
notes, “The conquerors who shepherded different nationalities into nation-states failed to 
realise that it is one thing to make Ghana or Kenya or Yugoslavia; it is quite another to make 
Ghanaians or Kenyans or Yugoslavs”. This has continued to be a serious challenge for post-
colonial states in Africa. For Basil Davidson (1992), the nation-state has proved to be a curse 
for post-colonial Africa.  
 
Colonial Inheritance and Post-colonial Challenges in Africa 
The nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s which removed colonial rule in Africa played a 
significant role in producing Africa’s modern “nation-states”. The main objective of the 
nationalist movements during that period was to fight against colonialism as well as racism. 
However, the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in its 1964 resolution resolved to retain 
 65 
 
and legitimate the existing boundaries as a means to avoid border disputes and threats to 
stability in Africa (OAU in Brownlie 1971). Since the decolonisation process was fast, 
African leaders failed to pay proper attention to the feasibility of the units being constructed 
(Herbest 2000). The new African elites’ failure to establish indigenous ideas of statehood 
worsened the internal contradictions of most African states, and this to some extent 
contributed to the socio-political challenges that led to the civil wars in states including 
Liberia, Angola, Sudan and Sierra Leone.   
 
Sovereignty and Legitimacy 
Since the new African leaders wanted to avoid border disputes, as a means to promote peace 
and stability on the continent, they could not gain control of “African territory through wars 
of expansion or by claiming control of territory on the basis of the administrative facts on the 
ground,” at the same time these leaders “rejected the entire precolonial tradition of multiple 
sovereignties overland with soft borders” (Herbest 2000: 97). A consequence of this was that 
peasants could not be incorporated into mainstream politics and economics.  
 
Herbest (2000) has observed that the post-colonial state failed to consolidate power within its 
entire territory. In this case, the state could not extend its power beyond the cities, partly due 
to the low population densities in many African states and its failure to incorporate the 
majority of Africans in mainstream politics. As result, the state remained non-hegemonic. 
However, the international society through the UN and related organisations recognised 
independent states in Africa as legitimate actors in the international system. They also 
supported nationalist movements against colonialism rather than secessionist wars to create 
independent states. Consequently, secessionist wars, for example, Katanga in the Congo 
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(1960-64), Biafra in Nigeria (1967-70) and Southern Sudan (1955-1972) never received 
support from the UN and OAU.26  
 
While the international environment for African states became secure, the domestic 
environment remained insecure (Clapham 1998). By so doing, the international community 
was able to prevent the use of war or force as means to build states in Africa (Jackson and 
Rosberg 1982). The right for such states to exist, according to Jackson (1990: 24), derived 
from “new international norms such as anti-colonialism, ex-colonial self-determination and 
racial sovereignty underwritten by egalitarian and democratic values” with origins from the 
Western social and political movements.  
 
 
In this regard, at independence many African states attained international sovereignty and 
legitimacy, but could not exercise control over the people within their territorial borders.27 
For Jackson such states reveal “limited empirical statehood” and are “quasi-states”, not “real 
states”. Indeed, post-colonial statebuilding in Africa led to the formation of “quasi-states”. 
The international acceptance of such states was a significant factor in the “rapid African 
rejection of any indigenous alternative” (Herbest 2000: 100). However, it became difficult for 
the African rulers to build effective states within the inherited frontiers.  
 
These inherited artificial states, according Davidson, are a serious challenge for development 
in Africa and he considers this challenge, the “black man’s burden” (1992). For Davidson, 
                                                           
26
  Until recently, Eritrea has been the only African country that the UN and the African Union (AU) have 
recognised as a sovereign state after it seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. On the 9th of July 2011, Southern Sudan 
became Africa’s newest country after most Southern Sudanese voted for cessation in a UN sanctioned 
independence referendum in January 2011. Somaliland which has claimed autonomy from Somalia has not been 
recognised as a sovereign state, although it is functioning like any other sovereign state.  
27
  I adopt Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 6)’s definition of exercise of control: “the ability to pronounce, 
implement, and enforce commands, laws, policies and regulations”  
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traditional political organisations should have been taken into consideration. Instead, the 
independent African states inherited the very institutions that had undermined development in 
Africa during colonial rule. As such, genuine liberation that liberation movements had 
advocated could not be achieved since inheriting the colonial institutions resulted in a “new 
period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe” (Davidson 1992: 10). Davidson 
attributes the challenges of the post-colonial states in Africa to the state and its institutions, 
and offers a solution that would see the decentralisation of political and administrative power 
from central authority to local authorities as well promote popular participation. In the 
absence of this ordinary people resisted the state and in response to these challenges the new 
African leaders centralised power and authority. 
 
Conceptualisations of Politics in Post-colonial Africa 
Various conceptualisations of politics in post-colonial Africa largely relating to state elites 
and their relations to state institutions as well as various forms of governance that emerged 
with the elites’ centralisation of power and attempts at achieving nation-building have been 
offered. These include the one party state-system, African socialism, multi-party democracy, 
personal rule, clientelism and neopatrimonialism. In this section I will focus on the one party 
state system and neopatrimonialism. The one party state system was seen as essential and 
quite pragmatic in dealing with the post-colonial challenges of development and nation-
building, though in reality it promoted neo-patrimonial politics. 
 
The One Party State System 
In the immediate post-independence era multi-party politics was banned since it was 
considered anti-progress and divisive, therefore, a threat to peace and stability. Instead, 
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“centralised nonparticipatory politics” was seen to be central to national development and 
unity (Chazan et al. 1999: 12). A strong government was considered essential in welding the 
nation together that was divided along ethnic lines. It was argued that the single-party system 
represented “the will of all the people”, it permitted “mass participation in decision-making” 
and in so doing encouraged “the development of a sense of personal responsibility in 
government” (Cowan 1964: 8). African leaders also argued that since a single-party system 
did not “represent only the interest of a group, a section or an economic class in the 
population, it [was] basically more democratic than the Western multi-party system” (Cowan 
1964: 8). Thus, in many African states, the Western-style institutions of parliamentary 
government that colonial rule had established were dismantled and opposition movements 
were subjected to repression.  
 
It is generally agreed that states should create political institutions that serve the needs and 
interests of their societies. In Africa, colonial political institutions modelled on the Western 
notion of a state did not really serve the interests of Africans, but those of the coloniser and 
the coloniser’s metropolis. However, the new African leaders who sought to modify the 
inherited political institutions with the aim of promoting consensus democracy, consequently, 
the needs and interests of African societies, abandoned this project as they sought to promote 
their personal interests and those of their own ethnic groups. The post-colonial state was no 
longer different from its colonial predecessor.  
 
As Cowan (1964: 13) observes, the new African states suffered from a “built-in instability” 
which basically derived from the rapid process of modernisation. This rapid modernisation 
process deeply affected the foundations of many African societies as in government various 
new types of authority emerged. For instance, Cowan notes, “[...] one day a man may be a 
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farmer in his field, and almost the next day, a Member of Parliament, or a Minister” (1964: 
14). The operation of a modern society alongside a traditional one (that colonialism failed to 
totally eradicate) is also viewed as a source of social and political instability in post-colonial 
Africa. Cowan (1964:14) observes:  
 
The conflicts between the authority resulting from these new roles and that from 
traditional roles, and the jockeying for power which is an inevitable part of the still-
limited opportunities offered to the growing educated elite, create a social instability 
which becomes readily reflected in the political process.  
 
Indeed, state elites saw a single-party system as a means to control the political process and 
deal with the political and social instability resulting from these conflicts. However, post-
colonial nation building and statebuilding failed to achieve unity among diverse groups since 
some of them could not accept the state’s leaders as their legitimate rulers and continued to 
recognise the authority of their chiefs.  
 
Neo-patrimonialism 
Studies on the nature of politics in Africa have conceptualised political power on the 
continent in terms of personal rule, neo-patrimonialism and clientelism (Young 2004; 
Sandbrook 1972; Bratton and van De Walle 1994; Bratton and van De Walle 1997; Jackson 
and Rosberg 1984; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Thomson 2000). The term neo-patrimonialism is 
derived from Weber’s idea of patrimonialism. Weber (1947: 347) uses the concept 
patrimonialism to refer to a form of governance in which “authority is mainly oriented to 
tradition but in its exercise makes the claim of full personal powers”. In patrimonial political 
systems the ruler centralises power in his hands and reduces the autonomy of the ordinary 
person. Bratton and van De Walle note that, the personal ruler treats ordinary folk as 
“extensions of the ‘big man’s’ household, with no rights or privileges other than those 
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bestowed by the ruler” (1997: 61). Political scientists have characterised neo-patrimonial 
political systems as “hybrid” political systems in which legal-rational institutions co-exist 
with “the customs and patterns of patrimonial” systems (Bratton and van De Walle 1997: 62). 
In neo-patrimonial states constitutional rules are often evaded. Such states are often 
associated with corruption with the actual “norms that affect political and administrative 
action [...] not [being] rooted in state institutions and organisations but in friendship, kinship, 
factional alliance, ethnic fellowship [...]” (Jackson and Rosberg 1984: 425).  Political 
clientelism is central to neo-patrimonialism. Political office holders who are the patrons offer 
resources and services to clients in return for political support. In such a political organisation 
it is hard to distinguish between the private and the public since the “big man” treats the state 
as his personal property. Lindberg (2003: 123) has called this the “privatisation of the state”, 
in which formal institutions are rendered ineffective.  
 
The big men see control of the state as essential since it “serves the twin purposes of 
lubricating the patronage networks and satisfies the selfish desire of elites to self-enrich 
themselves […]” (Taylor 2007: 561). It is in the self-interest of the “big men” to declare 
themselves leaders for life since handing over power to other actors would mean loss of 
control of state resources. This could be one of the reasons why many African presidents 
have a desire to be “president for life”. In this case, the political game is turned into “a zero-
sum struggle for control of the state” (Lindberg 2003: 123). One of the criticisms of the neo-
patrimonial theory of governance in Africa is that it tends to give more attention to the 
political behaviour of the elites and the logic that drives this form of behaviour, marginalising 
other significant social forces in the political arena and the structures of power which neo-
patrimonial rule is based (Ahluwalia 2001).  
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External Challenges 
Besides the internal political factors that contributed to the crumbling of domestic political 
order in Africa, external factors, particularly, regional superpower interests during the Cold 
War intensified some of the civil wars. For instance, in 1975 the Angola civil war that saw 
two liberation movements, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fighting against each other (soon after 
the colonial power – Portugal withdrew from Angola)  began as a proxy Cold War conflict. 
In this case, South Africa and competing international patrons including the USSR, Cuba and 
the USA became involved in the civil war (Clapham 2005).  
 
Development Challenges  
In addition to the above, most post-colonial African states’ economies could not meet the 
economic expectations of development (Thomson 2000). Africans who at independence had 
high expectations of their respective governments to promote development that would see an 
improvement in their lives were left disillusioned since their governments failed to meet their 
expectations. As Englebert (2000: 1) notes “Since 1960, Africans have seen their income rise 
by less than one-half of a percent per year, leaving the continent with negative growth of all 
regions in the world”.28 One of the implications of this was the damage done to state 
legitimacy. According to Englebert (2000: 4), a state is considered legitimate “when its 
structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical 
continuity to its institutions. State legitimacy is thus a historical, structural condition of the 
entire state apparatus.” Since the leaders of the new African states faced a serious challenge 
                                                           
28
  Not all African countries faced a decline in economic growth and the crisis varied widely. For 
example, Botswana has been labelled “an African miracle” (Samatar 1999), given its fast rate of economic 
growth. Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zaire and Sudan were of persistently economic crisis, while other countries such 
as Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal stagnated and others countries including Mozambique, Uganda, Angola and 
Central Africa Republic, external intervention and civil war lowered the growth rates (Faber and Green 1985). 
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to “acquire sufficient hegemony over their society in order to stabilise and routinise their 
power”, it became hard for them to “use developmental policies and institutions to generate 
support for themselves”, as these needed “a level of bureaucratic loyalty and a degree of 
supply response from private agents [...]” (Englebert 2000: 5). Since a number of post-
colonial African states lacked this, the growth of corruption, rent-seeking, predation and 
patronage among other activities in them is said to be an outcome of this.  
 
Consequently, the state’s capacity to provide institutions necessary for fostering economic 
growth was severely curtailed. State elites had to “respond rationally to the historical 
constraints that they [had] inherited” (Englebert 2000: 7). The structures that the postcolonial 
state inherited from colonialism could not promote both economic growth and technological 
advancement (Sahn 1994). For Clapham (2002: 780), the neo-patrimonial mechanism became 
a means of maintaining the state on “an inadequate social and economic base”. However, this 
tended to undermine the state’s effectiveness. With the World recession of the late 1970s, 
many African states faced a serious economic crisis and became increasingly dependent on 
external donors including their patrons – USA and the USSR as well as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The involvement of international donors in the 
internal affairs of these states undermined the idea of state sovereignty that the OAU had 
advocated at its inception in the early 1960s. 
 
The Economic Crisis and the Sidelining of the State 
The economic crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s which saw a decline in growth rates 
in many African states had profound effects on the African state’s legitimacy as well. Africa 
appeared to be the hardest hit compared to other regions of the world during the world 
inflation and recession of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. This period witnessed a decline 
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in growth rates in many Africa states as well as an increase of their economic dependence, 
and external debts.29 
 
In 1979, the African Governors of the World Bank requested the World Bank to prepare a 
report on the economic development crisis in African countries and make recommendations 
to it. In this report, the World Bank (1981) recognised both internal and external factors as 
affecting growth rate in African states. For the World Bank (1981), external factors included 
an increase in oil prices, a fall in mineral prices, mainly in iron ore and copper, and a 
decrease in the demand for primary commodities, while internal factors included, overvalued 
official exchange rates which did not reflect its scarcity, bias against peasant agriculture, 
excessive state interference in the economy, and an inefficient and over-protected industrial 
sector. The World Bank (1981) further states that, excessive state interference in the economy 
including price controls led to a production crisis and the rise of the black market; private 
property laws that were not clear and could not create a favourable climate for private 
investment, and the use of public jobs as a means to reward allies promoted inefficiency.  In 
addition, the World Bank has observed that the state had dismally performed during this 
economic crisis due to its less sustainable policies, agricultural bureaucracy and inefficiency 
among others. The state which at independence was portrayed as a key agent for progress was 
now being seen as an impediment to it.  
 
As the economic crisis continued in the 1980s, many African regimes sought assistance from 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank and the IMF – and Western 
donors. The international donors could only provide assistance on the condition that African 
                                                           
29
  For a discussion of low or negative growth rates in Africa from the late 1970s to the early 1980s see 
Sahn (1994), Faber and Green (1985), The World Bank (1981, 1983, 1994) and Englebert (2000).  
 74 
 
governments in question would change their policy that led them into crisis. In the 1980s, 
reforms in the form of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and stabilisation policies under 
the World Bank and the IMF with the support of powerful Western states became some of the 
strategies meant to help African countries emerge out of their economic problems. Foreign 
experts working for the World Bank and the IMF became involved in African states’ 
economic decision-making. As Abrahamsen notes,  
 
Structural adjustment was intended as an assault on inefficiency, waste and corruption, 
and, in its name, state bureaucracies across the continent have been drastically reduced 
and economic regulation dismantled in order to leave the market more or less free from 
the perceived political and destructive intervention of the state (2001: 85). 
 
For this objective to be achieved the state was required to reduce its role in the economy, and 
promote market liberalisation and privatisation. However, SAPs failed to attain their stated 
objectives. SAPs’ emphasis on the economic dimensions of adjustment over human 
dimensions resulted in negative social consequences (Tarp 1993). In this regard, the SAPs era 
witnessed an increase in the rates of unemployment, poverty, corruption, and the prices of 
basic commodities as well as, health care and education costs. This intensified inequalities in 
Africa. Further, the state was further alienated from the needs of the majority of its citizens, 
thus continued to lose its legitimacy. In response to the negative social consequences that 
SAPs caused on ordinary Africans, UNICEF called for adjustment with a “human face” (cited 
in Tarp 1993: 122).   
 
In addition, IMF/World Bank programs “failed to recognise an important element of the 
political logic of governance in Africa” (Abrahamsen 2001: 85). This element relates to 
patrimonial networks that are vital for elite cohesion (Abrahamsen 2001; Taylor 2007). As 
noted earlier, through neo-patrimonial networks elites distribute state resources to various 
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clients (for example, ethnic groups or ethnic power brokers) in order to meet and maintain 
their demands. This to a certain extent has helped avert political instability. Structural 
adjustment meant the limitation of the distribution of these resources to clients. The 
involvement of external advisers on managing their economies acted as an impediment to the 
distribution of resources through neo-patrimonial networks. In order to avoid this, African 
leaders manipulated the reform process. Abrahamsen (2001: 86) has observed that through 
the “manipulation of structural adjustment, many African elites have succeeded in making 
dependency a personally profitable and beneficial enterprise, even if the result for the 
majority of people has been devastating.” In short, the SAPs generated wealth for elites and 
provided them with resources they needed to remain in power while at the same time those 
who were not connected to them suffered. Further, these economic measures further 
weakened such African states as “more and more of [their] functions [were] outsourced to 
NGOs [...]” (Zack-Williams and Mohan 2007: 417).  
 
In response to these challenges and the state’s failure to protect them from worst excesses of 
the adjustment programs, ordinary Africans waged anti-SAPs protests. Besides engaging in 
protests, ordinary people created “autonomous political and economic spaces” like informal 
markets; smuggled goods across national borders; constructed “a system of multiple modes of 
livelihood; and directed “challenges to the state through support for social movements 
challenging state hegemony” (Zack-Williams and Mohan 2007: 417-18). Indeed, internal 
opposition and external intervention posed a serious challenge to the state’s monopoly of 
power. SAPs in Africa, according to Thomson (2000: 189), “seriously undermined the old 
political status quo of centralised states based on clientelism.”  Thus, it is not surprising that 
in the 1980s and 1990s a number of African states either failed or collapsed. 
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Violent Civil Wars in Africa in the Post-Cold War Period 
The situation in a number of African states worsened with the end of Cold War and the 
collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s which led to the end of super power support that had 
helped maintain client states. The end of the Cold War also witnessed the spread of 
democratic and participatory politics across Africa with varying success. This upsurge in 
democratic transitions in Africa saw a number of African states adopting constitutions that 
aimed at promoting multi-party political systems, the separation of the powers of the 
executive, the judiciary and the legislative, promoting human rights, and free and fair 
elections. However, the upsurge in democratic transitions on the continent coincided with an 
increase in the number of intra-state wars on the continent. In the 1990s Africa experienced 
deadly conflicts in the East (Somalia), the West (Sierra Leone and Liberia) and Central 
Africa (the Democratic Republic of Congo) that negatively affected millions of people. These 
intense intrastate conflicts and humanitarian crises in this period led to mounting international 
appeals for the need to intervene in conflict ridden countries on humanitarian grounds. 
 
Indeed, civil wars in a number of African countries and other low income countries posed a 
big challenge to the UN’s traditional peacekeeping approach. With the emergence of failed or 
collapsed states in Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) among 
others the UN’s traditional peacekeeping approach could no longer deal with such challenges. 
The UN gradually moved towards the implementation of peace settlements in countries 
emerging from violent internal conflict that involved multi-functional peace operations. 
These peacebuilding operations focused on promoting human rights, rule of law, democracy, 
economic liberalisation and elections, among others in these war-torn societies. This will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 2: Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and the Liberal Peace 
Framework 
 
 
Introduction 
As noted in the last paragraph of the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War witnessed an 
increasing change in both the norms and practice of international response to violent 
intrastate conflict.  From Namibia (1989) to Cambodia (1991-92) to Sierra Leone (1999-
2005) to Liberia (2003 to present) the UN took a leading role in multidimensional peace 
support operations that were aimed at preventing a return to conflict and promoting durable 
peace. Peacebuilding could no longer be limited to keeping warring parties from returning to 
conflict, but also addressing the root causes of conflict including promoting development 
since underdevelopment became increasingly linked with violent conflict in low income 
countries. This was later linked to security and terrorism, particularly, in the so-called 
“collapsed states”, “failed states” and “weak states”.  
 
The UN’s traditional peacekeeping approach could not match the emerging post-Cold War 
peace and security challenges in low income countries since it primarily sought to minimise 
interstate conflict through monitoring ceasefires between hostile states. Since in the early 
1990s the idea of peacebuilding was not very clear in policy terms, there was a gradual 
development of these UN-led multi-dimensional peace missions.30 These missions comprised 
of local (state elites) and regional actors, international actors including leading states such as 
the UK and the US, the UN and its agencies, the World Bank and IMF, international 
                                                           
30
  Even when Boutrous-Ghali wrote his Agenda for Peace in 1992 it was not really clear what 
peacebuilding was. This is reflected, for instance, in the development of UN policy documents on peacebuilding 
such as the An Agenda for Peace (1992), An Agenda for Development (1994), the Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace (1995), An Agenda for Democratization (1995) and the Millennium Development goals among others. In 
2005 peace became institutionalised with the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. One of 
the aims of the commission is to coordinate peacebuilding activities among key actors. What is important to 
note is that peacebuilding became clear when it became connected with the state. 
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nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), bilateral organisations such as, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and DFID (see Paris 2004). Although these 
operations lacked coordination and cooperation among the various actors, a loose consensus 
emerged: that of establishing a Western liberal democratic state as a sure means to maintain 
peace in war-torn societies. Peacebuilding became connected to the state through liberal 
peacebuilding. The aim of this chapter is two-fold, first to offer a distinction between 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and second, to provide a framework of the liberal peace.  
 
Conceptualising Peacebuilding 
During the Cold War the UN did not give political currency to the concept of peacebuilding. 
Its emphasis was more on preserving the territorial integrity of conflicting states through 
monitoring ceasefire agreements, creating buffer zones and peacekeeping, among others, 
partly as a result of conflict-ridden power politics during the Cold War. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, the concept of peacebuilding gained international prominence 
when the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 policy statement, An 
Agenda for Peace, brought it to the UN agenda. Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as 
“action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 104). Further, he differentiated 
between peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. 
Peacebuilding was associated with post-conflict activities that aimed at consolidating peace. 
For Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding included the following activities: “rebuilding the 
institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of 
peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war” as well as addressing “the deepest 
causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression” (1992: 102). 
In addition, peacebuilding would encompass such activities as “disarming the previously 
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warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, 
repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring 
elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental 
institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation” 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992: 115).  
 
In his Agenda for Development, Boutros-Ghali notes the importance of economic and social 
development as means to promoting lasting peace. In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 
Boutros-Ghali defined the essential goal of peacebuilding as “the creation of structures for 
the institutionalisation of peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 1409). In this report, he notes that 
addressing the root causes of conflict is crucial for building lasting peace. In this case, 
peacebuilding would not only mean the elimination of armed conflict, but also addressing its 
root causes in order to promote the resolution of disputes without resorting to violence. 
Boutros-Ghali saw a link between democracy, development and peace since “democracy 
provides the long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests 
in a way that minimises the risk of violent conflict” (1995: para. 120).  
 
With time, realities and new challenges on the ground resulted in new understandings and 
development of the concept of peacebuilding within the UN, academic, leading states, non-
governmental and bilateral organisations. Conflict prevention, conflict management and post-
conflict reconstruction, among others became part of the peacebuilding agenda. As Call and 
Cousens (2008: 3) note,  
 
This was driven partly by growing awareness of the complexity of post-conflict 
transitions and the multiple, simultaneous needs of post-conflict societies, and partly by 
bureaucratic imperatives as more and more international agency, parts of the UN 
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system, and nongovernmental organisations began to incorporate “peacebuilding” into 
their roles and missions. 
 
Kofi Annan who succeeded Boutros-Ghali as the UN Secretary-General emphasised the need 
to promote democracy, development and human security as conflict prevention measures. 
Further, he noted the need to strengthen democratic governance (1998). He identified the 
following as the key components for promoting lasting peace: “good governance, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law, promoting transparency and accountability in public 
administration, enhancing administrative capacity and strengthening democratic governance” 
(Annan 1998: 14). Annan further noted other important activities as organising elections and 
drafting constitutions. However, citing the case of Angola, Annan noted the inadequacies of 
elections by themselves in resolving conflicts since, elections can produce powerful 
incentives for political or ethnic entrepreneurs to engage in conflict (2001).  
 
In 2000, the UN Secretary-General’s Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the 
United Nations in the 21st Century, based on the concerns of an upsurge in violent intrastate 
wars in the 1990s that had claimed more than 5 million lives, proposed a “people-centred” 
approach: “we must put people at the centre of everything we do. No calling is more noble 
and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and 
villages around the world, to make their lives better” (Annan 2000: 7). The report further 
noted that in the wake of brutal civil wars “a more human-centred approach” to security was 
emerging and unlike the security approach of the Cold War era that was state-centred 
emphasising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, this new approach embraced 
“the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence” (Annan 2000: 43). In 
addition, the report noted the need to develop conflict prevention strategies that not only 
address the symptoms of violent conflicts, but also their sources. In this case, peacebuilding 
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would mean activities aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict, not just ending 
overt violence.  
 
Following the above report, in August 2000, the Brahimi report used the term peacebuilding 
to mean “activities undertaken on the far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just 
the absence of war” (Brahimi 2000: 3). It conceptualises peacebuilding as more than ending 
armed conflict, but also aimed at seeking to address its underlying causes. The report further 
provides a wide range of peacebuilding activities designed to help avoid a return to violent 
conflict, the promotion of peaceful co-existence and non-violent means of resolving conflicts.  
 
In the policy documents discussed above peacebuilding has come to mean a number of 
things: strengthening the rule of law, enhancing development, promoting justice, building 
democracies, ending overt violence, reconciliation and stability, among others. Despite the 
expansion and modification of the concept of peacebuilding in these policy documents as 
well as an upsurge in peacebuilding activities since the early 1990s, the concept of 
peacebuilding has remained elusive and contested, among academics and policymakers. 
While there have been disagreements on the role of external actors in post-conflict societies, 
there tends to be a consensus on their significance in supporting peacebuilding activities in 
war-torn societies.  
 
Peacebuilding Debates 
Questions have been raised regarding the role and responsibilities of external actors in 
peacebuilding operations who often determine or have significant influence on the final 
outcome of the peacebuilding process – whether they should act as mere facilitators of 
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peacebuilding processes or use more intrusive approaches if this helps promote lasting peace 
or end overt violence. On one hand, there are scholars who put emphasis on minimalist 
peacebuilding approaches aimed at ending overt violence and on the other hand, those who 
argue for maximalist approaches that aim at addressing root causes of conflict and structural 
violence such as social injustice and poverty (Newman 2009a). The narrow approach is 
security-oriented since it puts emphasis on the prevention of a return to violent conflict with 
the aim of promoting stability and order subordinating other values such as justice, 
development, emancipation and empowerment to the preservation of internal security, 
whereas, the maximalist approach is social-oriented emphasising on addressing underlying 
sources of conflict (Call 2008a). As Newman notes, many scholars and practitioners tend to 
advocate a narrow definition of peacebuilding which states that its main objective should be 
that of maintaining a ceasefire since for them, it is more realistic and quite feasible (2009a: 
27). For these proponents, peacebuilding should be considered a success “once a ceasefire is 
reached and holds” (Call 2008a: 4). Yet, a focus on maintaining a ceasefire may help in 
avoiding overt violence, but does not address underlying causes of conflict with a likelihood 
of a return to conflict if grievances or problems that led to the conflict in the first place are 
not addressed. Those who advocate a broader approach to peacebuilding argue that there is a 
need to take into consideration a wide range of peacebuilding initiatives, if “peace” is going 
to make sense to host societies (Newman 2009a).  
 
The broader approach includes various benchmarks as shown in the discussion above on the 
evolution of the concept of peacebuilding within the UN system, for example, democracy, 
respect for human rights, rule of law, eradicating poverty, social justice, welfare, nonviolent 
action, reconciliation, development, eliminating corruption and good governance (Call 
2008a). For critics such an approach is ambitious even for the more developed societies that 
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are considered peaceful (Call 2008a). As for Call (2008a: 6), this broad approach is “too 
inclusive to be useful”, although it helps show the complex and integrated nature of 
peacebuilding. Call further notes that, as it relates to measuring peacebuilding outcomes the 
broad approach to international peacebuilding fails to distinguish between dismal failures 
such as Rwanda and Angola and limited successes such as Mozambique and El Salvador 
where peace has been consolidated, but the underlying causes of the armed conflict have not 
been addressed. He thus, proposes a standard of success. The standard of success, according 
to Call, 
 
strikes a middle ground that includes the lack of recurrence of warfare as well as some 
sustained, national mechanism for the resolution of conflict – signified by participatory 
politics. Participatory politics does not equate to liberal democracy, but refers to 
mechanisms for aggrieved social groups to feel that they have both a voice and a stake 
in the national political system. This standard is difficult to measure but excludes 
stable, authoritarian, and clearly illegitimate governments (2008a: 6-7). 
 
 
As for this approach, what is crucial for measuring success are questions whether there has 
been a return to violent conflict or not and whether minimal political institutions that can help 
resolve conflict in a nonviolent way with citizens engaged in participatory politics have been 
established. As such, it does not emphasise the underlying causes of conflict including 
horizontal inequalities, social injustice and unemployment, which Call considers as “risk 
factors that shape outcomes, but not themselves indicators of peacebuilding success or 
failure” (2008b: 174). This standard does not escape from the criticism that it is inadequate 
since participation in politics will only be meaningful to most, if not all, poor people when 
their basic needs are met. This explains why in much of Africa people are not keen on 
participating in politics and tend to be concerned about their everyday survival. For such 
people peacebuilding is a success, if it meets their everyday needs.  
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This thesis uses a broader definition of peacebuilding which does not limit peacebuilding to 
activities aimed at preventing a return to conflict, but also includes social justice, welfare 
provision reconciliation, equity and humanistic agendas for peace rather than technocratic 
institutional state-centric agendas for peace. Such an understanding of peacebuilding is useful 
in dealing with the challenges that marginalised populations in Africa have been experiencing 
since colonial rule. At the same, time this does not imply that political participation and a 
prevention of a return to conflict are not relevant, but that these can still be dealt within the 
above understanding of peacebuilding.  
 
 In the context of this study, I focus on post-conflict peacebuilding – as activities that are 
conducted after the end of a civil war or a violent conflict in a given society so as to redress 
the causes of the conflict or to come up with structures that help avert future violent conflicts. 
The term “post-conflict” is problematic, thus its meaning in the context of this study needs to 
be clarified.  
 
Conceptualising “Post-conflict” 
The concept “post-conflict” has been used in various senses and at times in a confusing way. 
Lambach (2007: 9) raises the question: “What is ‘post-conflict’ about ‘post-conflict’ 
societies?”  He notes that the challenge about the concept of “post-conflict” relates to the fact 
that “the prefix ‘post-’ is a temporal signifier attached to a noun (“conflict”) that has no fixed 
temporal content” (2007: 9). The result of this is that the idea of “post-conflict” leads to a 
mental dichotomy that transforms “conflict” into a synonym of “war” and “post-conflict” into 
a synonym of “peace” (Lambach 2007). In this dichotomy, the idea of “conflict” relates to 
situations in which organised groups engage in acts of violence against each other, for 
instance, a state against a rebel movement, and this is conducted in accordance with a 
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dominant conflict narrative, whereas, “post-conflict” would mean the end of such violence, 
and a return to normalcy and peace (Lambach 2007).  
 
Yet, such an understanding of “post-conflict” makes it hard to provide a clear understanding 
of extensive violence, as in the genocide in Rwanda or situations where open warfare has 
taken long to end in which there has been a slowdown in violence, for example, northern 
Uganda. In northern Uganda, since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement 
between the rebel movement, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda 
in 2006, the government of Uganda has encouraged internally displaced persons (IDPs) to 
return to their homes (World Bank 2008a) as it considers the situation a “post-conflict” one. 
Yet, the LRA has not laid down its arms, but has retreated to Garamba National Park in DRC. 
In this case, conflict in northern Uganda has slowed down with the retreat of the LRA to 
DRC. The same question can be raised about South Africa: whether it can be considered a 
“post-conflict” situation given an increase in criminal violence and continued deterioration of 
human security since the end of the struggle against apartheid rule.  
 
Indeed, the concept “post-conflict” can be a misnomer for those societies which continue to 
experience other forms of violence after the end of open warfare or where violence has 
slowed down. As such, the level of violence is not a sufficient indicator of the end of conflict 
(Lambach 2007). Although in these situations, overt violence is absent, it does not necessarily 
mean that peace exists. For Mac Ginty (2006) it is a “no war, no peace” situation. As 
Finnstrom and Atkinson note, a “post-conflict” situation “can often be more violent than a 
conflict itself [...]. It is essential to acknowledge that a peace agreement must be won over 
and over again, on an everyday basis, in people’s everyday lives” (2008: 2). It is, thus, crucial 
to understand the various uses of the concept “post-conflict”.  
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For Call (2008b: 175) concept “post-conflict” has three uses: 1) refers to the period when 
open warfare is said to have come to a virtual end, either through a peace agreement or a 
military victory, as in Sierra Leone after 2002, Angola after the death of Jonas Savimbi in 
2002 and Liberia after 2003; 2) refers to “societies that have signed a formal peace 
agreement, even where the political violence that the peace agreement was designed to end 
has not been significantly diminished”, rather this should be called a “post-accord” situation, 
as in the DRC and northern Uganda; and 3) refers to “the apparent military defeat of one side 
in armed conflict, but more particularly the fall of a regime associated with the army”, for 
example, the fall of the Taliban and that of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Afghanistan and Iraq 
respectively. According to Call (2008b), the last two conceptions of “post-conflict”, have 
undermined the usefulness of the concept. For instance, in Iraq and Afghanistan organised 
violence has continued years after the fall of the target regimes, and for societies 
experiencing this violence, the term “post-conflict” is a misnomer in relation to their 
situation. As for Call (2008b), the first understanding of the term “post-conflict” tends to be 
more useful than the last two, since in such a situation there are certain changes that happen 
including, security sector reform, the building of more effective state institutions, elections, 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), reconciliation and transitional 
justice initiatives, development programs, the (re)construction or building economic 
institutions.  
 
This thesis uses the idea of “post-conflict” adopted from Lambach. For Lambach, a conflict is 
considered to have ended when “violence is no longer explained in terms of the dominant 
narrative of conflict” (2007: 10). Viewing “conflict” and “post-conflict” situations as social 
constructs, “discursive delimitations of the kind of behaviour that is to be expected and 
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allowed in a given set of circumstances” would mean a narrative of peace is put at the centre 
of the definition of “post-conflict” (Lambach 2007: 10).    
 
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding 
The concept of peacebuilding has also been used in the context of (re)building effective, 
legitimate government institutions, that is, statebuilding. Fukuyama defines statebuilding as 
“the creating of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (2004: 
xvii). In recent years, international actors and mainstream scholars (Paris 2004; Paris and 
Sisk 2009; Fukuyama 2004) have emphasised the significance of the state, power, functions 
and its institutions. According to Fukuyama, statebuilding is one of the most crucial issues for 
the global community since “weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s 
serious problems”, including terrorism and poverty (2004:1). In addition, such states are 
regarded as impediments to development, the eradication of poverty as well as a threat to 
domestic and global stability.  
 
Since the 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks (which were linked to Afghanistan – a “weak state”) on 
the US, international terrorism has been linked to state fragility/weak statehood. In this 
regard, such states have been viewed as having lost their monopoly over the use of violence 
to warlords, militia groups and terrorists.31 For Rotberg (2004: 1), nation-states fail “when 
they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their 
inhabitants”. Rotberg notes that political goods are:  
 
those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and 
now make on states. They encompass indigenous expectations, conceivably obligations, 
inform the political culture, and together give content to the social contract between 
                                                           
31
  The 7/7, 2005 terrorist attack in London, UK is evidence that terrorists can emerge from more stable 
states since the attackers were British citizens. 
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ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions 
(2004: 2).  
 
 
He considers the provision of security, especially human security as a crucial political good 
and the main function of a state. Rotberg further notes that the state’s provision of security 
includes the prevention of “cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; 
to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to 
prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to 
resolve their differences with the state and without recourse to arms or forms of physical 
coercion” (2004: 3). 
 
 If a reasonable measure of security exists, then it becomes much easier for the state to deliver 
other political goods. In addition to security, a state ought to provide “predictable, 
recognisable, systematised methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms 
and the prevailing mores of a particular society or polity” – this implies the existence of 
codes and procedures essential for the respect of the rule of law, private property, and 
contracts as an efficient and effective judiciary system (Rotberg 2004: 3). Another crucial 
political good that Rotberg notes is one that allows for an open polity that promotes the vital 
freedoms for citizens including, their ability to freely express themselves, freely participate in 
politics and in competition for office. In such an open political system fundamental human 
and civil rights are respected. Other public goods that a state is expected to provide to its 
citizens include education, physical infrastructure (roads, railway lines, telephones, electricity 
and so on), employment, health care (which can also be provided by private companies), 
space for the development of a vibrant civil society, national currency and a central bank. 
Rotberg notes that, put together this bundle of political goods does establish a set of criteria 
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for determining whether a state is strong, weak or failed (2004). For Rotberg, strong states 
tend to fulfil expectations in all the areas, while weak states tend to meet expectations in 
some areas and fail in some, failed states fail to meet expectations in all the areas.  
 
Consequently, weak and failed states are prone to a high level of internal violence which is 
often associated with inter-communal tensions. Such states cannot control their territories and 
are characterised by a lack of respect for the rule of law, human rights abuses, weak 
institutions, destroyed infrastructure, political instability, humanitarian emergencies, criminal 
gangs, arms and drug trafficking, and a loss of domestic legitimacy, among others (Fukuyama 
2004; Rotberg 2004). Strong states are the opposite of weak states. The failed or weak state 
paradigm fails to take into consideration external factors that contribute to state weakness or 
failure, for instance, colonial rule in Africa as noted in the previous chapter also contributed 
to the underdevelopment of Africa, as noted by Walter Rodney and also international trade 
with its rules determined by more powerful states and IFIs. 
 
Institutional and Legitimacy Approaches to Statebuilding 
There are two different approaches to the state: 1) the institutional approach (proponents of 
this approach include Fukuyama 2004, Rotberg 2004 and Paris 2004); and 2) the 
“legitimacy” approach (Call 2008a; Lemay-Hebert 2009). An institutional approach to 
statebuilding focuses on building effective state institutions in post-conflict environments as a 
remedy for the “weirdness” or “abnormality” found in weak and failed states that is absent in 
strong states and also as a way of enhancing conditions for building self-sustaining peace in 
them. This approach largely draws from the Weberian notion of statehood which views a 
state as a political entity that has monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Since the 
institutional approach emphasises building the capacity of state institutions it ignores 
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customary institutions (Call 2008a). In addition to service delivery, another important 
element of the state, according to the institutional approach, is the state’s capacity to 
institutionalise its diverse organisations (Call 2008a). “Institutionalisation”, according to Call, 
means “the process by which a cluster of activities acquires a persistent set of rules that 
constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles for actors” (Call 2008a: 8). 
Institutionalisation enhances the durability of the state and its institutions, and the death of a 
leader would not result in the collapse of the state. For example, the death of the Polish 
President, Lech Kaczynski and a number of senior government officials in a plane crash on 
the 10th of April, 2010 did not result in the collapse of state institutions in Poland. However, 
according to Call (2008a), predominant approaches to peacebuilding ignore 
institutionalisation of state agencies since these agencies are usually not functioning well and 
can be an impediment to the peacebuilding process. Instead, internationals often end up 
devising their strategies around influential leaders and this can have negative outcomes in 
relation to building durable institutions (also see Paris 2004). 
 
The “legitimacy” approach finds the institutional approach’s focus on institutions 
insufficient, thus argues for the need to also focus on “socio-political cohesion and the 
legitimacy central authorities can generate” (Lemay-Hebert 2009: 22). In this regard, issues 
of legitimacy are considered of paramount importance when building states. This also relates 
to issues of nation-building, that is, issues related to socio-political cohesion and how 
external actors shape conditions under which social integration is enhanced in post-conflict 
states (Lemay-Hebert 2009).32 However, this idea of external actors being involved in 
building “nations” contradicts the empirical and theoretical understandings of the nature of a 
                                                           
32
  Social integration occurs when distinct groups are incorporated into a common society with the 
creation of an over-arching supra-national identity by means of standardising and unifying the various cultures 
and identities (Kostic 2008).  
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nation and nation-formation (Newman 2009a, also see chapter 1). As Newman (2009a: 30) 
notes, “The idea of international nation-building seems a contradiction in terms, and nation-
building as peacebuilding seems like a historical aberration; historically nation-building was 
achieved through widespread violence”. As such, an emphasis on state legitimacy makes 
sense since a state needs to be acceptable to its citizens for them to be able to rally behind its 
authority, thus enhancing stability and order in it. Nation-building should evolve organically 
and not imposed from outside. Cramer (2006) has noted that, “civil war is not a stupid thing”, 
that is, civil wars can also have progressive consequences including nation- and statebuilding. 
 
In terms of conceptual viability, according to Newman, statebuilding is more conceptually 
viable than nation-building given its focus on meanings that are more objective such as the 
(re)building of government institutions and the provision of positive political goods including 
security, among others (2009a). The assumption behind statebuilding as peacebuilding is that 
once strong and legitimate state institutions are built then societies emerging from violent 
civil war are freed from the troubles of weak statehood. As such, this will enable positive 
political goods necessary for promoting internal order and stability as well as international 
peace and security.33  
 
A number of scholars and international, bilateral and development organisations have been 
engaged in debates on statebuilding and how it can contribute to peacebuilding. For Fritz and 
Menocal of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), statebuilding means: 
 
constructing the foundations of the very (government) edifice within which governance 
ought to operate. Without the construction of this edifice, governance interventions 
cannot have an impact. At the same time, ensuring the quality and integrity of 
government is an important dimension of the state-building process, including 
                                                           
33
  For instance Fukuyama (2004)’s view that weak states tend to be aggressive against their neighbours. 
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generating legitimacy of a new or re-emerging state and contributing to the creation of 
“nationwide public” and a shared sense of the public realm (2007: 4).   
 
 
This represents the idea of statebuilding and external nation-building as peacebuilding which 
is problematic as noted earlier. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in its “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and Situations” considers a focus on statebuilding as the main objective in enhancing state 
stability and order. In 2008 the UNDP launched the “Statebuilding for Peace” project aimed 
at empowering “national and local actors to develop and implement strategies that address 
fragilities and enhance responsiveness and resilience of states for sustainable peace” (UNDP 
2009a: 5). Analysts such as, Paris and Sisk have argued for the need to bring statebuilding 
into peacebuilding and consider statebuilding a sub-component of peacebuilding (2009; Paris 
2004).   
 
Does One Size Fit All? 
Chapter 1 has shown that state formation and consolidation in the West took several centuries 
according to the socio-political, economic and historical circumstances of the region. In the 
past two decades, states and institutions that the internationals have been imposing in post-
conflict environments resemble liberal Western states, an approach that largely overlooks 
local contextual matters. Western states are based on liberal values – support for individual 
liberties, a free market economy, a state with limited power, a viable civil society and a 
separation of state and church, among others – and such values are “not acceptable to all 
contexts as legitimate or appropriate” (Newman 2009a: 30). The success story of Asian 
developmental states such as Korea and Singapore which are not liberal, has raised questions 
about whether other forms of statebuilding, for instance, strong or authoritarian states, “are 
not, in the long run, more successful in creating stability, security, wealth and welfare for the 
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population” (Goetze and Guzina 2008: 324). Other critics view the statebuilding aspect of 
peacebuilding as “a thinly disguised attempt to modernise and thus ‘civilise’ dysfunctional 
‘third world’ countries that are incapable of developing viable indigenous forms of cohesion” 
(Newman 2009a: 30). In addition, peacebuilding is focused more on what peace means 
qualitatively and it does not have to be necessarily connected to the state. How it has been 
connected to the state is through liberal peacebuilding which has emphasised on building 
liberal states. In this sense, contemporary statebuilding in post-conflict societies is positivist 
instrumentalist Western Westphalian project which argue for the need to build states in order 
to build peace.  It is no surprise that statebuilding is fraught with tensions and contradictions 
(Paris and Sisk 2009).  
 
Peacebuilding as Liberal Peace 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis and in this chapter, contemporary post-conflict 
peacebuilding operations assume a different approach to managing conflicts, and 
international order and stability, which according to Newman, Paris and Richmond is perhaps 
a reflection that a liberal post-Westphalian world order is being constructed (2009; Newman 
2009b). In addition, it is viewed as a challenge to the Westphalian notions of the sovereignty 
of states as understood in the conceptualisation of “sovereignty as responsibility” 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001; Deng et al. 1996). A 
number of scholars have concluded that in the post-Cold War era international peacebuilding 
reflects a liberal agenda (Paris 2004; Taylor 2007, Duffield 2001; Willet 2005; Richmond 
2004; Richmond 2005; Richmond 2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Richmond and Franks 2008; 
Franks and Richmond 2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). The dominant form of 
contemporary peacebuilding that places emphasis on establishing liberal values such as, the 
protection of individual rights, rule of law, a free market economy, democracy as well as 
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building a liberal state in war-torn societies is called liberal peacebuilding. Liberal 
peacebuilding has sometimes been confused with statebuilding, however, as noted above, the 
two are different. In addition, liberal peacebuilding and peacebuilding are not the same, 
though sometimes the two concepts have been used interchangeably. Whereas liberal 
peacebuilding focuses on building a liberal state, democratisation, a free market economy, 
individual rights and the rule of law, as noted above, peacebuilding emphasises issues such as 
social justice, welfare provision, tradition, custom, culture, the grassroots, reconciliation, 
equity and humanistic agendas for peace rather technocratic institutional state-centric agendas 
for peace. The theoretical foundation for liberal peacebuilding is the liberal peace.  
 
The Liberal Peace Thesis 
The liberal peace thesis states that “certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend 
to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than 
illiberal states” (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 11). As such, it is premised upon the 
idea that liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics promote sustainable peace in war-torn 
societies. The state and the building of its institutions are central to liberal peacebuilding. In 
other words, liberal internationalists require the state and state elites as main means to 
introduce the idea of the liberal peace in societies emerging from violent conflict. The main 
proponents of the liberal peace agenda including the US and UK consider liberal ideas and 
practices as universal, and as such tend to undermine the ideas and practices of non-liberal 
societies.  
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The concept of the liberal peace should be viewed in relation to the democratic peace thesis.34 
A growing literature in IR has focused on the implications of democracy and markets on 
interstate relations. This literature has focused more on whether democratic states are more 
peaceful in their foreign relations and have attempted to provide the theoretical and empirical 
explanation for this (Chan 1997). The democratic peace thesis states the following: 1) 
democratic states rarely fight against each other; 2) democratic states tend to be more open to 
international trade than non-democratic ones creating interdependencies that preclude the 
outbreak of war between them; and 3) democracies tend to be more peaceful internally than 
other systems (Doyle 1983; Doyle 1986; Oneal et al. 1996; Rosato 2003). The democratic 
peace thesis is largely associated with Immanuel Kant’s notion of “Perpetual Peace” (1795).  
 
It appears a general consensus has emerged among international scholars that democracies 
rarely fight against each other, although they can fight against illiberal states, for instance, the 
US and democratic allies’ war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing from the democratic peace 
thesis, theorists such as Rummel (1995, 2005) have noted that democratic states are less 
likely to experience civil wars since democratic institutions create conditions for dealing with 
potentially violent social conflicts in nonviolent ways including mediation, voting, 
compromise and negotiation. I am more interested in debates on intrastate war and the liberal 
peace than the democratic peace since their focus is on inter-state relations. It is crucial to 
note that there is no single liberal peace, but various forms of it (Richmond 2005). 
 
                                                           
34
  A number of scholars have used concepts of the “liberal peace” and “democratic peace” 
interchangeably.  Mac Ginty (2006) uses the concept “liberal democratic peace.” However, in this study the 
liberal peace is distinguished from the democratic peace in the sense that, whereas, the democratic peace focuses 
on how peace can be built between states and is institutions, the liberal peace focuses on how peace can be built 
within states and tends to be ideological.    
 96 
 
The Liberal Peace Framework 
Nearly everyone yearns or supports peace with many commentators “invoking and 
prescribing peace” and yet, Richmond contends that peace has “rarely been addressed in 
detail as a concept” with its theorisation “normally hidden away in debates about responding 
to war and conflict” (2005: 2; also see Mac Ginty 2006; Gregor 1996).35 While war is 
described as real, peace is described as an ideal, “a chimera, receding over the horizon just as 
we get closer” (Gregor 1996: x). Hence, more attention has been given to war and “negative 
peace” in IR that understands peace as absence of overt violence within or between states as 
opposed to positive peace which is present where structural forms of violence, such as 
poverty and social injustice have been eliminated (Galtung 1969, 1985). It is the kind of 
peace which the “law and order-oriented” person envisages and it “leads to stability thinking” 
(Schmid 1968: 223). In this case, peace research that is defined solely in terms of negative 
peace will  
 
easily be research into the conditions of maintaining power, freezing the status quo, of 
manipulating the underdog so that he does not take up arms against the topdog. This 
concept of peace will obviously be in the interest of the status quo-powers at the 
national or international levels, and may equally be a conservative force in politics 
(Galtung 1967 cited in Schmid 1968: 223).  
 
As Richmond (2005: 2) notes, “Where theorists do attempt to engage with peace as a 
concept, they often focus upon units such as states and empire as its main building blocks, 
thus broadly discounting the role and agency of individuals and societies in its construction 
and sustainability.” In this regard, those who advocate negative peace tend to put much 
emphasis on states, and their institutions and functions, as well as want to maintain the status 
                                                           
35
  In The Transformation of Peace (2005) and Peace in International Relations (2008), Richmond 
attempts to fill this gap in IR and provides a discussion of how peace has been discussed in IR literature. 
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quo as means to maintain order and stability in post-conflict environments. This renders most 
of the population invisible.  
 
Consequently, this tends to promote the interests and needs of the most powerful and not 
those of the marginalised, the poor or the less powerful. This results in a failure to come up 
with strategies that also seek to empathise with the “subaltern”, reduce the inequities in 
power that can lead to structural violence or violent conflict, bring culture, custom, tradition, 
and make considerations of the everyday needs of most of the population in war-shattered 
states in the peace debate. In addition, as Richmond notes, “Concepts of peace may also be 
used as a tool of war, used to justify, legitimate, and motivate a recourse to war [...] (2005: 
13). For those interested in multiple conceptualisations of peace and emancipatory forms of 
peace questions such as who owns the peace, who creates it, who are the winners and whose 
interests are being served become pertinent. The dominant form of peace – the liberal peace – 
that international actors construct in post-conflict environments is a result of a limited 
conceptualisation of peace as absence of overt violence. An understanding of the nature of 
the liberal peace is useful in our understanding of the challenges it faces in post-conflict 
environments, the criticisms levelled against it, and the approaches and conditions relevant 
for helping create durable peace in post-conflict environments. 
 
Four Strands of the Liberal Peace 
In his conceptualisation of the liberal peace, Richmond (2005) has identified four main 
strands that have emerged from the debates in international theory and different historical 
contexts, particularly in the West. These four strands of the liberal peace include victor’s 
peace, constitutional peace, institutional peace, and civil peace. Richmond has pointed out 
that victor’s peace is an outcome of the age-old realist argument that peace is dependent on 
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military victory and upon the domination or hegemony of a winner. However, the victor’s 
peace may result in political resistance, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second strand is the 
constitutional peace which is derived from the Kantian argument that peace is an outcome of 
democracy, trade and a set of cosmopolitan values based on individualism. Richmond 
observes that the “constitutional peace struggles with those who do not want to share power, 
and who do not want the certainty of domestic legal structures that might outlaw their 
activities” (2005: 203).  
 
The third strand, according to Richmond, is an institutional peace which is a result of 
normative and legal institutional arrangements among states in which these states 
multilaterally agree on ways of behaving and enforcing or determining their behaviour. This 
can be found in international institutions such as the UN as well as regional organisations 
such as the EU, the African Union (AU), the Arab League (AL) and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), and sub-regional organisations such as Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
These international regimes and organisations regulate behaviour of member states. The 
institutional peace discourse “often fails to communicate with those involved at the civil 
level, or to receive their feedback on its overall project” (Richmond 2005: 203). The fourth 
strand, the civil peace emphasises participation, citizens, human rights and civil society as 
significant in peacemaking. Unlike the other three strands of the liberal peace, individual 
agency rather than state or international agency is present within it. The civil peace has not 
had huge support from states and multilateral organisations. As such, it has not received a 
central place in their thinking about peace. As Richmond notes, “The civil peace discourse 
often struggles to be heard, even though it is often propagated by non-state actors motivated 
by human security and social justice, who blame the state for war, or liberal states for self-
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interest” (2005: 203). Further, according to Richmond, these four strands of the liberal peace 
are “both contradictory and complimentary, and each brings with it a certain intellectual and 
empirical baggage” (2006: 294). Despite this, the liberal peace framework has been 
uncritically assumed as a panacea for all the problems experienced in post-conflict societies 
and is being exported to these societies without considering that their socio-political 
experiences are different from the West.  
 
Graduations of the Liberal Peace 
According to Richmond (2005), within the liberal peace framework there are several different 
graduations. An understanding of the graduations of the liberal peace framework is useful in 
helping expose the challenges of building sustainable peace and the types of liberal peaces 
that are being established in post-conflict environments. Richmond identifies three of these 
graduations as the conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory which relate to the four main 
intellectual strands of the liberal peace noted above. The conservative version of the liberal 
peace largely relates to top-down approaches to peacebuilding and development in which 
powerful external actors are heavily involved in the peace process and may involve the use of 
military force or coercion or conditionalities in its application. As such, “it is often seen as an 
alien expression of hegemony and domination” (Richmond: 2005: 214). This, according to 
Richmond (2005: 214), “equates to a hegemonic and often unilateral state-led peace […]”. 
Examples include the UK and UN involvement in Sierra Leone. However, coercive action in 
Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan, for example, represents what Richmond calls a hyper-
conservative model  and is “heavily informed by the victor’s peace in preliminary stages of 
intervention” (2005: 214, 2006, emphasis not mine).  
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In such situations, the military option appears to be the most realistic, and the militarisation 
of peace is justified on humanitarian grounds, though after the violence has stopped, this form 
of peace seems to care less for the ordinary people who suffered during the violent conflict or 
the period of gross human rights violations and even during the period of intervention. 
Besides being based upon coercive action, the conservative model of the liberal peace is also 
based upon diplomatic processes, that is, it is created at the elite level. Diplomacy or military 
intervention will lead to the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties, then peace 
negotiations and in the process a peace agreement is reached. Thus, the conservative model of 
the liberal peace is often associated with the idea of negative peace. With its heavy bias 
towards negative peace, it tends to focus on bringing an end to violent conflict and the 
introduction of programmes such as, the DDR and security sector reform. While this 
promotes order, stability and basic security to civilians, not much is done to promote their 
other basic needs, welfare and interests.  
 
The orthodox model of the liberal peace involves a top-down approach to peacebuilding and 
some bottom approaches that engage with a range of non-state actors. Although actors are 
“wary and sensitive of local ownership and culture”, they are “still also determined to transfer 
their methodologies, objectives, and norms into the new governance framework” (Richmond 
2005: 214). However, consensual negotiation dominates this framework (Richmond 2005). 
Although the orthodox model represents a bottom-up approach involving civil society and 
grassroots peacebuilding activities, as well as the top-down approach involving international 
organisations including the UN, IFIs, states, and the elites, top-down activities dominate 
through the use of carrots and sticks by leading donors and states. Both the “conservative and 
orthodox models assume technical superiority over recipient subjects, as well as the 
normative universality of the liberal peace” (Richmond 2005: 215). The two models lead to 
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peacebuilding approaches that depend on a “technocratic” understanding of peace, making it 
hard to accommodate alternative approaches to peacemaking, thus privileging the liberal 
peace to the detriment of the local understanding of peace (Mac Ginty 2006).  
 
The third model of the liberal peace that Richmond has identified is the emancipatory model. 
This model is a more critical version of the liberal peace “concerned with a much closer 
relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership, and tends to be very critical 
of coerciveness, conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models 
operate upon” (Richmond 2005: 215). Bottom-up activities dominate the emancipatory model 
of the liberal peace and this model aims at promoting human needs, welfare, justice and 
reconciliation. Richmond further notes that, this form of peace “equates to the civil peace” 
(2005: 215). Although this peace is not state-led since social movements and civil society 
shape it, it is still based on the belief that the liberal peace is superior to all other forms of 
peacemaking, thus tends to push the liberal agenda to the extent that local elites are co-opted 
as agents of the liberal peace. Consequently, statebuilding and peacebuilding remain chiefly 
the preserve of the state and its institutions since these are regarded as routes to a self-
sustaining peace and emancipation.  
 
Richmond observes that the above three graduations of the liberal peace model “tend often to 
be combined in the peacebuilding consensus and are expressed at different degrees in any one 
peacebuilding intervention, depending upon priorities associated with dominant state 
interests, donor interests, and the capacity of peacebuilding actors” (2005: 215). He further 
notes that these three versions of the liberal peace can undermine and contradict each other 
affecting the larger peacebuilding process. However, it is crucial to note that all the three 
graduations of the liberal peace tend to share an assumption that the liberal peace is a 
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universal peace, thus legitimating intervention and the superiority of the liberal peace over 
local forms of peace (Richmond 2005). The following chapter is a comprehensive review of 
literature on liberal peacebuilding. 
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Chapter 3: The Liberal Peacebuilding Debate 
 
Introduction 
Liberal peacebuilding initiatives in post-war societies have generated debates and 
controversies within the academic and policy circles on their nature and effectiveness, what 
causes peace, the nature of peace to be built, the owner(s) of the peace and how the 
international actors should relate with local actors. In addition questions have been raised 
regarding the assumptions, strategies, viability and coherence of international peacebuilding 
initiatives.  
 
Empirical and statistical evidence show that post-Cold War international peacebuilding 
operations have managed to promote stability and end overt violence in war-torn societies 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, recent studies on international peacebuilding note that 
liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding have proved to be partially counter-productive and on 
the whole have not achieved the intended goal of helping war-torn societies transform from 
states of violent conflict to self-sustaining peace (Paris 2004; Taylor 2007, Duffield 2001; 
Willet 2005; Richmond 2004; Richmond 2005; Richmond 2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Richmond 
and Franks 2008). The prevailing consensus among these critics of liberal peacebuilding is 
that efforts to promote political and economic liberalisation in post-conflict environments has 
had a mixed record – has often led to tensions or a return to overt violence, as in Angola, as 
well as partial success, as in Namibia and Mozambique (Paris 2004). Yet, the debate over the 
liberal peace reflects a polarisation between those who would want to see the liberal peace 
made better and cannot see “realistic” alternatives outside it, thus would prefer a search for 
alternatives within the liberal peace itself (Paris 2004; 2010; Begby and Burgess 2009), and 
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those who have subjected it to critical scrutiny questioning its viability, appropriateness and 
legitimacy (Richmond and Franks 2009; Taylor 2007; Willet 2005), with some like 
Richmond proposing “post liberal peace[building]” (2009b).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a critical review of literature on the liberal peace agenda 
and the controversies surrounding liberal peacebuilding. The growth in literature on post-
conflict peacebuilding and the liberal peace is a result of the increase and omnipresence of 
civil wars in the developing world after the end of the Cold War and the supposed failure in 
the dominant paradigm to create conditions for durable peace in post-conflict environments.  
 
Political Liberalisation, Free Markets and Peace 
There has been considerable debate among social scientists on the causes of a self-sustaining 
peace. Against the backdrop of the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union, 
liberal democracy has been viewed as viable and good form of governance across the world 
that promotes durable peace. However, the celebration of the triumph of liberal democracy at 
the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s was overshadowed by an increase in violent intra-
state conflicts in Rwanda, Sierra Leone Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Angola, Liberia and 
Burundi, among others. In the absence of superpower competition, Western liberal 
democracies had an opportunity to intervene for humanitarian purposes, to end the conflicts 
and adopt approaches aimed at establishing a liberal peace that has proved durable in Western 
liberal democracies. For proponents of the liberal peace, as noted in the previous chapter, 
open markets and open political spaces are essential for both domestic and global peace and 
security. Another assumption is that, since the liberal peace has worked well in the West, 
transplanting it in other parts of the world, especially those emerging from violent conflict, 
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can deliver sustainable peace in them. Based on these assumptions, international actors have 
pursued fast-track political and market liberalisation initiatives simultaneously.36  
 
Free market reforms involve the implementation of policies that lead to deregulation, 
macroeconomic stabilisation and the opening up of domestic markets to foreign investment, 
among others. On the political front, post-war societies have witnessed international actors 
pushing for multi-party elections, the writing of constitutions, the liberalisation of political 
activities, the establishment of vibrant civil societies and so on. In post-conflict environments 
it is assumed that providing individual liberties and free markets would not only promote 
economic growth, but also a self-sustaining peace since this encourages peaceful means of 
resolving conflicts. The simultaneous promotion of market liberalisation and political 
liberalisation is based on the assumption that the two are intrinsically connected and 
complement each other. However, the two tend to conflict with each other (Paris 2004). For 
instance, market democracy encourages competition and conflict, and in a situation where 
institutions are lacking to manage economic and political competition this can lead to 
violence and can undermine the (re)building of state institutions and the promotion of 
political liberalisation in war-affected societies (Paris 2004). 
 
  In an attempt to answer the question whether international peacebuilders’ strategies of 
political and economic liberalisation can recreate conditions of civil war, Paris (2004) 
examines fourteen major peacebuilding operations under the UN umbrella between 1989 and 
1999. These fourteen peace operations shared a basic assumption of transforming states 
emerging from violent conflict into “liberal market democracies as quickly as possible” (Paris 
                                                           
36
  This study adopts Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2008: 2)’s use of the concept political liberalism to 
refer to policies aimed at reducing “government constraints on political behaviour, promote free political 
exchange, and establish rights to political participation”, and economic liberalism to refer to “policies that 
reduce government constraints on economic behaviour and thereby promote economic exchange”. 
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2004: 5). According to Paris, the cases produced mixed results. In most of these cases the 
process of political or economic liberalisation or both had damaging and destabilising effects. 
Paris (2004: 155) concludes that rapid liberalisation helped rekindle overt violence or 
contributed to the recreation of the social and economic conditions that had caused violence 
in many of the countries that have hosted these missions, raising questions about the 
reliability of the current “peace-through-liberalisation strategy”.37  
 
Paris attributes the big part of this problem to contemporary students of the liberal peace 
thesis and peacebuilders who have continued to pay excessive attention to contemporary 
advocates of rapid liberalisation while ignoring classical liberals’ “pragmatic emphasis on 
authoritative and effective – in addition to limited – government as a precondition for 
domestic peace” (2004: 152). For Paris it is crucial to draw on classical liberalism’s “insights 
into the preconditions for lifting societies out of the state of nature, including the requirement 
for effective government institutions, or ‘state capacity’, as the foundation for a peaceful 
market democracy” (2006: 427).   
 
Democratisation and Violent Conflicts 
A number of studies that have examined the nature of the relationship between 
democratisation and the risk of violent conflict concur with Paris’s findings (Ottaway 1995; 
Synder 2000). Snyder (2000) has used empirical evidence, both historical and contemporary 
to investigate the connection between democratisation and increased risk of political violence 
that is related to nationalism and ethnicity. Snyder has noted the following paradox: 
                                                           
37
  Chua (2004) has shown that there is a link between democratisation and market liberalisation on one 
hand, an increase in ethnic violence and instability on the other hand. For Chua, where an ethnic minority group 
dominates, the simultaneous introduction of democratisation and free markets  exacerbate minority grip on the 
economy while democratisation provides an opportunity for the poor who are in the majority to  express their 
resentment against those ethnic minority groups who dominate the market.    
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On the one hand, the successful unfolding of global, liberal democratic revolution 
might eventually undergird a more peaceful era in world politics. On the other hand, the 
transition to democratic politics is meanwhile creating fertile conditions for nationalism 
and ethnic conflict, which not only raises the costs of the transition but may also 
redirect popular political participation into a lengthy antidemocratic detour (2000: 20). 
 
Although Snyder does not dispute the position that democracies rarely fight against each 
other, he finds the initial phase of democratisation to be extremely unstable. According to 
him, transition to democracy triggers political violence that is related to nationalism and 
ethnicity. Democratisation creates political space that results in the establishment of 
politically significant groups that have diverse interests and sometimes different ideologies. 
This results in political elites feeling threatened. For Ottaway (1997), since the process of 
democratisation challenges the status quo, traditional elites who feel threatened seek to 
maintain authority by mobilising masses along ethnic or nationalist lines. As such, if violence 
erupts, it does so along ethnic or nationalist lines.  
 
In addition to the above, elections can be highly destabilising in deeply divided societies, for 
example, Rwanda in 1994, Burundi in 1993 and Angola in 1992 and more recently, Kenya in 
2007, Ivory Coast in 2010 and Nigeria in 2011.  Ferme (1998) who examines the thought and 
practice of Sierra Leoneans in relation to competitive elections prior to the civil war observes 
that Sierra Leoneans perceive competitive elections as violent and dangerous. As a result, 
they “champion the social cohesiveness of consensus-building in ‘traditional’ African 
political idioms, such as the Mende practice of ‘hanging heads’” since “their open-ended and 
provisional form is often better suited to hold conflict at bay, than the finality of vote counts 
in competitive elections” (Ferme 1998: 557).    
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Without an understanding of the local context and power relations, the idea of peace-as-
democratisation can lead to unintended consequences in conflict-prone societies. As such, a 
Western-style democratic system should not always be seen as a panacea to the instability in 
conflict-torn societies, but also a potential source of instability depending on how it is 
introduced in these societies. Given the fact that the process of democratisation is more 
problematic, Snyder argues for the need for democratisation initiatives to be cognisant of the 
politics of the transition (2000). Snyder’s findings are crucial in our understanding of how 
democratisation can lead to instability in states emerging from civil war and ways of avoiding 
this.   
 
Paris’ Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation Approach 
Paris does not suggest a solution that takes proper consideration and understanding of 
existing political and cultural systems in countries hosting peacebuilding operations, but one 
that aims at building effective institutions before the liberalisation process. His work is 
significant in bringing out important issues including the process through which war-torn 
societies can be transformed into liberal market democracies, and the negative effects of 
competition associated with capitalism and democracy on war-shattered states. While 
proponents of the liberal peace see the competition that democracy and capitalism encourage 
as important in promoting efficiency and accountability in both the economic and political 
realms, they overlook the fact that this is not effective in war-shattered states since such states 
lack effective government institutions (Paris 2004). For Paris war-torn societies are 
susceptible to five pathologies: 1) “bad” civil society; 2) opportunistic “ethnic 
entrepreneurs”; 3) the danger that elections may cause destructive societal competition; 4) 
local “saboteurs” who claim to be champions for democracy, but seek to destabilise the 
democratic process; 5) and the risk of economic liberalisation (2004: 159-65). War-torn states 
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are vulnerable to the above five pathologies due to intense societal conflicts, their lack of 
traditional conflict dampeners including cultural constraints on violent behaviour and 
ineffective political institutions (Paris 2004: 168-75). For Paris, building strong and effective 
state institutions before implementing liberalisation policies is the sure way out of this 
challenge.  
 
Drawing from the democratic peace thesis, Paris argues that peacebuilders should preserve 
the broad goal of transforming war-torn states into liberal market democracies since mature 
democracies tend to be peaceful in their domestic affairs as well as in their relations with 
other democracies. Although Paris is critical of the liberal peace model of the 1990s, he does 
not reject the goals of liberal peacebuilding.  Instead, he offers an alternative model within 
the liberal peace framework which he calls “Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation” (IBL). 
This approach acknowledges that political and market liberalisation can worsen societal 
conflicts and further proposes the building of strong and effective state institutions before 
embarking on a liberalisation agenda and transferring power to local actors.  
 
In this regard, the process of liberalisation is gradual and controlled ensuring that state 
institutions being built can manage the political and economic reforms being introduced in 
such post-conflict societies. The IBL approach encourages an arrangement that is similar to 
the United Nations Transitional Administrations in East Timor and Kosovo. Since there is a 
likelihood of warring parties returning to conflict in the early stages of building strong 
institutions, Paris suggests that in these earliest stages international peacebuilders should act 
“illiberally.” For Paris such a move is crucial if the long-term objective of establishing 
durable peace in such societies is to be achieved.  
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Criticisms of the IBL Strategy 
Paris’s IBL approach is flawed for a number of reasons. It is built on the idea that the liberal 
peace is a universal peace and as such, it offers a prescription that overlooks and undermines 
local ownership, custom and local institutions. As Mac Ginty and Richmond note:  
 
[...] even the process of building institutions must be locally owned, and reflect local 
identity and the new peace, liberal or otherwise, and must be quickly and demonstrably 
of benefit to the vast majority of the population, not just in ways that withstand 
comparison with the local pre-peace process environment, but the globalised milieu of 
stable and prosperous societies around the world (2007: 493).  
 
In addition, Paris’s suggestion that peacebuilders should use “illiberal” means to achieve the 
goal of building institutions before liberalising political and economic spheres reflects a 
classic expression of the authoritarianism that liberalism can adopt. It encourages liberals to 
use force in situations where they want to build strong institutions in war-shattered states or 
when the host states do not comply with the demands of the liberals. The net effect of this is 
that the liberal peace that is created in post-conflict states is anti-liberation since it takes away 
the right to self-governance and self-determination of the individuals in host countries. As it 
is, the IBL is counterproductive. It asks too much from the peacebuilders including being 
coercive in the interim period and can put peacebuilders in harm’s way if local actors 
violently resist such initiatives. Sriram (2008: 191) adds that “the rush to institutionalisation 
carries with it significant risks, including destabilisation of weak state structures and the 
development or consolidation of new spoiler groups”. 
 
In addition, the IBL strategy overlooks critical factors to the promotion of lasting and stable 
peace including the promotion of the needs and interests of the ordinary people. Further, it 
reduces peacebuilding to a technical exercise involving activities such as, institution building, 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, rather than considering 
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the root causes of the conflict. A “virtual peace” (Richmond 2005, 2006; Taylor 2007) or 
“technocratic peace” (Mac Ginty 2006) emerges from such problem-solving approaches to 
peacemaking. A “virtual peace” does not have wide support from most of the population in 
war-torn societies, though it is usually satisfactory to the ruling elites and international 
peacebuilders (Taylor 2007; Richmond 2005). It is often contested, fragile and overlooks the 
agency of most of the population to build peace through other mechanisms such as custom, 
traditions, reconciliation and restorative justice.  
 
For Chopra and Hohe (2004) there is the need to integrate “communities into the process of 
institution building, where they live and at higher-levels, in order to foster a sense of 
identification with the greater whole and a feeling of ownership of the alternative structures” 
(2004: 291).  Empirical studies on Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and other war-shattered 
states have shown that where a peace dividend is not shared among most of the population, 
there is a very high risk of a return to a violent conflict or authoritarianism (Richmond and 
MacGinty 2007; Chopra 2002; Richmond and Franks 2008).   
 
Critiquing the Liberal Peace Agenda in Africa 
Despite the fact that most of the violent conflicts have occurred in Africa and the liberal 
peace agenda has been dominant on the continent, many studies on the liberal peace tend to 
focus on non-African cases (Shaw and Mbabazi: 2007).  Few of the studies on the liberal 
peace specifically examine the implications of the liberal peace agenda in Africa and their 
conclusions show that it faces challenges on the continent (Abrahamsen 2001; Fanthorpe 
2005; Shaw and Mbabazi 2007; Taylor 2007; Willet 2005; Castaneda 2009; Kurz 2010;  
Englebert and Tull 2008; Salih 2009). Abrahamsen notes that contemporary development 
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policy has emphasised a merger of development, democracy and peace: “development is 
dependent on democracy, and democracy supports peace and stability, further encouraging 
development” (2001: 80). However, she observes that democracy and peace have remained 
elusive in Africa despite the international actors’ high expectations and injection of 
considerable political and financial resources aimed at promoting this developmental agenda 
(Abrahamsen 2001). The primary reason being that “the policies of development and 
democratisation ignore crucial features of the power structure in African states, and entail an 
assault on existing relations and forms of power and legitimacy” (Abrahamsen 2001: 80).  
 
In a number of post-conflict African states, the liberal peace has failed to transcend the neo-
patrimonial political culture and in some cases, democratisation and liberalisation policies 
have created conditions for conflict, for example, Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, civil war in 
Sierra Leone and a return to conflict in Angola (Williams 2004; Abrahamsen 2001; Taylor 
2007, 2009). Williams (2004) has observed that attempts at constructing liberal democratic 
states in Rwanda and Sierra Leone contributed to the violence in the two countries since these 
failed to take into account the neo-patrimonial nature of state power in the two states. Indeed, 
the promotion of neo-liberal economic reforms in Africa has “contributed to the undermining 
and dissolving the patrimonial ‘glue’ that previously bound many African states together, 
resulting in the reconfiguration and re-negotiation of political authority as elites compete for 
their survival in the face of declining resources” (Abrahamsen 2001: 99).  
 
Taylor (2007) who concurs with Williams and Abrahamsen, adopts a Gramscian critique of 
neoliberalism to note that the concept of the liberal peace as a representation of an 
internationalised neo-liberal hegemony depends in part upon the existence of a domestic 
hegemony that is absent in Africa states. Gramsci conceptualised hegemony as “a dynamic 
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lived process in which social identities, relations, organisations, and structures based on 
asymmetrical distributions of power and influence are constituted by the dominant classes” 
(Mittelman and Chin 2005: 18). In this regard, the dominant class does not rule against the 
subordinate groups, but with and over them, and hegemony can only be achieved within the 
realm of civil society which gives “meaning and organisation to everyday life” resulting in 
the elimination of the need to use force (Mittelman and Chin 2005: 18). In addition, it 
requires consent and participation of most of the population. In the absence of this form of 
hegemony at the domestic level of African states with most leaders using violence, 
intimidation, personal rule and patronage to control the state and the masses, there exists a 
disconnection between international prescriptions for peace and the socio-political dynamics 
on the ground (Taylor 2007). Taylor concludes that the liberal peace is being naive in its 
evaluation of its potential to bring about change in post-conflict zones in Africa and its failure 
to understand the nature of political organisation in the African context.38  
 
The assumption that Western institutions can be successfully transferred to Africa without 
modifications which underpins the liberal peace agenda and the failure to take into 
consideration underlying political dynamics in Africa’s post-conflict environments are 
flawed. These challenges of liberal peace in Africa call for the need to rethink liberal 
peacebuilding on the continent. Indeed, it is crucial to “think anew” in relation to 
international intervention aimed at building durable peace in Africa’s war-torn societies 
including an understanding that the essence of peacebuilding and statebuilding on the 
continent is “not to construct state structures per se, but to foster state formation, that is, 
interaction and bargaining processes between government and society” (Englebert and Tull 
2008: 138). 
                                                           
38
  Taylor (2009) offers a similar conclusion in his analysis of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and 
further notes that the nature of political culture in the country makes it difficult for the liberal peace to succeed. 
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Some scholars have offered critiques of the dominant political economy of the liberal peace 
in Africa (Salih 2009; Castaneda 2009; Cooper 2008). Salih (2009: 133) notes that while the 
dominant political economy of the liberal peace has led to stability, “nurtured the politics of 
democratic hope and a modicum of respect for human and civil rights, […] it has largely 
failed to deliver tangible developmental or economic benefits to the majority of the African 
poor”. The main developmental challenges that the liberal peace has failed to address, 
according to Salih, include the deficit of social justice, poverty, exclusion and limited access 
to human needs. He further notes that, this failure to address such major developmental 
challenges in Africa and the emphasis on the liberal above the social will do more harm than 
good on the continent (Salih 2009).  
 
Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, Castaneda (2009: 236) observes that the political 
economy of the liberal peace favours macro-economic security over the social and this is 
based on the assumption that peace will “trickle down from the macro-economic to the social 
realm” leading to a “trickle-down peace” – a form of peace that trickles down from the top to 
the bottom emphasising on security and tends to be oblivious of current interests of most of 
the population in post-conflict societies. The assumption behind the idea of a “trickle-down” 
is that “a lack of violence (negative peace), an improved macro-economic framework 
(‘economic peace’), and large-scale goals such as food production will flow down to the 
community and individual level as increased personal, economic, and even food security” 
(Castaneda 2009: 236). For Castaneda, a trickle-down peace will make peacebuilding hard 
and problematic. While she acknowledges that Sierra Leone’s fragile stability is legacy of the 
civil war, she also argues that it is also a product of a post-conflict peacebuilding initiative 
that emphasises “trickle-down peace” and fails to pay greater attention to social welfare. As 
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such, this makes it difficult for the liberal peace to establish sustainable peace in post-war 
environments of Africa where poverty, exclusion, marginalisation and inadequate access to 
social justice are major problems. 
 
“Thinking Anew” 
In an attempt to provide a new thinking about international peacebuilding and statebuilding, 
contributors to the book, Peace Operations and Global Order, edited by Bellamy and 
Williams criticise the problem-solving approach of the mainstream literature on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding (2005). Bellamy and Williams state that it is crucial to “think 
anew” about the role of peace operations and “providing alternative visions of their function 
in global politics” (2005: 2).  
 
Bellamy and Williams, and others call for the need to adopt critical perspectives in order to 
re-examine the ontology and epistemology of peacekeeping. In an attempt to “think anew”, 
this thesis goes beyond Bellamy and Williams’ conceptualisation of “thinking anew” and 
draws from critical thinkers whose interests include liberation and emancipation as well as 
the liberal peace, the conditions of a durable peace that are not necessarily grounded in the 
liberal peace, but in the local context, culture and custom, human needs and welfare as well 
as rights and the unintended consequences of the liberal peace (see Tadjbakhsh 2011). This 
points to the need to acknowledge what is there on the ground rather than “what ought to be 
there” (Moe 2010: 7). 
 
Using Local Cultural Resources in Peacebuilding  
Lederach (1997) has argued for the need to approach a conflict within its particular context. 
For him people within a conflict setting should be viewed as a key resource, not recipients. 
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He further argues for the need to build appropriate models from the cultural and contextual 
resources for peace and conflict resolution available within a conflict environment. For this to 
be achieved, according to Lederach, those in the international community need to “move 
beyond a simple prescription of answers and modalities for dealing with conflict that come 
from outside the setting and focus at least as much attention on discovering and empowering 
the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for building peace that exist within the context” 
(1997: 95).  
 
Although internationals have paid some attention to the roles of African culture in creating 
conditions for a self-sustaining peace in some African states emerging from violent civil war, 
they do not want to acknowledge it. Why are African cultural experiences of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding not really present in the literature about conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding? This could be a result of Western bias against African culture which is viewed 
as dysfunctional and inadequate as well as responsible for all the ills that are being 
experienced on the continent. However, “inherent in most African cultures is the belief that 
conflicts should be resolved through dialogue and non-violence, dialogue that encourages 
participation and compromise, the component parts of a culture of peace and democracy” 
(Osei-Hwedie and Abu-Nimer 2009: 1).  
 
Indigenous traditions in Africa have played a significant role, for instance, in creating 
conditions for order, healing, reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, among others at 
community levels, for example, the Jir (a community dispute mediation session) among the 
Tiv community of Nigeria, the guurti system (inter-clan mediating council) in Somaliland, 
Mato Oput (drinking the bitter herb) in northern Uganda and the Ubuntu approach to 
reconciliation in South Africa (Murithi 2008). In Somaliland traditional leadership 
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institutions played a significant role in bringing together the various clans and creating “a 
legislature and government drawing upon Somali tradition and combining these traditional 
structures with modern institutions of governance like the parliament” (Murithi 2009: 148; 
Boege et al. 2008).39 The situation in Somaliland is more promising than in central and 
southern Somalia, and it currently enjoys some relative peace and stability (Murithi 2009). 
These traditional and indigenous forms of peacemaking and dispute resolution have co-
existed with the international/Western ones and remain resilient against the onslaught of 
modernity, thus continue to be extensively used at community levels in most parts of Africa.  
 
In the context of Sierra Leone, its 1991 constitution recognises the institution of the 
Paramount Chief and customary law. In fact, a dual formal legal system exists in the country 
that is based on a common law consisting of English law which is administered through 
national courts and customary law that is administered through local courts in 149 chiefdoms 
(Sawyer 2008). According to the 1991 Sierra Leone constitution, “customary law” refers to 
“the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone” 
(section 170(3)). In Sierra Leone, “Customary justice is dispensed in line with the beliefs, 
customs and traditions of inhabitants of the local area through the administration of 
customary law by local courts” (Robins 2009: 1).40 Although most of the rural population use 
local courts, such courts’ jurisdiction is limited to minor criminal offenses, land disputes, 
seduction, witchcraft, divorce and debt. An informal legal system also exists in the country. 
Sawyer (2008: 393) notes that, “Paramount chiefs, section chiefs and village headmen often 
hold informal courts where they adjudicate cases, levy fees, and impose fines or other 
                                                           
39
  Recent research in the Pacific Islands region – Bougainville (Boege 2010), Timo Leste and the 
Solomon Islands (Richmond 2011a), and Vanuatu (Brown and Nolan 2008) – shows the effectiveness of 
customary institutions in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  
40
  In Sierra Leone, the term local court is sometimes used interchangeably with the term “native court” 
and these courts are located within chiefdoms. According to Ali (2008), 80 per cent of Sierra Leoneans fall 
under the jurisdiction of customary laws.  
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punishments”, and are more accessible for most of the rural population. In addition, most of 
the rural population rely upon “[…] customary law structures and processes within secret 
societies […]” (Sriram 2011: 130) as well as diviners and “medicine men” “who may offer 
alternative forms of adjudication or retribution” (Sawyer 2008: 393; Ali 2008), although the 
state does not recognise them.   
 
The rural populace in Sierra Leone have continued to rely upon customary, non-state justice 
systems for a number of reasons: corruption and limited access to the formal justice sector, 
customary justice systems offer a range of advantages to them including being cheap, 
accessible, connecting them to their customs, flexible, familiar to the conflicting parties, not 
adversarial, offer restorative justice (aimed at mediation that leads to decisions that restore 
and rebuild community relations) as opposed to retributive justice, give them a sense of 
ownership, payment of compensation to the individual(s) who is wronged and are flexible 
(see Sawyer 2008; Sriram 2011; Alie 2008). Like other parts of Africa, in Sierra Leone 
customary law has been criticised for privileging men over women, especially in the context 
of marital disputes (Ali 2008; Sriram 2011). However, Ali (2008: 137) notes that among the 
Kpaa Mende this is done for the purpose of maintaining relations and peace: 
 
It is not considered in the best interest of the family to wrong a husband even if his guilt 
is clearly evident. Instead, the elders would attempt to saying soothing words to the 
wife and later privately rebuke the husband for his misdeeds. While this may look like 
an injustice to the woman, there is an important social element here. The main interest 
is to hold the marriage together, not to create a situation where the woman will “win the 
war but lose the peace”. 
 
Manifesto ’99 (2002), a human rights NGO in Sierra Leone, notes that traditional beliefs play 
a significant role in the lives of Sierra Leoneans and most of the 14 ethnic groups in the 
country have long-established traditional practices of conflict resolution. In addition, Sierra 
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Leoneans have used proverbs and idioms in conflict resolution. For instance, Stovel (2008: 
306) has observed that, in post-war Sierra Leone, officials and civil society leaders, searched 
their traditions and found the conciliatory Krio proverb: “Bad bush nor dae for troway bad 
pekin” (“There is no bad bush to throw away a bad child”), which means that irrespective of 
what a person has done the community will still accept him/her. According to Stovel, the 
philosophy behind this Krio proverb extends beyond children as it implies that Africans are 
community-oriented and the community will always have space for its members (2008). 
Officials and civil society leaders, in Sierra Leone, used this proverb to promote 
reconciliation and integration of former rebels and child soldiers in the society.  
 
However, Stovel (2008) observes that this approach has led to the romanticisation of this 
conciliatory tradition-based expression and thus has a danger of being blind to or to reinforce 
the power structures that contributed to the conflict. Besides the use of proverbs in promoting 
reconciliation and peace, secret societies’ “processes of justice and conflict resolution [such 
as cleansing ceremonies that] often emphasise truth-telling and reconciliation” have been 
used to facilitate the reintegration of form combatants, especially the reintegration of former 
child soldiers into their families (Sriram 2011: 130; Ali 2008). One of the limitations of secret 
society processes, according to Sriram (2011), is that given an oath of secrecy, it is difficult 
for members to seek recourse, even when a decision made under such a process is abusive.  
 
In addition to the issues discussed above, Lederach (2005: 60) has noted that “suspicion, 
indifference and distance” are feelings expressed by ordinary people in societies emerging 
from violent conflict. For Lederach, it is crucial to pay attention to “social spaces, 
relationships, ideas and processes” that can contribute to the restoration of trust (2005: 59). 
The liberal peace which places much emphasis on the state and its institutions tends to be 
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blind to this. As such, it has failed to acknowledge customary approaches to peace and 
conflict resolution that are significant for rebuilding social and interpersonal trust through 
participation, forgiveness, healing, restorative justice and reconciliation (Murithi 2008). 
  
In addition, customary approaches to peacemaking can be useful in recognising the voices 
and agency of ordinary people in post-conflict environments as well as in dealing with some 
of the root causes of conflict at community or village levels. At the same time, these 
approaches should not be over romanticised. It is crucial to expose their limitations as well as 
argue for integrating their positive aspects with other forms of peacebuilding such as the 
liberal peace. In post-conflict societies, a mere adoption or uncritical use of customary 
approaches to peacemaking can reinforce the local power structures that were part of the root 
causes of the conflict.  In addition, recognition of positive aspects of customary systems and 
traditional belief systems, chieftaincy and African philosophy as expressed in proverbs can 
help identify local “resistances” to violence (Milne 2010).  
 
Mac Ginty (2008) cautions against viewing indigenous and traditional approaches to 
peacebuilding as a panacea to all the problems associated with the liberal peace. This, 
according to Mac Ginty, is for the following reasons: 1) “the dislocation associated with civil 
war has often made traditional and indigenous social patterns unsustainable. […] the descent 
into civil war may have been facilitated by the failure of traditional and indigenous restraints 
on conflict”; 2) “some literature has a tendency to over-romanticise traditional and 
indigenous practices (and similarly overlook the advantages of conventional approaches to 
peacemaking) [...] some traditional and indigenous practices can be deeply conservative and 
exclusionary” (2008: 120). Further, Mac Ginty (2010b) notes that in recent years leading 
states and INGOs have been facilitating and funding traditional and indigenous approaches to 
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peacebuilding. He, therefore, questions whether such methods should be called “traditional” 
or “indigenous” if leading states and international organisations have co-opted them. Mac 
Ginty (2010b: 353) further notes that “the international peacebuilding agents that regard 
‘local ownership’, ‘participation’, and ‘sustainability’ as the saviours of peacebuilding have 
also identified indigenous and traditional approaches to peacebuilding as a means to promote 
their peacebuilding agenda”. He calls this approach a “peace-fixing” or “problem-solving” 
approach and that it can lead to the co-option of local elites and NGOs. This would end up 
undermining the voices of the “local-local”.41 While I agree with Mac Ginty that traditional 
and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding are not panacea to all the problems in post-
conflict situations, his idea of “peace-fixing” runs the risk of undermining the role of custom 
in peacebuilding and overlooks the local’s creative agency to influence international 
peacebuilders. However, the idea of “peace-fixing” helps us to think about interests of the 
internationals who sponsor local forms of peacebuilding. 
 
As such, it is crucial to critically examine the relationship between the international actors 
who are sponsoring and supporting traditional and indigenous and the locals, whether these 
“indigenous” or “traditional” approaches are not being designed to suit the interests of their 
sponsors and also to what extent local voices and agency are being recognised. In addition, 
whether the “local-local” lead these initiatives or whether co-opted local NGOs are not 
imposing these programs on them in the name of tradition in order to continue getting 
funding from the West which in the end may promote Western interests and not interests, 
needs and concerns of the ordinary people in a post-conflict environment. This should not 
                                                           
41
 I borrow the idea of “local-local” from Richmond (2009a: 341) who defines it in contrast to “the local”, which 
(“the local”) according to him refers to “what international actors normally perceive as a range of actors and 
terrains spanning their non-Western and non-liberal partners for liberal peacebuilding at the elite level […] and 
civil society and in contrast, he uses the term “local-local” to show “the existence and diversity of communities 
and individuals that constitute political society beyond the often liberally projected artifice.” 
 122 
 
distract us from identifying customary and indigenous peacebuilding approaches that could 
still have relevance in contemporary Africa. As Richmond (2011a: 118) notes, “A resurgence 
of traditional belief systems and customary forms of governance perhaps has the effect of 
[…] redressing the local agency gap, and certainly also significantly modifying the liberal 
state”.  
 
On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace 
The liberal peace’s failure to adequately address the positive aspects of peace such as 
welfare, poverty and social justice has led critical scholars like Richmond (2009b) to 
conclude that it is in crisis. Richmond (2009a: 324) criticises liberal peacebuilding for its 
failure to achieve “a liberal peace for all” as per its promise:  
 
It has become clear that the liberal international institutions and “corridors of power” 
have so far failed to deliver on their promise of a liberal peace for all – and particularly 
for the citizens of the new “liberal” states that have been recipients of peacekeeping and 
peace operations in the post-cold war world.  
 
Richmond (2009b) further notes that, the liberal peace is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy 
at the level of the everyday in post-conflict societies. In a number of post-conflict societies, 
for example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the bulk of the population is increasingly becoming 
disappointed since the liberal peace that is trickling from top to bottom is yet to reach them. 
In such post-conflict environments most of the population, according to Richmond, perceive 
the liberal peace project and its focus on statebuilding as “ethically bankrupt, subject to 
double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned, with the social welfare, 
and unfeeling and insensitive towards [them]” (2009b: 558). Despite the implantation of the 
liberal peace in post-conflict environments, ordinary people in these environments continue 
to engage in what Gordon (2002 cited in Gonzalez de Allen 2006: 9) calls “extraordinary 
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measures to live ordinary lives.” In response to this crisis, a number of critical scholars have 
called for an alternative(s) to or modifications of the liberal peace(s) that is grounded in 
people’s customs, traditions and culture, an adoption of hybrid practices in post-conflict 
situations, a consideration of local participation and use of local resources, among others. 
However, this has not gone without challenges from those who want to maintain the status 
quo.  
 
Critiquing the “Hyper-critics” 
Various responses have been offered to criticisms and challenges of the liberal peace. 
Recently, mainstream scholars while acknowledging that the record of liberal peacebuilding 
is not very impressive have criticised critical scholars for being “hyper-critical” and for 
exaggerated or misdirected and generalised claims on liberal peacebuilding as well as for 
failing to come up with a viable alternative to it (Paris 2010; also see Begby and Burgess 
2009; Newman 2009a).   
 
Paris notes that in spite of liberal peace operations’ many flaws, they have done more good 
than harm, and “the failure of the existing peacebuilding project will be tantamount to 
abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease and fear”, and as 
such these criticisms are unwarranted and imprudent, respectively (2010: 338; 2009). 
Similarly, Begby and Burgess (2009) argue that although liberal peacebuilding has a 
disappointing record, this does not warrant the conclusion that the very idea of liberal 
peacebuilding is bankrupt. As for Paris, scholars and commentators who argue that the liberal 
peace is illegitimate or basically destructive are being “hyper-critical”. These responses 
reflect a deep polarisation between the critical theorists and mainstream critics who would 
want to see the liberal peace model made better within the liberal internationalist 
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framework.42 Liberal peacebuilding according to mainstream scholarship needs to be “saved” 
from “hyper-critics” who have offered exaggerated claims about it. Saving it would include 
the following: 1) “continuing to press forward with efforts to dissect and understand the 
paradoxes and pathologies of peacebuilding”, and 2) “ensuring that this critical enterprise is 
well-founded and justified” (Paris 2010: 339).  
 
Paris further notes that instead of offering sweeping rejections of liberal peacebuilding, 
critical scholars should use tools of critical analysis to come up with alternatives within the 
liberal internationalist framework itself rather than conceiving alternatives to liberal 
peacebuilding. For him, it is not difficult to conceive alternatives or reforms from the liberal 
approach since the idea of liberalism is quite broad that it can “accommodate a wide range of 
political and economic structures as well as diverse methods for engaging with inhabitants of 
war-shattered societies” (Paris 2010: 339; also see Begby and Burgess 2009). However, the 
thinking that there are no alternatives outside the liberal peace is controversial, as it impedes 
ingenious thinking regarding ways in which durable peace can be built, including 
imaginations about a “post-liberal peace” (Richmond 2009b; Tadjbakhsh 2011).  
 
In their examination of the dilemmas of statebuilding, Paris and Sisk (2008) argue that 
although statebuilding remains a core element for peacebuilding in war-torn societies, it faces 
inherent contradictions and tensions which international state builders have paid little 
attention to and these tensions and contradictions in turn have resulted in policy dilemmas for 
both international and local actors. Roland and Sisk further argue that although statebuilding 
                                                           
42
 For a similar view see Begby and Burgess (2009: 93). For the two scholars there are two strands to the 
recent critique of liberal peace: the first one which they call the primary argument offers “a diagnosis of what 
goes wrong when things go wrong with liberal peacebuilding” and the second one “attempts to distil from the 
primary argument a negative assessment concerning the very idea of liberal peace”. According to Begby and 
Burgess the primary critique is more plausible than second one which is “radical”. 
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has produced mixed results and its record has generally been disappointing, neither can it be 
abandoned nor can the international state builders do more, but should manage these 
dilemmas (at the same time, noting that these dilemmas are difficult to resolve). Further, 
these dilemmas of statebuilding can better be managed by having a deeper understanding of 
them. The two scholars recommend “dilemma analysis” as a new analytical tool that 
international state builders must use before and during their missions in order to more 
effectively deal with the inherent tensions and contradictions of statebuilding. However, this 
“dilemma analysis” does not aim at replacing the more conventional approach to mission 
planning, but supplements it and starts from the assumption that many of the elements of 
statebuilding will not integrate easily. This still reflects an ethnocentric bias which does not 
see anything good in the non-European “other” and views the liberal peace as the best 
possible alternative. 
 
This raises the question whether the liberal peace is prepared to engage with the non-liberal 
other. And if it is tolerant to local approaches to peacemaking, as Paris is pointing out, why is 
it that for the past two decades it has ignored them or undermined them? Is this being done 
with the consent of recipients of the liberal peace? Or is the social contract not of much 
significance? Legitimacy can only be built with the consent of those in host-countries and 
without this the politics of anger, frustration and resentment can emerge. In other words, the 
liberal peace-is-good-for-sustainable peace argument, fail to realise that liberal peace-
without-local-legitimacy-is-not-good-for-sustainable peace. This argument is in line with 
utilitarian arguments which argue for approaches that would produce best possible results in a 
given situation and also points out to the possibilities of other alternatives.  
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Liberal Peacebuilding as Neo-Colonial or Neo-Imperial? 
Given that the liberal peace is engaging the non-liberal other in a dominant way, one would 
understand why some critical scholars have concluded that liberal peacebuilding is a form of 
neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. For instance, Roberts (2008: 64) views liberal 
statebuilding and peacebuilding as a “post-Cold War neo-imperial agenda of intervention” in 
which states in post-conflict environments are being built in the image of the West. For 
Roberts, such an approach which is invasive and imperial has failed and will continue to fail 
as long as there is a failure to recognise and understand that “transitional impositions of 
democratic practice cannot be substitute for or replace, in the short-term, political behaviours 
derived from needs, experiences, histories and evolutions quite different from those from 
which Western democracy is derived” (2008: 64). Similarly, Darby using a post-colonial 
critique of liberal peacebuilding notes that it is a colonial enterprise that marginalises the 
experiences, approaches and understandings of non-Western societies and does not connect 
with their everyday lives (2009).  
 
Paris’s response is that while there were echoes of European colonialism in other parts of the 
world during the nineteenth century, in current peacebuilding operations, comparisons of 
modern peacebuilding and European colonialism should be limited. He further notes that, 
although liberal peacebuilding and European colonialism share the idea of refashioning of 
domestic structures of weaker societies with the intention of achieving a greater “good” – 
civilisation for nineteenth century European colonialism and “good governance” in the form 
of a liberal market democracy, they differ in four important respects: 1) the primary motive of 
the practice of colonialism was to benefit the colonising state at the expense of colonised 
societies (for instance, through cheap labour and the extraction of material resources from 
them), whereas in the case of liberal peacebuilding resources flow from international actors to 
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war-torn societies;43 2) liberal peacebuilding support operations are multilateral involving a 
wide range of actors, international and local, however, this was not the case with colonialism 
which was primarily carried out by individual colonial states for their own benefit; 3) 
Europe’s imperial states often perceived overseas colonies as their permanent possessions 
until the latest stages of colonialism, whereas, post-Cold War peace peacebuilding missions 
are not permanent and aim at establishing necessary conditions for effective governance in 
the host-countries; and 4) the practice of colonialism was grounded in ideologies of racial 
superiority, however, this is not the case with liberal peacebuilding (2009). Paris thus, argues 
that equating liberal peacebuilding with colonialism or imperialism is not only an 
exaggeration, but it “implicitly (or explicitly) discredits and delegitimises peacebuilding by 
framing it as an exploitative, destructive and disreputable form of international intervention” 
(2009: 102).  
 
However, as Darby notes, as long as peacebuilding initiatives are determined from “above 
and outside”, they are “cast in the mould of colonialism” (2009: 701). In other words, while 
the practice of international peacebuilding is not grounded in ideologies of racial superiority, 
it is grounded in the idea of the superiority of the liberal peace over other forms of peace, 
especially, local ones. Communities in Africa, for instance, are rarely consulted about what 
kind of politics or state they want and as such, are being presented with no choice, but the 
liberal peace. This assumes a priori that this is what they want, thus ends up looking like a 
colonial project. Richmond observes that “The whole apparatus of peace is sometimes 
colonial and racist in that it implies the transference of enlightened knowledge to those who 
lack the capacity or morality to attain such knowledge themselves” (2005: 2004). In addition, 
the liberal peace project has failed to achieve its aims including a democratic setting in which 
                                                           
43
  There is also the need to investigate how much is coming out of these societies with the introduction of 
open markets, particularly, resource rich countries like Sierra Leone and the DRC. 
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people’s welfare and human rights are promoted. As such, it doesn’t look like a very 
humanitarian practice, but as something that has been designed to recreate colonialism.   
 
However, this should not be interpreted as implying that the primary motive for liberal 
peacebuilding is colonialism. The point here is that just as during the colonial era (see chapter 
1), the dominant assumption is that Western knowledge and political organisation are more 
advanced than those of non-Europeans. And even where they claim to be working in 
partnership with state elites in host-countries, their approach to “good governance” (and their 
idea of partnership) is through direct, hands-on intervention. In this regard, Western forms of 
governance are seen as the norm and as such, for the internationals, it is essential to ensure 
that the host-countries do not deviate from the norm.  
 
Similar criticisms have been given in the area of development in which post- and anti-
development scholars have noted that there is a continuity between the current Western 
assumptions about universal validity of modern Western science and knowledge, and those of 
the colonial past (Escobar 1996; Esteva 1992). According to Escobar, “Development has 
been the primary mechanism through which the Third World has been imagined and 
imagined itself, thus marginalising or precluding other ways of seeing and doing” (1996: 
212). For Escobar since the end of World War II, development has been a powerful tool for 
the production and management of the non-Western world. Development is perceived as a 
means to modernise, urbanise, promote industrial growth and agricultural modernisation in 
the less developed world, however, it has “proceeded by creating abnormalities (‘the power’, 
‘the malnourished’, ‘the illiterate’, ‘pregnant women’, ‘the landless’) which it would then 
treat or reform” (Escobar 1996: 214). In this case, “development experts” from the West who 
go to the developing or underdeveloped world to deal with the “abnormalities”, tend to offer 
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solutions to these problems using Western lenses with alternatives, local voices and other 
ways of knowing often being ignored. For Escobar, development approaches have 
uncritically transferred modern Western science, technology and knowledge from the West to 
the South as a means to end problems in the South, however, this has ended up “multiplying 
them indefinitely” (1996: 217).  
 
Similarly, Duffield views development as “a liberal design of power” which “always acts in 
the name of protecting and bettering life” (2007a: 232, 2007b). He further notes that 
development discourse “the civilised/barbarous dichotomy has been realised in terms of 
humanitarian differences between effective and ineffective states” (2007a: 236, emphasis not 
mine). As noted in the previous chapter, ineffective states are viewed as not having the 
capacity to protect and improve the lives of their citizens. In response to this, the international 
community has adopted the responsibility to protect doctrine as a means to protect the lives 
and human security of citizens of such states. In the name of partnership, NGOs and leading 
states personnel have become heavily involved in the work of key government departments 
and institutions, and have become part of the state. Thus for Duffield, “Development is the 
essence of a specifically liberal imperial urge. It embodies the experience of life that is 
culturally unfamiliar as provisional and incomplete, and consequently in need of external 
tutelage to induce self-completion” (2007a: 241, emphasis not mine). 
 
For instance, nine years after the official end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, British 
government officials are still directly involved in governing the state of Sierra Leone. Little 
(a BBC reporter) notes that the British influence in Sierra Leone is far much greater than 
since the end of British colonial rule in the country: “British government officials sit in the 
main offices of [the] state [of Sierra Leone] – monitoring what the ministers do, supervising, 
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scrutinising, guiding the country toward European-style good governance” (Little 2010). He 
further points out that Valnora [Edwin]44 of a local Sierra Leone NGO, Campaign for Good 
Governance (CGG) commented that an inside source had told her that “when other donor 
partners are coming, they need clearance from […] [DFID] or the UK before they do x and y, 
and everywhere you go, there’s a British person” (2010). While critics call this form of 
intervention intrusive and neo-colonial, the British government, state elites and mainstream 
scholars view it as a social mission, a form of partnership aimed at “planting the seeds of 
progress” in Sierra Leone (Little 2010).  Yet, Little observes that nine years of “peace” in 
Sierra Leone has not done much to deal with high poverty and unemployment rates as well as 
high child and adult mortality across the country (see chapter 6).  
 
For Chandler (2006a), external support operations, for example, the British government’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone can have negative effects such as creating a dependency 
syndrome, the weakening of politics at both national and local levels which could further 
diminish the political autonomy and capacity for self-rule, and also create challenges for state 
elites to establish broad legitimacy among ordinary citizens. Without self-governance, the 
state has no legitimacy and also will not function independently, thus will remain weak and 
cannot deal with post-conflict (and even pre-conflict) challenges including socio-political 
divisions, unemployment and poverty (Chandler 2006a). This form of external intervention 
leads to what Chandler calls “peace without politics” in which the creation of liberal 
democratic institutions is not grounded in domestic politics (2006b).  
 
If liberal peacebuilding is to be “saved”, it ought to be saved from its “cheer leaders” who 
offer prescriptive strategies without a critical reflection on their viability and acceptability in 
                                                           
44
  Allan Little cites the respondent’s name as Valnora Jones, however, her correct name is Valnora 
Edwin. I have changed the name with her consent. 
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post-conflict environments, and have witnessed local resistance to them. While the liberal 
peace model has worked well in the West, it is crucial to question whether transplanting it 
wholesale to non-Western societies with different cultural and historical backgrounds from it 
will work. In fact, war-torn societies need to be “saved” from problem-solving approaches 
that are biased towards these societies and ignore local agency, capacities for peacemaking, 
order and recovery. It is important for the locals’ voices to be heard since as insiders they 
“possess the historical, cultural, and linguistic resources that outsiders lack, and that are 
essential not only to understanding the root causes of conflict but also to the search for 
sustainable solutions” (Donais 2009: 11; also see Lederach 1997). At the same time, it is 
crucial to be aware that there are various claims to local ownership in post-conflict 
environments and how these claims can be dealt with in ways that do not recreate the 
conditions for a violent conflict.  
 
More recently, critical scholars rather than just focusing on the inherent tensions and 
contradictions of the liberal peace in post-war societies have argued for the need to move 
beyond the liberal peace through examining local and contextual responses to it. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Thinking Beyond the Liberal Peace 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the emerging critical literature that argue for the need to shift from 
merely criticising the liberal peace to engaging with local contextual matters through  
examining local and contextual responses to liberal peacebuilding that is, the forms of peace 
that are emerging as the liberal and the local interact. It also offers a theoretical framework 
for the rest of the thesis.  
 
Thinking of the Local and Contextual Responses to the Liberal Peace 
As noted in the previous chapter, it is widely accepted – among mainstream and critical 
scholars - that the liberal peace’s record has been very disappointing and partially counter-
productive. However, there is a lack of consensus among these scholars on how to respond to 
its partial success as well as tensions and contradictions inherent in it. This lack of consensus 
is partly due to the different approaches that these scholars take. Mainstream scholars such as 
Paris advocate a problem-solving approach and argue for the need to reform the liberal peace 
model as well as the need to search for alternatives from within the liberal framework itself. 
As such, remain committed to the liberal peace framework. However, critical theorists are not 
just concerned with the liberal peace and its implications on non-liberal societies, but also 
about social and economic rights, custom, traditional and indigenous forms of governance 
and peacemaking, and the everyday. Critical thinkers like Richmond have gone a step further 
noting the need to start imagining a “post-liberal peace”. This emerging literature has shifted 
attention from merely critiquing the liberal peace in terms of its inherent contradictions, the 
practical challenges of liberal peace support operations and the ideologies underpinning them 
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as well as finding ways of “saving the liberal peace”, among others, to examining local and 
contextual responses to the liberal peace and the forms of peace that are being built.  
 
Scholars like Paris who have argued for the need to save liberal peacebuilding have failed to 
see or think beyond the liberal peace framework. Rather, as noted in chapter 3, they have 
proposed the need to build the capacity of institutions of the central state, as in Paris’ IBL 
strategy (Paris 2004). This is despite Paris’ earlier observation that international 
peacebuilding appears “to represent an updated version of the mission civilisatrice [“the 
Westernisation of the periphery”], or a colonial-era notion that ‘advanced’ states of Europe 
had a moral responsibility to ‘civilise’ the indigenous societies that they were colonising” 
(2002: 651). This of course, has resulted in internationals seeing war-torn societies in terms 
of how they see themselves (Paris 1997). In his IBL approach and the “saving liberal 
peacebuilding” argument, Paris locates agency with the West, and not the people in post-
conflict environments. In “Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary 
Studies of the Liberal Peace”, Paris shows a nostalgic feeling of the classical liberals 
sidelining local agency (Paris 2006). This exposes Paris and other mainstream scholars for 
their Eurocentric biases since they see the West as the sole producer of peace and the liberal 
peace as the only viable peace.  
 
The failure of mainstream scholars to think beyond the liberal peace framework itself and 
their call to think within it could be a result of the hegemonic nature of the liberal peace, 
Eurocentric biases and the commitment to problem-solving approaches. However, 
Eurocentric biases have often resulted in the historical experiences of people in the periphery 
being “conceived in categories derived from great power politics in the North” (Barkawi and 
Laffey 2006: 332) and their treatment as objects and not subjects, thus negating their agency. 
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This failure to see most people in post-conflict environments as subjects has often brought 
unintended consequences in such environments including the failure to be responsive to their 
demands, needs and interests (chapter 3), hence the need for an empirical study of post-
conflict societies helps to come up with a deeper understanding of realities on the ground and 
identifying the forms of peace that are emerging which may or may not lead to durable peace 
in these societies. 
 
Based on recent experiences of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-conflict 
societies some critical scholars have suggested the need to pay attention to the dynamics and 
resilience of local politics and their relationship to external intervention, that is, local and 
contextual responses (at various levels – elite and grassroots) to the liberal peace project, 
among other things (Richmond 2010c; Heathershaw and Lambach 2008). This emerging 
literature points to the need to think of peace support operations, for instance, in terms of 
hybridity (Richmond and Franks 2009; Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; MacGinty 2008; 
MacGinty 2010b, 2011), and also to think of them normatively in terms welfare, empathy, 
and care, as well as empirically in terms of “the everyday” (Richmond 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c; Pugh 2009). Richmond (2009a), for instance, has shown an interest in the possibilities 
of drawing upon resistance and the everyday of those individuals in the host-communities 
taking note of the hybridity that emerge as the “local” and the international interact, resist, 
tolerate and accept each other. Similarly, Heathershaw and Lambach (2008) have dismissed 
the view that post-conflict environments are just objects of international involvement and 
have suggested the need to consider them as spaces in which various agency emerge – where 
international and local actors re-appropriate, appropriate, accept, hybridise, subvert, resist and 
co-opt peacebuilding or statebuilding initiatives to suit their own interests and needs, some of 
which may be at odds with the intended objectives of the liberal internationals. For 
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Heathershaw and Lambach, post-conflict spaces should be understood as “fields of power 
where sovereignty is constantly contested and negotiated” among different actors – 
internationals (whether liberal peacebuilders or not), elites and non-elites in the host-country” 
(Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 269). This implies that there is no full absorption of 
international peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-conflict societies, but get mixed with 
local forms of peacemaking. Thus, these local responses and reactions result from vested 
interests among various local actors. These local actors develop “tactics” aimed at promoting 
their interests and needs, in response to the liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies 
that have seen internationals superimposing the liberal state, (neo)liberal economics and 
liberal forms of governance on them.45 
 
According to this emerging critical literature, these responses and reactions on the ground 
may lead to hybridised forms of peace – this will be discussed below (Richmond 2009a, 
2009b, 2010b; Mac Ginty 2010b, 2010c). This, according to Richmond, might be called a 
“post-liberal peace” (Richmond 2010b). This highlights the mutual dependency between the 
internationals and the locals in constructing peace in societies that are going through 
transition. I will use hybridity as a conceptual approach in understanding the dynamics in 
post-conflict environments in the context of liberal peacebuilding. Thinking of post-conflict 
environments as spaces where hybridised forms of peace are emerging need to be done in the 
context of an understanding of these environments as “contact zones”46 where international 
actors encounter local ones.    
                                                           
45
  On the relationship between strategy and tactics see de Certeau (1984).  
46
  Mary Louise Pratt (1992: 6)’s notion of “contact zones” could be useful in the analysis of the 
interaction of external and local actors. She uses the concept “contact zone” to refer to “a space of colonial 
encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each 
other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and 
intractable conflict.” 
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Post-conflict Environments as “Contact Zones”  
Though used in the context of the “first” encounter between the coloniser and the colonised, 
the concept of “contact zone” will be used here to mean a space where the culture, the local 
and the outsider interact, negotiate, get modified, accepted and resisted (even in situations 
where power relations are viewed as asymmetrical) which may result in a form of peace that 
is neither liberal nor local but a mixture of the two, that is, a hybrid peace. This results in 
what Pratt regards as a contact perspective – a perspective that considers the relations 
between (in the case of contemporary peacebuilding) local and international actors in terms 
of “co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often with radically 
asymmetrical reflections of power”, and not in terms of separateness (Pratt 1992: 7). This 
helps us to break from binary oppositions, for instance, the civilised and the primitive, the 
local and the international, the modern and the traditional, and the developed and the 
underdeveloped, and as such, could help in finding ways of creating conditions for durable 
peace in post-conflict environments. In this sense, an understanding of post-conflict 
environments as “contact zones” in which international actors and local actors interact, at the 
same time paying attention to unequal power relations, would emphasise facts on the ground 
and attempts to show that post-conflict situations follow their own logic or that state 
institutions exists alongside with non-state institutions such as indigenous and traditional 
political institutions and secret society institutions  (as in the case of Sierra Leone) which 
have various claims to authority, legitimacy, power, sovereignty and order. This calls for the 
need to recognise multiple sovereignties and legitimacies in such situations rather than 
focusing on undermining or banning these institutions. 
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As critical literature has highlighted, the liberal peace is far from being perfect, particularly in 
post-conflict environments. Hence, the need to investigate what is on the ground through 
empirical research. 
 
Conceptualising Hybridity  
The concept of ‘hybrid’ is not new. Young (1995) traces its origins to biology and botany. He 
notes that in Latin, it referred to the progeny of a tame sow and wild boar and for human 
beings, a progeny of human parents of different races (Young 1995: 6). Webster (1828), 
provided a definition of hybrid as “a mongrel or mule; an animal or plant, produced from the 
mixture of two species (cited in Young 1995: 6). In the 18th century, colonialism and 
population displacement in countries such as, the US, UK and France led to interracial 
contact, resulting in new debates on the notion of hybridity (Kraidy 2002). However, 
hybridity, during this period was defined in the negative sense since there was a general fear 
among Westerners that the other races they encountered and colonised would pollute them, 
thus often invoking biology so as to “justify ideologies of White superiority and warned of 
the danger of interracial breeding described as ‘miscegenation’ and ‘amalgamation’” (Kraidy 
2002: 319). Hence, for Knox (1850), hybridity, in the context of interracial contact had a 
negative consequence as it was “a degradation of humanity and was rejected by nature” (cited 
in Young 1995: 15).  Although Knox and others paid attention to hybridity as it related to 
interracial breeding and the negative connotations of this, hybridity during this period was not 
limited to this form of interaction. It existed on the commercial farms, mines and even in 
colonial administration. For example, the British form of indirect rule produced a British-
local hybrid form of governance.  
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In recent years the concept of hybridity has been widely used and applied in a variety of ways 
in cultural studies, literary theory and criticism, anthropology, communication studies, 
political science (for instance, the study of hybrid political regimes/orders) and post-colonial 
studies. However, this concept has not attracted much attention in IR. Indeed, in post-colonial 
studies, hybridity has become a central theoretical concept in debates on culture and identity 
formation. Bhabha (1994), a prominent theorist of hybridity, celebrates the notion of 
hybridity as evidence of the resilience of the colonised and “as the contamination of imperial 
ideology, aesthetics, and identity, by the natives who are striking back at imperial 
domination” (Kraidy 2002: 319). For Bhabha (1994), in the colonial situation the indigenous 
people who encountered the colonisers found themselves caught in between two cultures, 
theirs and that which the coloniser had imposed on them and as the natives continually 
negotiated, resisted, undermined and re-appropriated the dominant colonial culture in their 
struggle for survival new cultural forms and practices emerged, that is, hybrid cultures. 
Contrary to the “invention of tradition thesis”, post-colonial scholars like Bhabha (1994), 
have observed that the hybridity that resulted from the interaction between the colonisers and 
the colonised reflected mutual dependency between them in the construction of a shared 
culture. Such theories show that hybridity is a positive force that resists homogenising 
ideologies because it creates space in which the agency of the subaltern can be enhanced as 
well as that of inclusivity. Through their questioning of the notion of a monolithic identity 
and invoking the notion of hybridity post-colonialists have been able to focus on the 
marginalised and their agency. 
 
The concept of hybridity has been used with much controversy. As Kraidy states, it is 
“conceptually ambiguous and controversy surrounds its meanings and implications (2002: 
320).  According to Kraidy, “While some see hybridity as a site of democratic struggle and 
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resistance against empire, others have attacked it as a neo-colonial discourse complicit with 
transnational capitalism [...]” and also that “the concept reflects the life of its theorists more 
than the sites and communities these theorists write about” (2002: 316). Frello has spelt out 
the danger of celebrating hybridity as it can be “potentially oppressing” since if done 
uncritically, it may work in favour of the powerful by “hiding unequal power relations, rather 
than undermining or criticising them” (2007: 4). In this sense, hybridity can be seen as a 
negative development and an uncritical theorisation of it can be blind to existing unequal 
power relations. For instance, Schmeidl (2009) has noted that recent attempts at establishing 
a liberal peace in Afghanistan has created a hybrid state in which regional strongmen and 
warlords command more power than state elites. Similarly, Mehler has pointed out that, in 
Africa hybrid solutions have a risk of bringing back instabilities and inefficiencies associated 
with neopatrimonialism (2009). Hence, the need to recognise and analyse internal politics, 
difference and how power is exercised within post-conflict “contact zones” and their impact 
in generating positive hybridity. 
 
In the context of Africa (and other former colonised parts of the world), an argument for 
peacebuilding initiatives which, for example, take custom and tradition into consideration 
does not imply an argument for returning to the pre-colonial period or purity of indigenous 
knowledge/tradition since this will fail. For instance, where a Western culture was imposed 
on Africans during the colonial period has become part and parcel of their experience. As 
such, we cannot ignore the reality of colonial history (chapter 1). However, African societies’ 
experiences, cultures, customs and traditions must function as sources “from which to extract 
elements that will help in the construction of an authentic and emancipative epistemological 
paradigm relevant to the conditions in Africa at this historical moment” (Ramose 1999: 130). 
Although, Ramose does not use the concept of hybridity, he shows the inevitability of it since 
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for him the “alien European culture has become part and parcel of the contemporary way of 
life in Africa” and at the same time, though weakened indigenous and traditional political and 
social institutions have remained operative (1999: 134).  
 
For Ramose, what is practical and realistic is to “situate the Western culture in a fundamental 
dialogue with African tradition” as a way of determining whether the two different paradigms 
can be reconciled (1999: 134). While Ramose recognises the influence of the West on the 
colonised, the process of constructing “an authentic and emancipative epistemological 
paradigm” in Africa which he advocates should not merely focus on “refuting and dislodging 
the “social epistemology of domination” (Ramose 1999: 128) as it relates to Western 
domination if it is going to be meaningful to everyone. It must also deal with certain 
customary practices that have resulted in certain groups of people (such as children, youths 
and women) being exploited and abused by the powerful at the local level. In this case, 
hybridity should be examined with a critical eye including questioning what it consists of. In 
other words, a “a radical conception of agency” in the context of hybridity is crucial – the 
concept “radical” entails that agency “must be tied to social change in which some inequality 
or injustice is addressed” (Prabhu 2007: 2). 
 
While I support the idea of hybridity in peacebuilding and statebuilding and the need to 
examine hybrid forms of peace that could be emerging in post-conflict environments, I argue 
for a hybridity that does not end up “immunising the objectively false and socially regressive 
elements of indigenous knowledge systems of non-Western societies from critical evaluation 
or reform” (Nanda 2001: 182). As Harris notes, “suitably honed hybridity has a necessary 
place in our tool kit, along with tradition and modernity, domination and hegemony, 
subalternity and power. We just have to get out there and use it” (2008: 29).  
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Situating Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding  
Recently, hybridity has been used in the study and practice of transitional justice to describe 
courts that have been developed in a number of settings, but more generally in post-conflict 
settings, such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor in which international criminal courts 
combine domestic and international components as in “hybrid domestic-international courts” 
(Dickinson 2003). In Darfur, Sudan, the term “hybrid AU-UN force” has been used in 
reference to the AU-UN peacekeeping forces in the region. In IR, and Peace and Conflict 
Studies, as noted above, there is an emerging literature that has invoked the concept of 
hybridity to describe a process whereby the “local” interacts, resists and modifies the liberal 
peace producing new forms of peace and practices. In this literature, concepts such as “hybrid 
political orders” (Boege et al. 2008), “liberal-local hybridity” (Richmond 2009a) and a 
“local-liberal-hybridity” (Richmond 2010b, 2010a) have been used. Based on empirical 
research, Richmond has noted the existence of resistance to the liberal peace in post-conflict 
environments, such as the Solomon Islands, Liberia, Mozambique and Timor Leste, and in 
this “Agency are expressed that contaminate, transgress and modify both the international 
and the local”, resulting in “local-liberal” or “liberal-local” hybrid forms of peace (Richmond 
2010b: 669, 2011a, 2011b).  
 
Although Richmond uses the concept contaminate, he does not use it in the negative sense, as 
was done in the 18th century in reference to interracial mixing, but in a positive sense in 
which subaltern agency becomes a resistive force to the liberal peace hegemony resulting in a 
peace that is a mixture of local forms of peace and the liberal peace. This defies the purity 
and hegemony of the liberal peace in post-conflict environments. However, where a “liberal-
local” hybridity emerges, though local actors have an influence on the peace that emerges, the 
liberal peace still dominates. As noted earlier, it is crucial to pay attention to relations of 
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power and domination that may be inscribed and reproduced within hybridity (Pieterse 1993). 
In this context, “hybridity raises the question of the terms of mixture, and the conditions of 
mixing and melange. At the same time it is important to note the ways in which hegemony is 
not merely reproduced but refigured in the process of hybridisation” (Pieterse 1993: 11, 
emphasis original). While Richmond has conceptualised the forms of peace that emerge with 
the interaction between the liberal peace and the local forms of peace in terms of “liberal-
local” and “local-liberal” hybrid forms of peace, Boege et al. (2008, 2009a) have argued for 
the need to recognise hybrid political orders as the basis for statebuilding and 
peacebuilding.47 
 
On Hybrid Political Orders  
Boege et al. (2008) have conceptualised fragile or failed states as hybrid political orders. As 
Clements notes, hybrid political orders are characterised by “a contradictory and dialectic co-
existence of forms of socio-political organisation that have their roots in both non-state 
indigenous societal structures and introduced state and societal structures” (2008: 12). In 
these political orders “diverse and competing claims to power and logics co-exist, overlap 
and intertwine, namely the logic of the ‘formal’ state, of traditional ‘informal’ social order, 
and of globalisation and associated social fragmentation (which is present in various forms: 
ethnic, tribal, religious...)”, for example, East Timor, Somaliland and the South Pacific Island 
of Bougainville (Boege et al. 2009: 24). In this case, a particular internal logic governs hybrid 
political orders and empirical evidence has shown that such political orders can be a source of 
stability, for example, Somaliland. In situations where state and informal institutions exist 
alongside there is tendency for them to share authority and legitimacy. This implies that in 
                                                           
47
  Hagmann and Hoehne (2009: 44) define a political order as “the sum of institutionalised, yet dynamic 
power relations that one can empirically grasp at a given time and place. It involves international legal 
arrangements as well as everyday practices of ordinary people and processes on the local, often across but rarely 
without reference to national boundaries.” 
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terms of governance and legitimacy hybrid political orders are quite distinct from the 
Western Weberian model state (Clements 2008).   
 
As noted in chapter 1, whereas, legitimacy for the institution of the chief in Africa is derived 
from custom and tradition, in the Western model state legitimacy is derived from legal-
rational authority.48 In hybrid political orders legitimacy derived from tradition and custom, 
and that derived from legal-rational authority interact. In Africa, as noted in chapter 1, chiefs 
still play a significant role in local and national politics as well as in development, security 
and justice. It is also crucial to note that in hybrid polities, customary law and forms of 
governance are still considered to be crucial in people’s everyday life (Clements 2008). 
Clements observes that customary governance that is deeply rooted in locality impacts 
strongly on state’s capacity, function and legitimacy and in addition, customary institutions 
do permeate state institutions, even though there is a lack of formal recognition of this.  
 
Boege et al. (2009) argue for the need to recognise the hybridity of political orders in the 
context of statebuilding and peacebuilding. By doing so, such an approach deconstructs the 
idea of the Western liberal state as crucial and superior form of political order and stability by 
itself. This implies paying attention to the complexity or dynamics of domestic processes, to 
local agency, local institutions, and indigenous knowledge. The idea of hybrid political orders 
reveals the political potential intrinsic in hybridity, though it is crucial not to romanticise it.  
 
                                                           
48
  With regard to legal-rational authority, obedience to the rulers is based on a liberal social contract (see 
Weber 1978). 
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Richmond’s Everyday Approach 
In an attempt to make the marginalised and groups more visible Richmond (2009a, 2009b) 
has gone further to argue for the need to critique contemporary peacebuilding and 
statebuilding interventions from the notion of the everyday. He notes that there is a 
possibility of achieving more emancipatory forms of peace through the utilisation of the 
concept of the “everyday” (together with that of “empathy”) (Richmond 2009a: 326, 2009b). 
This, according to him, could be helpful in uncovering and implementing plural models of 
peace, thus “moving beyond [the] problems of liberal agency [...] in its modernisation-
oriented, problem-solving, institutional and governmental forms” (Richmond 2009a: 326). 
The everyday approach entails the uncovering and analysing of the types of agency, 
responses and practices in the everyday life of people in post-conflict societies that produce 
hybrid models of peace in the context of international peace support operations. Richmond 
(2010c: 671) defines the everyday as “a space in which local individuals and communities 
live and develop political strategies in their environment, towards the state and towards 
international models of order”. He does not consider it as civil society, which in most cases 
emanates from the West, but as “representative of the deeper local-local” (2010c: 671). For 
him, “It is often transversal and transnational, engaging with needs, rights, custom, 
individual, community, agency and mobilisation in political terms” (Richmond 2010c: 671).  
 
Yet, the internationals have paid scant attention to ordinary people’s everyday concerns. 
Richmond’s everyday approach attempts to bring to the fore people’s everyday concerns such 
as employment, welfare, food security, culture and social needs into the liberal peace 
discourse. Through its connection with resistance and agency, the everyday is said to be a site 
that has a potential to generate autonomy, new political orders and forms of peace (Richmond 
2009a). Richmond connects the everyday and resistance.  
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On Resistance 
As noted earlier, international peacebuilding relies on the exercise of power in its expression 
of what counts as proper order and acceptable forms of political organisation and in its 
reaction to “disorder” and nonconformity – this can be through conditionality or force or 
sanctions. In this sense, international peacebuilding is a form of domination. However, as 
Sharp et al. have observed, “domination is no way complete or secure” since people may 
resist it since the dominated will always seek alternative spaces the dominant group want to 
erase (2000: 7). 
 
The concept of resistance does not have a clear-cut definition. I use Hollander and Einwohner 
(2004: 534)’s definition of resistance as “a form of refusal, opposition or unwillingness to 
cooperate with behaviour or practices that are abusive or undermine one’s interests”. As 
Routledge (1997: 361) notes,  
 
Resistances are assembled out of the materials and practices of everyday life and imply 
some form of contestation, some juxtaposition of forces involving all or any of the 
following: symbolic meanings, communicative processes, political discourses, religious 
idioms, cultural practices, social networks, physical settings, bodily practices and 
envisioned desires and hopes. 
 
Individuals or groups of citizens, in this sense, may engage in overt and confrontational or 
hidden forms of resistance (Scott 1985, 1990) or both. Resistance can be expressed through 
language, communication, art, drama and music.  
 
Questions have been raised whether for an action to be called a form of resistance it should 
be recognised by others or not, and whether it is the actor’s intention that matters (Hollander 
and Einwolmer 2004). For Scott resistance can be hidden and an action does not necessarily 
have to be recognised for it to be called a form of resistance. As for Hollander and 
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Einwolmer, both intent and recognition matter “to different degree for different types of 
resistance” (2004: 539).  Another crucial point is that the idea of resistance is complex: 1) it 
can play a dual role (not pure), that is, “even while resisting power, individuals or groups 
may simultaneously support structures of domination that necessitates resistance in the first 
place”; 2) neither those who resist nor those who dominate are monolithic given that 
“multiple systems of hierarchy, and individuals can be simultaneously powerful and 
powerless within different systems” (Hollander and Einwolmer 2004: 549, 550).  
 
Similarly, Ortner has noted that there “is never single, unitary, subordinate, if only in the 
sense that subaltern groups are internally divided by age gender, status, and other forms of 
difference and that occupants of differing subject positions will have different, even opposed, 
but still legitimate, perspectives on the situation” (1995: 175). It is crucial to consider this 
when studying resistance from the margins since resistors also have their own politics which 
can be conflictual (Ortner 1995).  
 
Resistance is crucial in determining the success or failure of international peacebuilding. If 
properly understood and worked with, it can be useful for peacebuilding. It can help to show 
that ordinary people in post-conflict situations are not merely passive objects of international 
peacebuilding, but also active agents involved in shaping the peacebuilding process. Writing 
about resistance is crucial for helping support emancipatory forms of peace. As de Certeau 
(1984) has noted, subordinate groups or individuals often engage in tactical practises in their 
everyday life as a form of resistance to domination. He considers tactics as everyday 
activities including walking and interacting. Scott has analysed and theorised relations of 
domination and resistance, which highlights “everyday resistance” of the weak against the 
strong (Scott 1985, 1990, 1989). Scott critiques social analysis on resistance for being limited 
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to the obvious such as large scale, organised protest movements that often were perceived as 
threats to the state, making the peasants’ resistance invisible (1985). 
 
Scott has proposed the concepts of public transcript and hidden transcript in order to 
elaborate his argument. The idea of public transcript relates to the aspect of domination that is 
obvious, that is, the open, public “interaction between subordinates and those who dominate” 
(1990: 2). He considers the public transcript to be “highly partisan” since the dominators 
have the power to control it and compel performance from the dominated. The public 
transcript is “designed to be impressive, to affirm and naturalise the power of dominant elites, 
and to conceal or euphemise the dirty linen of their ruler” (Scott 1990: 18). Scott further 
notes that the public transcript of domination comprises “a domain of material appropriation 
(for example, of labour, grain, taxes), a domain of public mastery and subordination (for 
example, rituals of hierarchy, deference, speech, punishment, and humiliation and [...] a 
domain of ideological justification of inequalities (for example, the public religious and 
political world view of the dominant elite)” (1990: 111). In contrast, the hidden transcript 
comprises of “the offstage responses and rejoinders to that public transcript” (Scott 1990: 
111). By concealing the resistant nature of their activities the dominated can protect 
themselves from the powerful. He then introduces the concept of “infrapolitics” as “[...] the 
circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate groups is, like infrared rays, beyond the 
visible end of the spectrum” (1990: 183). In this sense, the concept refers to hidden everyday 
forms of resistance that subordinate groups wage against the dominant elite and its 
invisibility is “a tactical choice born of prudent awareness of the balance of power” (1990: 
183).  
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The “small arsenals” for the less powerful include such acts as, “foot-dragging, 
dissimulations, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, 
poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous threats [...]” 
(Scott 1989: 34). Such activities are regarded as “everyday” due to their ordinary nature 
(appear to be survival or coping mechanisms) and if taken at face value it is hard to tell that 
they are forms of resistance against domination. In this case, everyday resistance is “virtually 
always a stratagem deployed by a weaker party in thwarting the claims of an institutional or 
class opponent who dominates the public exercise of power” (1989: 52, emphasis not mine). 
Informal assemblages such as the local community, informal market, the workplace, public 
transport and secret societies bushes “provide both a structure and a cover for resistance” and 
as such, are spaces for infrapolitical activities (Scott 1990: 200). Scott considers infrapolitics 
as real politics – politics in which “counterhegemonic discourse is elaborated” (1990: 200). 
For infrapolitics to be identified, according to Scott, then it is essential to juxtapose the 
hidden and public transcripts. Insights from Scott’s theory such as “hidden transcripts”, 
“public transcript”, “everyday forms of [...] resistance” and “infrapolitics” can be useful in 
understanding local and contextual responses to contemporary peace support operations. 
 
From Liberal Peace to Post-liberal Peace 
Acknowledging local agency, institutions and knowledge as well as the emergence of 
hybridity in post-conflict spaces, at the same time being aware that the powerful have a 
potential to hybridise, thus continuing to dominate the less powerful, is a step towards what 
Richmond (2009a) calls, a “post-liberal peace” agenda in peacebuilding. The prefix post- in 
this context could be interpreted as implying that the liberal peace is in the past when in 
reality it continues to play a dominant role in post-conflict environments. However, this is not 
 149 
 
the sense in which it is understood in this thesis as will be shown in the next paragraph.  
Another question relates to whether the idea of a “post-liberal peace” is not a Eurocentric 
critic of the liberal peace given the absence of the voices of scholars in the global South and 
also that its main proponents hail from Europe and whether this would mean the concept 
“trans-liberal peace” is more appropriate as it relates to transcending the liberal peace. 
Although the main proponents of the notion of “post-liberal peace” come from Europe, their 
proposal of a post-liberal peace is based on facts on the ground – a result of empirical 
research in various post-conflict situations, such East Timor, Liberia, Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Somaliland, and Pacific Islands including the Solomon Island and Tonga. However, it is 
crucial for these progressive intellectuals to do collaborative research with thinkers from 
various post-conflict environments in the developing world, especially in Africa where this 
remain under theorised.  
 
In regard to the prefix post-, Vattimo (1991 cited in Mazotti 2008: 100) notes that it “does not 
always imply a temporal sequence, but simply an opposition practice”. In this sense, the 
prefix post- as in the context of liberal peace is an indication of “a desire among the 
dominated subjects to alter or overcome [the liberal peace] domination, and it would also 
recognise that this desire generates a variety of subjective positions and agency” (Mazotti 
2008: 100). In addition, it does not negate other forms of peace and knowledges, rather 
recognises them and emphasises their co-existence.  
 
In this case, a “post-liberal” peace agenda advocates a move towards new and reconstructed 
approaches and strategies that allow different actors – international, state elites and local 
groups – to participate in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in non-hegemonic ways. 
It also engages in processes that are relevant to socio-political, cultural, historical and 
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economic experiences of the host-state. This recognises and accepts the positive changes or 
modifications that are happening on the ground as locals interact with the internationals, 
resist, modify, accept, reject and tolerate international peace initiatives in an attempt to 
establish peace that is relevant to their situation. Such an agenda (as noted earlier) implies 
moving beyond the representation of local populations as victims who need Western concepts 
of progress and peace for them to move out of their situation, while at the same time, 
ignoring or avoiding local forms of political organisation and peacemaking in international 
peacebuilding practice and policy. It is also a project that advocates the liberation or 
emancipation of Dussel’s “post-colonial” marginal (1995) or Spivak’s “subaltern” (1988) or 
Fanon’s “wretched of the earth” (1967), who often have been represented as victims who 
cannot liberate themselves out of their situation without outside intervention.   
 
In a nutshell, a “post-liberal peace” agenda deconstructs conventional approaches to peace- 
and statebuilding which explain violent conflicts, fragile or weak statehood as “deficits 
measured in standards of modern civilisation [Western civilisation] and ends up in strategies 
of promoting and implementing these standards where it is (seems as) necessary” (Meyer 
2008: 569), but does not attempt to deal with the problems in relation to the situation on the 
ground. It also implies the “possibility of a non-Eurocentric dialogue with alterity, one that 
fully enables ‘the negation of the negation’ to which subaltern others have been subjected” 
(Escobar 2004: 219). This will also help to show how marginalised or subordinated groups 
who are not readily in a position to control what comes from the dominant culture are able to 
determine to varying degrees what to absorb and what not to absorb from the dominant 
culture into their own culture as well as what use it is for them (Pratt 1992).   
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 In this sense, the daily reality of peacebuilding practice ensures that the ideas and 
assumptions of the liberal peace cannot exist undiluted in reality. In addition, the existence of 
multiple or hybrid sovereignties,49 local approaches to peacemaking, different cultural 
practices, dual authority and different ways of understanding political organisation in Africa, 
as noted in chapter 1, entails that reality is different from theory and that a state-centred 
approach does not provide us with a full picture of what is the case on the ground. Hence, it is 
crucial to move beyond blue prints of the liberal peace which are disconnected from local 
realities. This approach through detailed empirical research enables the researcher to 
understand real issues, such as poverty, food insecurity, social injustice, the everyday life, 
resistance, acceptance and modification of the liberal peace in post-conflict societies. One of 
the goals here relates to “de-Westernising social emancipation” (Escobar 2004: 12) or 
challenging the emancipatory version of the liberal peace which views the liberal peace as the 
only peace that ensures human emancipation or progress and showing that the local has a role 
to play in its own emancipation or progress.  In this case, there is the need for the position 
that the liberal peace per se is the real peace and good for all the people across the world to 
give way to the understanding that various forms of peace exist or are possible including 
hybridised forms of peace which could be appropriate for particular situations.  
 
In an attempt to show that “other forms of peace are possible” this study will examine the 
interface between liberal peacebuilding and domestic politics and social forces interacting in 
Sierra Leone. By so doing, this study will able to ascertain how local agency is driving the 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, how local actors are maintaining their agency in their 
interactions with the internationals and the forms of peace that are emerging as a result of this 
interactions. An investigation of the agency and methods that local actors in Sierra Leone use 
                                                           
49
  For an overview of the concept of hybrid sovereignty see Bacik (2008). 
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to resist, accept, modify and subvert the liberal peace in order to enable more locally resonate 
forms of social, economic and political organisation will help us understand the facts on the 
ground, for instance, to find out how this results in the production of a certain kind of 
peace(s) – whether hybrid or not.   
 
As noted earlier, IR scholarship has for a long time been preoccupied with states, state 
sovereignty, anarchy, security, order and territorial integrity, as a result, it has failed to 
engage with multiple and hybrid sovereignties, how external intervention has been resisted, 
accepted, modified, tolerated, co-opted or subverted. However, in recent years, efforts at 
theorising and developing a framework for the analysis of post-conflict spaces as spaces 
where various agency emerge and hybridity occur have challenged the ideas of bounded 
territoriality, the single sovereignty of the state as well as the dominant liberal position on 
peacebuilding (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Richmond 2009a, 2010c; MacGinty 2010b, 
2010c).  By doing so, this critical literature is giving more attention to local actors’ (state 
elites and non-elites) creative reinvention of the liberal peace agenda and their initiatives to 
engage it. As Richmond and Franks (2009: 182) have recently noted, “Far more attention 
needs to be paid to peacebuilding and longer-term engagements with specific conflicts, with a 
more hybridised meeting of the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ than currently appears to have 
occurred”. This study draws from the critical insights and investigates whether this is the case 
in Sierra Leone. Insights from this critical literature have not been comprehensively 
examined in relation to post-conflict societies of Africa. This study, thus, complements the 
emerging critical literature putting emphasis on the need to pay attention on the interface 
between the “liberal” and the “local”. The next two chapters focus on Sierra Leone. 
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Chapter 5: The Sierra Leonean Struggle 
 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to discuss the causes and evolution of the civil war in Sierra Leone. 
Although there has been a tendency among a number of scholars to associate the crisis in 
Sierra Leone with short-term causes, I consider the causes to be multifarious and connected 
to Sierra Leone’s past including the intense social, economic and political polarisation that 
the country experienced during the colonial period which the postcolonial state inherited. A 
discussion of the background to the civil war in Sierra Leone is useful in helping us gain a 
more intimate understanding of the local context and its possible challenges to the liberal 
peace  
 
In this chapter, I will first discuss historical factors (Sierra Leone’s pre-colonial and colonial 
inheritance) that laid a weak foundation for the modern state. I will then examine scholarly 
debates on the immediate causes of state failure/collapse and the civil war. Neither religion 
nor ethnic tensions was the cause of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Kurz (2010: 219) identifies 
three key factors that had a role in shaping the origins and development of the Sierra Leonean 
state: “the fragmentation of the polity, the centre-periphery divide and the role of powerful 
local chiefs”.  
 
Geography and a Fragmented Polity 
As noted in chapter 1, political organisation and institutions in Africa date back to the pre-
colonial period. Chapter 1 also noted that although large kingdoms with highly developed 
political systems existed in pre-colonial Africa, including Sierra Leone, these kingdoms were 
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not hegemonic because low population densities made it difficult and expensive for 
governments to exert political authority to everyone within their domain. In Sierra Leone, 
dense tropical forests and hills (together with a lack of transportation and communication 
technologies) imposed certain constraints on the establishment of large-scale states (Kurz 
2010). Sierra Leone’s hinterland which consisted of 14 ethnolinguistic groups “was not a 
unified entity, politically, culturally, or ethnolinguistically” (Caulker 1981: 399).  Despite, 
cultural and linguistic homogeneity, the ethnolinguistic groups were never (and even today 
are not) politically integrated and each had its own distinctive political institutions and 
culture, language, social and cultural institutions (Caulker 1981). Each ethnolingiustic group 
tended to localise political power: “Instead of an integrated political dominion in which 
political authority was in the hands of one ruler, each ethnolinguistic group was divided into 
small, independent political entities” (Caulker 1981: 400). Due to the lack of a unified polity 
in pre-colonial Sierra Leone, large political organisations similar to the one that formed in the 
West did not develop and this has had a negative impact on state and nation formation in the 
country (see chapter 1). In Sierra Leone, the rural populace tend to associate themselves more 
with their chiefdoms/ethnic groups than the state.  
 
Colonial Legacies 
Socioeconomic and Political Polarisation 
Sierra Leone’s colonisation is a form of external intervention that saw the British attempting 
to build a form of state that resembled the Western polity – a Westphalian state. However, 
this resulted in a hybrid polity that was weak, undemocratic, authoritarian and politically and 
socioeconomically polarised.50 With the colonial state failing to establish durable or strong 
connections between the urban centre (Freetown) and its periphery (rural publics) as well as 
                                                           
50
  Chapter 1 has discussed the nature of the colonial state in Africa and the issues raised are relevant to 
Sierra Leone. 
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extending its institutions into the hinterland, the chieftaincy became the colonial’s state’s 
main agent of local rule from the time the British established a British protectorate over the 
inhabitants of the hinterland in 1896 (Barrows 1976; also see chapter 1).   
 
British rule in Sierra Leone began in the early 19th century after the British colonialists 
declared Freetown a crown colony for the freed slaves who had been removed from Jamaica, 
Britain and Nova Scotia as well as Africans freed from slaving ships. The new settlers 
became known as the Creoles. The assumption was that freed slaves would be “better off in 
their ‘ancestral homeland’” (Cartwright 1978: 36). In 1896 the British declared the hinterland 
a protectorate. Consequently, the hinterland people became the British’s protected people, 
while the Creoles who lived in the colony (Freetown) were British subjects. Both colonial 
authorities and Creoles generally referred to the protectorate people as “aborigines, natives, 
savages, naked barbarians and many other kindred epithets” (Kandeh 1992: 83). The Creoles 
who through Europeanization held Euro-Christian values and culture regarded themselves as 
more civilised and superior than the indigenous population. Indeed, the relations between the 
protectorate people and the Creoles were characterised by “a peculiar version of the colonial 
mission civilisatrice” (Pham 2006: 70). According to the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (hereafter called the TRC), the British colonial administration 
promoted the idea that Western values and Christianity were superior to religions, traditions 
and customs practiced in the hinterland, leading to the discrimination of the protectorate 
people (2004). As a result, the colonial administrators pursued a social engineering strategy 
that divided the colony and protectorate people resulting in extreme political, social and 
economic polarisation in the country. A unified state could not be created, thus effectively 
establishing “two nations in the same land” (TRC 2004: 5).   
 
 156 
 
This colonial social engineering strategy saw the emergence of two distinct political units in 
which Freetown was run on modern lines and the Creoles being ruled under this modern 
system, and a protectorate that was subjected to indirect rule via Paramount Chiefs who were 
under the supervision of a small civilian staff (Jackson 2005). Further, given that all mineral 
and agricultural resources were in the protectorate, the colonial government had to adopt 
strategies of co-option and coercion as means to extract them, and often, it preferred 
cooptation given the limited resources that were available to it (Kurz 2010). Two important 
outcomes of this strategy were the creation of a colony-protectorate divide in political and 
economic terms that undermined nation building and the creation of powerful chiefs vis-a-
vis, their followers. 
 
Chiefs, Power and Local Politics  
From the onset, like other colonised parts of Africa, the colonial state in Sierra Leone had no 
local legitimacy and acceptance. In order for the colonial government to extend its authority 
in the hinterland the colonial administrators adopted a policy of indirect rule which allowed 
traditional leaders designated “Paramount Chiefs” to rule their followers using “native 
custom” and “native law” under the supervision of a British District Commissioner (DC) 
(Pham 2006; Alie 1990; CGG, Methodist Church Sierra Leone and Network Movement for 
Justice and Development 2009; Cartwright 1976).51  The assumption among the British 
colonialists was that “these institutions, under the guidance of the resident European DC, 
would be continually developing into more efficient units of administration; responding to 
and adapting themselves to the new situations created by colonial rule” (Alie 1990: 134). 
                                                           
51
  The colonial government introduced a system of “ruling houses” in which each chiefdom had at least 
two ruling houses and only if someone was a descendent from a ruling house he/she was eligible to contest an 
election for Paramount Chieftaincy and was elected for life, unless if the relevant Chiefdom Council (an 
assembly of elders and notables) disposed him/her (Barrows 1976). 
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Consequently, Paramount Chiefs became subordinate to DCs who were the heads of districts 
and representatives of the central government.  
 
In addition, Paramount Chiefs’ functions and powers became limited compared to the pre-
colonial period. In this new political arrangement the chiefdom became the basic unit of 
administration in the protectorate under the rule of Paramount chiefs, with the support of the 
Tribal Authority (in post-colonial Sierra Leone this was changed to Chiefdom Council). As 
the TRC notes, the DC could only grant a Paramount Chief a degree of autonomy to rule his 
people, if he met the DC’s demands for “maintaining law and order” in his chiefdom as well 
as meeting demands for labour and taxes (TRC 2004). As such, the chiefdom in Sierra Leone 
has often been portrayed as having been “originally designed to harness ‘native authority’ to 
British rule” (Fanthorpe 1998: 558). 
 
British Consolidation of Colonial Rule and the Creation of Powerful Chiefs 
Following the British’s defeat of the protectorate people during the war of 1898 that was 
attributed to the protectorate people’s resistance to the British imposition of hut tax, the 
colonial government maintained the position of the Paramount Chief in the protectorate. In 
addition, it maintained their main role of collecting taxes, maintaining law and order and 
dispensing justice among the indigenous population as well as the provision of essential 
services such as clinics and schools. However, the colonial government ensured that chiefs 
recognised its control over the protectorate and required them to promote its interests ahead 
of the interests of their followers. This transformed the nature of chiefs’ power. Some chiefs 
were deposed, with some coming into power resulting from British patronage, not popular 
support. As such, chiefs became very powerful vis-a-vis their followers. For some scholars 
and local NGOs in Sierra Leone, chiefs could no longer be accountable to their followers, but 
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the colonial government (CGG, Methodist Church Sierra Leone and Network Movement for 
Justice and Development 2009; Fanthorpe 2007; Barrows 1976).  
 
For instance, Alie notes that since chiefs knew that they had the backing of the colonial 
government, many of them became authoritarian and maltreated their followers as well as 
“ran the Native Administration as if it was their personal property” (1990: 154).52 He further 
notes that chiefs received financial incentives from the colonial government as means to 
make them dependable allies in the new system of governance. The incentives included “a 
five per cent rebate on collection of the house tax, incidental gifts, entertainment allowances 
and tributes from sub-chiefs and headmen. Economically, the chiefs made capital of the 
tribute paid them in goods and services to enhance their standing in the community” (Alie 
1990: 150). In addition, with the colonial government not giving much attention to the chiefs’ 
activities after its consolidation of colonial rule, chiefs often appropriated tax revenue as well 
as used forced labour for their own personal gain (Barrows 1976). Moreover, as Tangri notes, 
“offices and financial resources have not always been distributed in such a way that all 
groups in the chiefdom might benefit equally; the paramount chiefs and their followers have 
been the major beneficiaries, and certain sections have been favoured” (1976: 312). Since the 
chiefs had support and recognition from the colonial government, internal checks and 
balances (see chapter 1) that had been established during the pre-colonial period diminished. 
Violence came to characterise chiefdom politics. 
 
                                                           
52
  The colonial government introduced the Native Administration system in the Protectorate in 1937 with 
the aim of putting the chiefdom administration on “a sound footing” and it served three main purposes: a) “the 
establishment of separate financial institutions, known as Chiefdom Treasuries, for each unit of administration”; 
b) “the grant of tax authority to each chiefdom unit”; and c) “authorisation of Paramount Chiefs and other Tribal 
Authorities to enact by-laws and issue orders in pursuance of social services and development functions” (Alie 
1990: 152). 
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Violence in Chiefdoms 
The colonial transformation of chiefs had a negative impact on their relations with the 
followers. Since the end of 1898 Hut Tax War and the British consolidation of colonial rule, 
the protectorate had never been free from politically motivated violence. The violence that 
came to characterise chiefdom politics and periodically disrupted it has largely been 
attributed to conflicts among the hinterland people themselves (Tangri 1976). Two different 
explanations regarding the frequency and virulence of the violence in the chiefdoms, 
especially since the late 1930s, have been provided.53 Kilson attributes the conflict in the 
hinterland to rural “radicalism”. He notes that a form of rural “radicalism” characterised this 
conflict “which in some instances constituted a virtual peasant revolt against traditional rulers 
and authority” (1966: 60). According to Kilson, the November 1955 to March 1956 riots in 
the hinterland are an outcome of this rural radicalism. He further notes that, “a populist 
groundswell against taxes resulted in great violence” and the objects of this populist violence 
were “all related to specific features of local administration that proved unjust or unduly 
burdensome to the masses” (1966: 188-189). Contrary to this position, Barrows (1976) and 
Tangri (1976) attribute the intense political competition among ruling house families to the 
violence that came to characterise chiefdom politics.  
 
Because of the power and economic benefits associated with the Paramount Chieftaincy 
including its use as an avenue for private accumulation as well as the general 
underdevelopment in the rural areas, the office of the Paramount Chief became a site of 
intense (sometimes violent) political competition among rival ruling houses due to the 
existence of a “zero-sum game” (Keen 2005). This was more pronounced in the Mende 
chiefdoms since the idea of a “bi-polar chief” (“chief-opposition ruling house”) was alien to 
                                                           
53
  Fathorne (2007; see chapter 1) has attributed the violence to the power struggles between secret 
societies and chiefs. 
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them (Barrows 1976: 100).  As compared to the Temne in the north, the practice of rotating 
the chieftaincy was not common to the Mende (Barrows 1976; Keen 2005). For the Mende 
chiefdoms, their openness to internal rivalries often led the various factions forging alliance 
with outsiders who further divided them, unlike other societies, such as, Somalia where rival 
clans have often closed ranks against outsiders (Barrows 1976). Often members of a rival 
ruling house(s) mobilised “young men” to engage in protests and acts of violence against 
incumbent chiefs in order to advance their personal interests, for instance, economic gain, 
political power and position.54 As Tangri notes (1976: 312), “violence has been a means of 
seeking to achieve greater share of the resources and benefits of the chiefdom – for 
themselves and their clienteles – by overthrowing the incumbents and installing themselves in 
office”. Tangri adds that, “young men” resented the chiefly hierarchy, and as result, 
disaffected “young men” who feared continued forced labour and the heavy fines forged 
alliances with opposition elders who were more interested in their own personal gain such as 
power and position in the chiefdom affairs than the masses.  
 
Although chiefs, their supporters and property were targeted, no chief was killed and 
attention was on removing certain chiefs from power as well as doing away with specific 
chiefdom policies and rules (Tangri 1976). This, for Tangri, shows that the protests neither 
represented “a popular movement against the existing establishment, nor the wholesale 
change of the structure of chiefdom authority”, but largely a result of opponents of the local 
establishment who manipulated popular discontent (1976: 315). In addition, indigenous 
people respected the institution of the chief and wanted to see it continue. Indeed, the post-
colonial society inherited them with the new African state elites, like their colonial 
                                                           
54
  According to Barrows, the Mende use the term “young men” to refer to males who have no respect, 
little power and hold no position in the chiefdom affairs (1976). The use of “young men”/youth in political 
violence at the national level has also been noted as a key factor to the recent civil war in Sierra Leone. 
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predecessors failing to reach the grassroots, but relying on the chiefdom as the basic unit of 
administration since for the new state elites the chiefdom was the only local institution that 
could command support from the hinterland people.  
 
The hold to chiefs, according to Keen, was further underpinned by Sierra Leone’s path to 
independence (2005).  In preparation for Sierra Leone’s independence, the British and Sierra 
Leone elites in 1960 held a constitutional conference in London which saw them drafting 
Sierra Leone’s constitution without the input of most of the population. Following this the 
British granted independence to Sierra Leone in 1961. According to Keen (2005), in Sierra 
Leone there was no broad-based nationalist movement that could have played a role in 
mobilising popular discontent and threatened the chiefs’ position. Unlike other colonial states 
such as Mozambique where the post-colonial government depicted chiefs as colonial stooges 
and a threat to the modern nation-state it wanted to establish, Paramount Chiefs in Sierra 
Leone were not viewed that way since chiefs had been involved in the country’s struggle for 
self-governance. As such, at independence, Sierra Leone inherited a combination of a 
Westminster model and indigenous institutions of chieftaincy in which central and chiefdom 
politics closely intertwined, that is, a hybrid political order.   
 
It is crucial to note that the colonial state in Sierra Leone never had effective state institutions 
and the colonial government’s attempt to integrate traditional political structures into the 
colonial state led to the transformation of the indigenous political order, the relations between 
ordinary people and their rulers as well as society and state, and increased the role of 
patronage as competing ruling families sought to outdo each other. The postcolonial state 
inherited this. 
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Politics in Post-colonial Sierra Leone 
The idea of the liberal peace is not new to Sierra Leone. In response to calls for 
decolonisation and self-governance of colonised African states that came across Africa, in 
Sierra Leone the British created a liberal democratic framework aimed at enabling local 
political actors to establish political parties as well as compete for the leadership of the state 
(Abdullah and Rashid 2004). Alie (2000: 15) notes that at independence in 1961 Sierra Leone 
inherited from the British “the promise of a budding democracy”. In the early years of 
independence, Sierra Leone had a functioning parliamentary system that exercised legislative 
power in an elected House of Representatives, an independent judiciary system, a vibrant 
civil society and a free press, among others (Alie 2000). In addition, it had “a policy of 
Laissez-faire in economic development, a willingness to accept whatever kind of investment 
might be offered, regardless of its effect on the overall economic position of [the country]” 
(Cartwright 1978:  74). In this regard, all private investors were welcome. A consequence of 
this approach was that Sierra Leone could not come up with an approach to development that 
emphasised on self-reliance, thus Sierra Leoneans were left in “a state of economic 
dependence on industrialised states for most of the satisfaction to which they aspired” 
(Cartwright 1978: 74).  
 
Despite the liberal democratic experiment that the British initiated towards the decolonisation 
of Sierra Leone, the political polarisation between the Creole and the hinterland people did 
not cease to exist. At independence, a coalition of indigenous elites from diverse regional and 
ethnic background prevented the Creole elite from inheriting the state from the British 
(Kilson 1966). This resulted in SLPP winning independence for the country and its leader Sir 
Milton Margai becoming the first Prime Minister of independent Sierra Leone. Milton 
Margai continued to be closely connected with the chiefly ruling strata. The alliance between 
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the indigenous elites did not last long as the ethnic tensions between the Temne and Mende 
witnessed increased ethnicisation and regionalisation of domestic politics. As a result, “The 
‘indigenous’ elite subsequently fragmented into Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), a 
coalition of chiefs and middle-class professionals that came to represent the predominantly 
Mende southeast, and the All People’s Congress [led by Siaka Stevens], which garnered 
support from the Temne and Limba in the north, the Kono in the east, and the Creoles in the 
west” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 173). Political competition among elites increasingly grew 
into a contestation for power between those from the north and the south aligned to their 
respective ethnic groups and coalitions. This, to some extent, can be linked to the pre-colonial 
nature of political organisation and societies in Sierra Leone, as noted earlier in this chapter 
and chapter 1, which were heterogeneous and fragmented. Despite this, the British brought 
them under one territory and their departure in Sierra Leone saw “differences rather than 
similarities increasingly dominat[ing] political life” in Sierra Leone with elites using these 
differences to consolidate their control over the state (Ake 1991: 317).   
 
The liberal democratic experiment that had begun towards the decolonisation in Sierra Leone 
collapsed in 1967 when the head of Sierra Leone army, Brigadier David Lansana seized 
power following APC’s defeat of the SLPP which witnessed an intense struggle over 
electoral results between the two parties. This effectively blocked what would have been 
Africa’s first smooth democratic transition involving transfer of power from a ruling party to 
an opposition one. A few days after Brigadier Lansana took over; a second coup was staged 
resulting in the creation of a National Reformation Council (NRC) which took control of the 
government for a year (Fisher 1969). A year later, a third military coup led to the restoration 
of civilian rule with the handing over of state power to APC and the position of Prime 
Minister to Siaka Stevens. The transfer of power marked the beginning of the decline of the 
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state and the country’s descent to state autocracy that contributed to the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) insurgency in 1991. Stevens first transformed the country into a republic in 1971 
and then into a one-party state in 1978 after several attempts to overthrow his government 
failed. In 1985, Joseph Momoh a former army commander succeeded Stevens. However, his 
rule was brought to an end in 1992 when disgruntled front-line soldiers led by Captain 
Valentine Strasser seized power and established the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) (Gberie 2005).  
 
Explaining the Short-term Causes of the Sierra Leonean Civil War 
Various interpretations have been offered in response to Sierra Leone’s state decline, its 
descent to state autocracy and the civil war. These interpretations tend to focus on the short-
term causes including a crisis of patrimonialism (Richards 1996; Reno 1998); an outcome of 
lumpen culture and youth resistance (Abdullah 1998; Abdullah and Rashid 2004); the 
predatory functionality of state power (Kandeh 1999); a product of greed, not grievance 
(Collier 1999, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and a new form of barbarism (Kaplan 1994). 
Although most of these explanations do not bring out the long-term historical causes of the 
civil war including pre-colonial and colonial legacies, and the eventual state collapse, they 
deserve attention since an understanding of both long-term and short-term causes of the 
conflict contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of the civil war in Sierra Leone and 
responses to it.  Below I will review some of these accounts. 
 
A New Form of Barbarism 
In his seminal article, “The Coming Anarchy”, Kaplan (1994) has traced Sierra Leone state’s 
descent to state autocracy to new forms of barbarism, what Richards (1996) has called, the 
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“New Barbarism” thesis (Richards 1996). Kaplan refutes the political dimensions of the civil 
war in Sierra Leone and other parts of West Africa, and emphasises its criminal nature – an 
outcome of traits embedded in the local culture. For him, like in other parts of West Africa, 
the conflict in Sierra Leone is a result of a combination of factors including marginalisation 
from the world economy, overpopulation, environmental collapse, disease, crime and deep-
seated tribal hatred, among others. Kaplan’s work reduces rebels in West African countries 
like Sierra Leone to irrational and superstitious bandits engaged in primitive violence. Since 
his work is not analytical and also it does not examine the local context in a historical 
perspective, it does not help in explaining the structural causes of the civil war. Other 
scholars like Richards (1996) who have critiqued the “New Barbarism” thesis have pointed 
out that the RUF insurgency is an outcome of the disintegration of patrimonial politics in 
Sierra Leone. 
 
A Crisis of Patrimonial Politics 
Several scholars have traced the origins of the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone to a “crisis” 
or collapse of patrimonial politics in the country (Richards 1996; Reno 1998; Boas 2001). As 
noted earlier, rather than building up formal state institutions, successive post-colonial state 
elites in Sierra Leone preferred to use informal networks to consolidate their political and 
economic power. During his reign, Siaka Stevens increasingly centralised his power and 
authority as well as personalised the office of the President by dismantling district councils, 
putting the institution of chieftaincy under the control of the central government, establishing 
a one party state in 1978, politicising the military and police, undermining press freedom, 
civil society and the autonomy of the legislature (Hayward 1984). For Boas, Stevens is “the 
perfect embodiment of a neo-patrimonial ruler [who] envisioned himself as the head of the 
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extended Sierra Leonean family, claimed roots in all major ethnic groups” and portrayed 
himself as “Pa Siakie” – “the father of the nation” (2001: 708).  
 
The personalisation of government meant, for example, employment and education became 
dependent on loyalty rather than performance. Reno has called this form of politics, “warlord 
politics” in which “rulers reject the pursuit of a broader project of creating a state that serves 
a collective good or even of creating institutions that are capable of developing independent 
perspectives and acting on behalf of interests distinct from rulers’ and personal exercise of 
power” (1998: 1). Reno further notes that, patronage politics in Sierra Leone resulted in a 
“shadow state”, a form of patronage system that was not formally recognised, which at the 
same time, was “rigidly organised and centred on the rulers’ control over resources” (1998: 
2).   
 
Neopatrimonial corruption affected all state enterprises including the diversion of profits 
from oil and rice marketing for the personal gain of state elites and their associates including 
Lebanese merchants. However, it is in the diamond sector that it was more pronounced. As 
Reno notes, “Before Stevens’ rule, diamonds had generated about $200 million in profits in 
Sierra Leone’s formal economy, or about 30 percent of national output, and had provided 70 
percent of foreign exchange reserves” (1998: 116). Indeed, the extensive patronage network 
that Stevens and later his successor Joseph Momoh created resulted in few diamonds passing 
through the formal economy to the extent that, by 1987 they were valued at $100,000 
effectively depriving the state of much needed revenue while financing neo-patrimonial 
exchange (Reno 1998). As state elites channelled public resources for patrimonial 
distribution, most of the population was suffering. It is not surprising that an “irrelevant” state 
emerged that was “inefficient as an instrument of policy, inept in the regulation of social 
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behaviour and almost irrelevant as a force for the mobilisation of national resources for 
development” with groups of “people, individuals or certain ‘classes’ retain[ing] sufficient 
clout to undermine policy and hold the state hostage” (Sesay 1995: 167).  
 
Richards (1996) notes that, a combination of economic decline and external impositions, 
especially, the IMF and World Bank’s demand for reforming Sierra Leone’s economy 
including public expenditure cuts and strict financial discipline which starved state elites of 
resources essential for financing neo-patrimonial exchange in Sierra Leone led to a crisis of 
patrimonialism in the country. Based on this, Richards uses “the crisis of patrimonialism” as 
a framework for understanding factors that led to the outbreak of the civil war. He rejects 
Kaplan’s argument that overpopulation and scarce resources contributed to the violence, and 
argues that the origins of the RUF insurgency and the brutality that ensued are political and 
rational rather than anarchic. In fact, for Richards, the crisis of patrimonialism under APC 
rule resulted in the contraction of the state “both physically (in terms of its communication 
facilities) and sociologically (in terms of the groups it can afford to patronise)” (1996: 36). 
And, without sufficient resources to “maintain the crumbling facade of the ‘official state’” the 
regime had to prioritise maintaining loyalty among the security forces for its survival and this 
had a devastating effect on, for example, the hinterland, education, jobs and social services 
(Richards 1996: 36).   
 
Richards further points out that, in Sierra Leone, the crisis of patrimonialism had a negative 
effect on young people, especially in the area of education since “one end point of much 
patrimonial redistribution is the payment of school fees” (1996: 36). Momoh who succeeded 
Stevens viewed education as a privilege rather than a right of Sierra Leoneans. As such, for 
him the state had no obligation to provide education to its citizens. As Kandeh (1999) has 
 168 
 
observed, prospective students were awarded government scholarships for higher education 
on the basis of their patronage ties and ethnic identity, and not merit. This resulted in the 
alienation of youths. For Richards, the RUF insurgency is a response to this social exclusion 
and it sought to provide an alternative political organisation. Richards further notes that, the 
“excluded intellectuals” who had grievances against their exclusion from the patrimonial 
networks of support under APC governance, appealed to the “excluded youths” who faced 
the reality of state recession in the mining districts such as Kailahun and, ultimately 
providing a fertile recruitment ground for the RUF. 
 
Lumpen Youths and the Culture of Resistance  
Several Sierra Leonean scholars have rejected that the civil war was an outcome of a crisis of 
patrimonialism per se (Bangura 2004; Abdullah 1998; Abdullah and Rashid 2004; Rashid 
2004). Bangura (2004) critiques Richards’ “a crisis of patrimonialism” thesis and traces the 
origins of the RUF insurgence to the fiscal crisis that Sierra Leone experienced since the 
early 1980s. He links this to the informalisation of essential industries, such as, diamonds as 
well as the collapse of the iron ore mines which had previously played a crucial role in 
providing much of Sierra Leone state’s official revenue. Bangura further notes that the 
informalisation of public resources was later extended to state sectors, such as, gold and 
fisheries. This, according to him, weakened the government’s capacity to collect revenue 
from state enterprises. State elites played a prominent role in “the process of destroying the 
formal institutions for resource extraction, the management of public sector enterprises, and 
the regulatory mechanism that had ensured the transfer of revenue from such ventures to the 
state” (Bangura 2004: 27). Bangura observes that, while the fiscal crisis affected general state 
provisioning and administration, it increased the fortunes of those who used the state as a 
source of their livelihood. For Bangura, there is a positive correlation between “the poverty of 
 169 
 
the state” and the “affluence of ‘patrimonial’ groups” (2004: 27). Such “patrimonial” groups 
were insensitive to the suffering of those who were not part of their networks, and who had 
been seriously affected by the shrinkage of the state and the informalisation of public 
resources.  
 
Contrary to Richards, Bangura argues that foreign aid flows in Sierra Leone never declined, 
but instead went up consistently each year since 1987 (except for 1990 when it dropped): 
“[...] official development assistance to Sierra Leone went up from US$68 million or 7.3 
percent of GNP in 1987 to US$99 million or 10.6 percent of GNP in 1989; it dropped to 
US$66 million or 8.1 percent of GNP in 1990; but shot up to US$108 million or 10.8 percent 
of GNP in 1991 [...]” (2004: 26). Bangura further notes that, this happened at a time when 
APC was engaged in the informalisation of essential formal structures crucial for revenue 
collection in both the private and public sectors. Internationals ended up taking the 
responsibility to promote the welfare of ordinary Sierra Leoneans while state elites and their 
clients abused state resources and strengthened patrimonialism (Bangura 2004; Kandeh 
1999). Bangura concludes that most of the population suffered due to the crisis of the state 
and the increasing gains of patrimonialism, not from the crisis of patrimonialism as Richards 
claims.  
 
According to Bangura, patrimonialism is just one aspect of the problem of the state in Sierra 
Leone and as such, a fuller understanding of the political atmosphere that led to the creation 
of the conditions for the civil war requires a closer examination of other critical issues. Some 
of these factors have been discussed above like state autocracy and the centralisation of 
power under APC rule, the silencing of various forms of civic opposition through co-option, 
suppression and intimidation, the concentration of power in Freetown and the marginalisation 
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of rural areas. This resulted in “a highly repressive, anti-developmental political system, 
which rewarded sycophancy [...], and punished honesty, hard work, patriotism and 
independent thought” (Bangura 2004: 29). The RUF was able to appeal to disaffected youths 
alienated from mainstream society.  
 
Several Sierra Leonean scholars concur with Bangura (Abdullah 1998, 2004; Rashid 2004; 
Kandeh 1999). While Abdullah (1998) concurs with Kaplan and Richards that the youth 
factor is central in understanding the crisis, he points out that their interpretation of the 
origins and character of this factor are to some extent flawed. For Abdullah, it is vital to 
understand the historical and sociological processes that led to the formation of the RUF. He 
observes that the civil war can be traced in the “lumpen” youth culture that began to unfold in 
the post-1945 period and the absence of a radical post-colonial alternative in Sierra Leone’s 
political culture (Abdullah 1998, 2004, Rashid 2004).  He uses the concept lumpens to refer 
to mostly unemployed and unemployable urban young males, “who live by their wits or who 
have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy” 
(2004: 45). Such youths are said to be prone to anti-social behaviour like substance abuse, 
gambling, petty crime and violence, among others.  
 
As Kandeh points out, lumpens are “an inchoate mass of thugs, hoodlums, pickpockets, 
transients, vagabonds, panhandlers, and discharged jailbirds” (1999: 356) and this youth 
culture had its roots in the raray boy culture (Abdullah 2004).55 In the post-independence 
                                                           
55
  Rarray boy is a Creole term used to refer to unemployed urban youth involved in anti-social 
behaviour, such as drugs and petty theft – in short, “underclass” youth (Abdullah 2004). The emergence of 
rarray boys was a result of the colonial political economy in late nineteenth and early twentieth century when 
peasants, escaped and freed slaves migrated to  the city in search for greener pastures with most of them settling 
in peri-urban enclaves and as the rural to urban migration increased their population continued to grow since 
there were no jobs in the city and rarray boys were compelled to engage in all sorts of social vices including 
drugs, petty theft, prostitution  and violence (Rashid 2004; Abdullah 2002).   
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period lumpens have been key actors in political violence since SLPP and APC politicians 
hired them to intimidate and engage in violence against their political opponents.56 For 
instance, in the 1973 elections, the ruling party, APC hired lumpens to engage in intimidation 
and political violence against SLPP politicians forcing SLPP to withdraw from the elections 
(Rashid 2004). In addition, in the late 1970s Siaka Stevens was able to use lumpen youth 
violence to establish a one party-state in Sierra Leone.  
 
According to Abdullah, it is also crucial to note that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a loose 
association between marginalised radical students and urban lumpen youth – an outcome of 
their common experience of state repression under APC rule. Their meetings took place at 
cultural sites and trends – “the pote (a place for alienated and marginal youth to congregate, 
smoke, gamble, and talk), reggae music, odelay festivals57, drugs, a new Krio language, and 
the neighbourhood – which had hitherto separated respectable middle-class youths from the 
lumpen ‘riffraffs’” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 178; Rashid 2004; Abdullah 1998). It is at 
these sites that radical students and lumpens engaged in radical politics and where also 
radical students “conscientised” the underclass youth with ideas from Pan-Africanism and the 
Libyan leader, Muammar Qadaffi’s Green Book – that favours direct democracy through 
people assemblies to the Soviet’s single party-rule and Western democracy – resulting in the 
development of an anti-establishment culture among the youth (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 
179; Richards 1996).  
 
                                                           
56
  This can be linked to the Chiefdom level violence in colonial Sierra Leone (even today) as noted 
earlier, in which “young men” were at the center of political violence involving rival ruling families.  
57
  In Sierra Leone, masked urban odelay societies started as urban gangs “modelled on traditional secret 
societies, boasting masquerades and initiation rituals” which helped to bind their members together and have 
often been associated with political violence and petty crime, though in recent years they are now seen as 
representing social clubs (Opala 1994:  198).   
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The development of the anti-establishment culture among student radicals and lumpens, in 
the late 1970s and 1980s witnessed violent clashes between the APC-led government and 
students at Fourah Bay College (FBC) with lumpens joining the violence on the part of the 
students. The RUF is said to be a by-product of this alliance between urban lumpens and 
radical students who increasingly came to believe that progressive social transformation 
could only be achieved through violence. As Rashid notes, “The RUF attack of 1991 and the 
NPRC coup d’état of 1992 were direct results of youth and student political actions, and 
government reactions of the 1980s” (2004: 83). Abdullah and his colleagues claim that none 
of the original intellectual leaders in the “revolutionary” movement, including some student 
leaders who went into exile in Ghana, were part of the RUF leadership. They further point out 
that the RUF leader, Foday Sankor was not an intellectual, hence their denial of the presence 
of either radical or “excluded intellectuals” in the RUF leadership (Abdullah 1998; Rashid 
2004; Bangura 2004).  In response to Abdullah and others’ criticism regarding RUF 
intellectuals, Richards acknowledges that he was quick to give credit to the “highly-educated 
civilian members of the RUF/SL’s small ‘war council’”, thus notes that “movement 
intellectuals” guided the organisation and some of them had not gone beyond primary school 
education and some were of mixed Liberian-Sierra Leonean descent (see the 1998 reprint of 
his book – “Postscript”: 174).58   
 
While Abdullah and others have attributed the civil war to excluded urban underclass, 
Chauveau and Richards although agree that disenfranchised youths played a role in the 
outbreak of the war, based on their research in eastern Sierra Leone conclude that the RUF 
recruits were from an excluded agrarian underclass who during the war sought to target local 
                                                           
58
  Paul Richards uses the concept “movement intellectuals” to refer to thinkers “(ideolugues, apologists, 
strategists etc, whether highly-trained or autodidacts) who develop their analytical skills on the job, in response 
to the needs and circumstances of their movement” (1996: 175). 
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leaders and community institutions (2008). For the two scholars, in the context of Kailahun, 
the war was not much about natural resources such as diamonds, but more about “serious 
(and still unresolved) social tensions of an agrarian character, skilfully exploited by the RUF” 
(Chauveau and Richards 2008: 536), thus the violence reflected an element of revenge. 
Chauveau and Richards note that “community failure” in rural areas resulting from traditional 
social institutions’ failure to incorporate a large number of community members led to the 
crisis of the youth in rural areas. The two scholars further note that, the rural “lineage” 
structures allowed an exploitative labour system, rigid marriage laws and heavy fines. As 
such, it became difficult for a large number of young men to acquire social standing including 
the position of an adult or eldership in the community resulting in their frustration with the 
system. Chauveau and Richards conclude that the war that ensued in Sierra Leone was a 
rebellion against the existing social system. This was also confirmed by chiefs, youths, NGOs 
and villagers I interviewed in Sierra Leone who pointed out that forced labour, social 
exclusion and heavy fines, where among the factors that led young men to flee rural areas to 
urban areas and to Liberia where the RUF recruited them. However, it is important to note 
that not all RUF combatants joined the movement voluntarily, quite a number of them were 
abducted and forced to join the rebels.  
 
From the above discussion, it is vital to note that “community failure” (which contributed to 
the marginalisation of rural youths) and “state failure” (which largely affected urban youths 
as the state could not provide public goods including education and the creation of 
employment opportunities) should be viewed as interdependent. Both had a role in 
contributing to the country’s youth crisis that saw marginalised youths playing a central role 
in the civil war. In this regard, putting much emphasis on urban lumpen youths will not help 
us understand the magnitude of the “youth crisis” in Sierra Leone and it also silences youths 
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from rural areas who voluntarily joined the RUF. The urban lumpen youth thesis also fails to 
account for the involvement of foreign Liberian and Burkina Faso youths in the RUF ranks. 
In my interviews with two former combatants, one a former RUF commander and another, a 
former Civil Defence Forces (CDF) commander, both pointed out that poverty and continued 
marginalisation that most ex-combatants experience in post-war Sierra Leone may force them 
to join rebellions in other countries in the region – at least by doing so, they can earn a living. 
Further, they pointed out that the recent instability in neighbouring Guinea made a number of 
former combatants “excited”, most of them now live in cities such as Bo, Kenema and 
Freetown, with their fellow “brothers and sisters” (other former combatants) since their 
families and communities rejected and re-marginalised them. This could also explain why 
foreign mercenaries from Liberia and Burkina Faso joined the RUF ranks – poverty and 
marginalisation in their communities. As such, the crisis should not be seen as limited to 
Sierra Leone’s urban lumpen youths, but should be seen as a regional one. 
 
Liberia and other Regional Actors  
The conflict in Sierra Leone should also be understood in the context of an insecure and 
unstable region, especially the crisis in Liberia in the 1980s. The end of the Cold War saw 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’lvore, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone involved in “an 
interconnected web of conflicts that have seen refugees, rebels, and arms spill across porous 
borders” (Adebajo 2004: 1). In addition, Libya, a North African state, played a significant 
role in the conflict. It is well-documented that the Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi helped 
start civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia since he provided military training to RUF rebels 
and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group, “as part of his 
anti-Western crusade for influence in West Africa” (Hirsch 2001: 147). Davies considers 
Libyan military training and finance for rebellion as the key factor that really triggered the 
 175 
 
civil war in Sierra Leone (2000). Libya was not the only country that provided military 
training for the rebellion since some Sierra Leoneans living in West African countries such as 
Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire were later recruited for training in Burkina Faso, 
and after their training they first went to Liberia with other Libyan-trained Sierra Leoneans to 
join forces with Charles Taylor’s NPFL’s initial campaign against the Liberian president, 
Samuel Doe that started in 1989 before invading Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 (Abdullah 
and Rashid 2004). Taylor in return supported the RUF’s invasion of Sierra Leone: “[...] 
provided a base in Liberia for the RUF to launch its ‘revolution’ with the help of 200 
Burkinabe regular soldiers and NPFL veterans [...]” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 185). It is 
not surprising that after the war the UN-assisted Sierra Leone Special Court indicted Taylor 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Sierra Leone.   
 
Taylor’s support for the RUF rebellion was done for several reasons. Momoh had allowed the 
Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) that had 
intervened in Liberia’s civil war to use Sierra Leone as its air-base to launch attacks against 
Taylor’s NPFL in order to prevent it from toppling Doe’s regime (Keen 2005). In addition, 
the government of Sierra Leone contributed troops to ECOMOG forces launching attacks on 
the NPFL in Liberia which, according to the TRC, “drew an embittered and vengeful 
response from within Liberia” (2004, Vol.3A: 98). In response to this, Taylor sought to 
retaliate against the government of Sierra Leone. By supporting the RUF incursion into Sierra 
Leone and providing it with arms and ammunition, Taylor sought to undermine and discredit 
ECOMOG by showing that it was not capable of keeping peace in the region.  
 
Keen notes that, internal discipline could have been a motive, since Taylor sent “some of his 
wildest and most violent fighters” to join forces with the RUF (2005: 37). Taylor’s support 
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for the RUF was also aimed at forcing Sierra Leone to withdraw its troops from the 
ECOMOG peace operation in Liberia. In addition, it would also help him exploit the country 
resources, especially diamonds. Although Taylor provided support to the RUF, there is no 
evidence that it was his brainchild. 
 
An Overview of the Civil War in Sierra Leone 
On the 23rd of March 1991, the RUF consisting of a small group of Libyan-trained Sierra 
Leoneans with the support of Burkinabe and Taylor’s NPFL invaded the eastern region of 
Sierra Leone from Liberia with the objective of ending APC’s grip on power.59 The war in 
Sierra Leone had spilled over from neighbouring Liberia where Taylor was fighting the Doe 
regime. For more than a decade Sierra Leone experienced a devastating civil war that lasted 
until January 2002 in which an estimated 50,000 people lost their lives (Abdullah 2004; 
Gberie 2005), a large number of civilians were displaced, raped and maimed, children were 
recruited through abduction, diamonds were looted and the revenue from diamonds helped 
prolong the war, the rule of law became non-existent, social capital declined and schools, 
government buildings and administrative infrastructure were destroyed. This devastation and 
the RUF’s targeting of civilians contradicted its claims that it wanted to liberate the people of 
Sierra Leone from state autocracy and introduce multi-party democracy in the country, that it 
was fighting for the provision of public goods such as better medical care, free education and 
the need to protect Sierra Leone’s resources from foreign capitalists.60 Because of its violence 
against civilians, the RUF failed to win the sympathy and support of the people in the 
                                                           
59
  Although he was not part of the first RUF rebel group that invaded eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia, 
a former RUF commander acknowledged the presence of the Burkinabes in the RUF and also pointed out that, 
he was among the group that the “special forces” from Burkina Faso provided with military training in Liberia 
(personal interview, 23 November 2010). 
60
  The former RUF commander cited above also told me that the RUF fought to put SLPP in power and 
he could not understand why the same SLPP which he fought for went on to imprison him and his colleagues 
after the war. 
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Southern and Eastern Provinces, despite the fact that most of them wanted to see an end to 
the APC regime which was aligned to the Northern Province.  
The 1992 Coup 
In order to counter the RUF invasion in the east, the government of Sierra Leone deployed its 
paramilitary State Security Defense (SSD), however, the SSD could not defeat the rebels 
since it was poorly equipped and lacked morale (Abdullah and Rashid 2004). In 1992, a 
group of young officers in the Sierra Leone army staged a protest in Freetown against poor 
salaries and working conditions for front-line soldiers which inhibited them to counter the 
rebels more effectively. The mutiny escalated into a coup resulting in Momoh fleeing to 
neighbouring Guinea (Gberie 2005). The soldiers then formed the NPRC, led by a young 
officer, Captain Valentine Strasser to replace the APC regime. The new NPRC government 
which had the support of young people pledged to end corruption, end the war swiftly and a 
return to civilian rule. However, without experience and consisting of mostly high school 
graduates as well as its leadership surrounded by “discredited politicians and senior civil 
servants” who had ruined the country, the NPRC regime soon began to display political 
behaviour that had characterised previous regimes including a high level of  corruption, the 
targeting of political opponents and the looting of diamonds for personal gain (Abdullah and 
Rashid 2004: 187).  
 
In an attempt to bring a quick end to the war and in response to the RUF insurgency that was 
gaining strength, the NPRC regime increased the size of the army from 3 000 to nearly 15 
000 and the majority of the new recruits were urban lumpen youths who, according to 
Rashid, “revealed their lumpen instincts in their desire to get rich quick, the use of drugs, 
disrespect for ordinary citizens and excessive womanising” (2004: 85; Abdullah and Rashid 
2004). The recruitment of the “urban riffraff” in the army led to the creation of a “lumpen 
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militariat” and tipping the “balance of war in favour of the RUF” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 
187). In addition, army rank and file who shared the same social background as the RUF 
rebels colluded with the RUF resulting in the phenomenon called “sobel” (soldier by day, 
rebel by night) in the period 1994 to 1997 (Kandeh 1999; Keen 2005; Richards 1996). The 
same period also witnessed RUF change its tactics from conventional warfare to “classical 
guerrilla tactics using bypass to hit strategic targets” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 188). The 
phenomenon of “sobels” and the RUF’s change in military tactics as well as the revenue that 
the rebels got from the diamonds contributed to the prolongation of the war.  
 
The 1996 Multiparty Elections and AFRC-RUF Challenges 
Under local and international pressure, the NPRC government conceded to a return to 
multiparty politics. In early 1996 multi-party elections were held in Sierra Leone. The 
elections were conducted in the midst of a civil war and increased RUF violence against 
civilians since the rebel group wanted to discourage people from voting. Despite these 
impediments the elections went ahead and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP emerged the 
winner with the NPRC regime handing over power to him. However, this was short-lived as 
Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup staged by the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) which then invited the RUF to join their government in Freetown. Kabbah 
and his government fled to neighbouring Guinea where they mobilised regional and 
international support. The AFRC under the leadership of Major Jonny Paul Koroma 
suspended the country’s constitution and banned all political parties. The AFRC-RUF 
coalition was also short-lived since the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG forces together with 
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local Civil Defence Forces (CDF) expelled the regime from Freetown in 1998, restoring 
Kabbah back in power.61 
 
The RUF continued to fight for the control of Freetown. Backed by Ukrainian and South 
African mercenaries, the RUF and dissident AFRC units invaded Freetown in January 1999 
(Richards 2002; Gberie 2005). Richards (2002) has noted that those who attacked Freetown 
in 1999 had various motives: some in the AFRC joined the attack with the hope to return to 
power, others wanted to destroy the evidence on which the cases against their colleagues who 
had been imprisoned rested and the RUF’s main interest was to free their leader Sankoh from 
prison.  
 
Contrary to the economic analysis put forward by scholars such as Keen (2000), Reno (1998), 
and Collier (2001) which views rebellion as indistinguishable from organised crime,62 
Abdullah and Rashid (2004) argue that the RUF had a political agenda since it was interested 
in capturing political power as shown in its involvement in the 1999 invasion of Freetown as 
well as its participation in the AFRC government. The RUF’s strategy was to capture 
political power by any means at its disposal. However, Abdullah and Rashid do not account 
for why it failed to break away from its violent past after signing a power-sharing agreement 
in 1999 in which Foday Sankoh was appointed vice President of the country as well as 
chairman of a commission managing strategic resources including diamonds and gold, and 
development.  
                                                           
61
  These were community-based militias that emerged in the mid-1990s among various communities in 
Sierra Leone. Their main aim was to protect their communities from RUF and government soldiers attacks when 
it became clear that the Sierra Leone Army was colluding with the rebels to destabilise the countryside and also 
that the army was failing to defeat rebels. The most prominent and largest community-based militia was the 
Kamajoisia (a militia force from the south and eastern parts of Sierra Leone that was rooted in Mende cultural 
practices, see Hoffman 2007).  
62
  According to this view, the RUF was more interested in mining diamonds than seizing political power. 
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As such, the two views – the view that the RUF had a political agenda and the one that sees 
the war as mainly a function of economics – should not be seen as in much contradiction with 
each other. As noted earlier, in Sierra Leone the dominant group (state elites and their 
allies)’s appropriation of public resources and their distribution to their patrimonial networks 
had a devastating effect on the population and the state, resulting in the less dominant group 
(disenfranchised youths, in particular) claiming their share and joining the RUF to wage a 
“war of liberation”. In this regard, greed by state elites and their allies, generated grievances 
from the marginalised which resulted in them calling for an armed “revolution” as well as 
joining the RUF ranks. As a result, the outbreak of the civil war in Sierra Leone (in relation to 
the short-term causes discussed above) could be attributed to the interaction of economic 
motives and opportunities with political factors and economic grievances. However, the 
revolution turned wrong when RUF wanted to achieve their political agenda and access to 
mineral resources by any possible means as was the case during the 1999 invasion of 
Freetown code-named “operation no living thing” in which a lot of civilians lost their lives 
(Gberie 2005; Alie 2000). 
 
A Framework for Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: Lome Accord  
The January1999 AFRC-RUF attack on Freetown saw the Sierra Leone crisis receiving much 
more international attention and commitment. With the both the RUF and the government of 
Sierra Leone under immense pressure to resolve the conflict peacefully (international and 
regional organisations such as the UN, Commonwealth, ECOWAS and OAU as well as states 
such as Libya, the US and UK became involved), the warring parties signed a peace 
agreement (Lome Peace Agreement) in July 1999 in Lome, Togo (Malan, Rakate and 
McIntyre 2002). This peace accord should be seen as a framework for liberal peacebuilding 
in Sierra Leone. It led to the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
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(UNAMSIL) to implement the agreement, and the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces from the 
country. It included a power-sharing deal between the SLPP government which would end 
with the 2001 elections, security sector reform and a blanket amnesty to all warring parties. It 
also focused on other significant issues on governance, education, health, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration, and the establishment of a human rights commission as well 
as a TRC.  
 
Despite the fact that the agreement provided an opportunity for both the RUF and the Kabbah 
government to gain legitimacy as well an access to economic and political power for the 
RUF, the protagonists had not negotiated in good faith, thus failed to sustain the process 
resulting in its collapse as well as the country’s failure to make a transition to peace and 
stability. The peace process was largely flawed. Since the immediate imperative was to stop 
overt violence as well as achieve order and stability, the peace agreement was rushed. Given 
that the violence was largely associated with the RUF, the negotiations were done between 
the RUF and the government. This resulted in a range of key stakeholders including other 
armed combatants such as the Kamajor militia, AFRC/SLA and West Side boys, civil society 
and local community leaders being marginalised in decision-making. Moreover, those 
involved in the peace negotiations failed to make use of the barry system, a community 
decision-making system that is found throughout Sierra Leone which local communities use 
to discuss issues, resolve conflicts and reach decision through consensus. As such, a bottom-
up approach to the process could have been useful in helping formulate an agreement that had 
a vision for the country as it would have allowed the wider public and other stakeholders to 
participate in the peace process.  
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In May 2000 the Lome Peace Agreement collapsed and much blame was laid on the RUF 
which had been reluctant to disarm, continued to harass civilians, contested the legitimacy of 
UNAMSIL and took hostage 500 UN peacekeepers as well as confiscated its equipment 
threatening its collapse (ICG 2001a). The May 2000 crisis brought the conflict to increased 
international attention with the British taking a pivotal role in ending it. A combination of 
factors contributed to the eventual stabilisation of the situation, disarmament and 
demobilisation of thousands of the RUF and other armed groups, and an end to the conflict. 
These include, diplomacy, British military intervention, the May 2001 Guinean bombardment 
of Kambia – a town in north Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone-Guinea border that was under 
RUF control, the UN Security Council expanded the size of UNAMSIL and its mandate 
which allowed UN troops to use force against the RUF, civil disobedience, and the 
imposition of economic and travel sanctions on Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia (Ero 
2009; Olonisakin 2008; Paris 2004; ICG 2001b). In early 2002 the war was officially 
declared over and multi-party elections were successfully held in the same year, which 
Kabbah’s SLPP won. The post-war period has seen international intervention strategies 
aimed at promoting the liberal peace in Sierra Leone as will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
 183 
 
Chapter 6: Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone 
 
Introduction 
In February 2002, during her visit to Sierra Leone, Clare Short, the then UK Secretary of 
State for International Development, said: “[...] the UK government is committed to stand by 
Sierra Leone for the long-term provided that we have a strong mutual commitment to the 
building of a competent, transparent and uncorrupt modern state” (2002). Indeed, the end of 
the civil war gave the internationals an opportunity to transform the Sierra Leonean state on 
liberal lines, economically and politically with the aim of creating a stable and peaceful post-
war society. Much attention has been given to building a Western liberal democracy and 
effective state institutions, a (neo)liberal economic order, security and governance with little 
attention to social justice, the basic needs of most of the population, welfare, custom, 
tradition, local political dynamics, and customary peacemaking and political institutions. 
Internationals intervened in the war-torn state of Sierra Leone on the assumption that the 
locals did not have the capacity to (re)build it on their own viewing themselves as having the 
capacity to do so. Based on this flawed assumption, internationals (working with state elites) 
took a direct role in the statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts in the country sidelining most 
of the population. This international peace support operation in Sierra Leone appeared to be 
neo-colonial in nature (see Chapter 3).  
 
From this it could be noted that, in Sierra Leone, international attempts at social and political 
engineering largely reflected internationals’ preference and terms, and failed to engage with 
most of the population in defining the kind of post-war society/polity they wanted to 
construct. As such, this neglected “local agency and indigenous capacities for institution 
building” (Englebert and Tull 2008: 134) as well as customary practices and customary law, 
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and the development of a social contract between the state and citizens, among others. As this 
chapter will show, Sierra Leoneans (I encountered during my fieldwork in the country), some 
of whom live on the “margins of the state”, who have become disillusioned with the liberal 
peace, state and state elites’ failure to respond to the underlying causes of the conflict as well 
as their needs, want to have more voice in defining the sort of post-war society they want. In 
addition, they have offered critical responses and agency challenging the hegemony of the 
liberal peace in the country. 
 
The withdrawal of UNAMSIL in December 2005, the holding of two successful post-war 
national elections in 2002 and 2007, and the smooth transfer of power from the ruling party, 
SLPP to the opposition, APC in 2007 has resulted in Sierra Leone being cited as “a 
successful example of multilateral peacebuilding” (UN Secretary-General 2010: 6). Yet, the 
reality on the ground shows that nearly a decade after the end of the conflict a liberal 
democratic state, a self-sustaining peace and political stability are far from being achieved. 
International intervention in the country has witnessed the alienation of the interests of most 
of the population in the country. The peace dividend in Sierra Leone is yet to emerge for most 
of the population including war victims, and it largely supports state elites and those 
connected to them. Despite the emergence of a basic form of security and some progress in 
the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2010,63 Sierra Leone’s social and health indicators 
remain weak. The government of Sierra Leone has acknowledged that it is most unlikely that 
it will meet most of the millennium development goals (MDGs) by 2015: the country has an 
adult illiteracy rate of 60 per cent, its infant rate (89 per 1 000 live births) and maternal rate 
(857 per 100 000 live births) are among the highest in the world, it has a high rate of 
unemployment, particularly among the youth (Government of Sierra Leone 2010) and about 
                                                           
63
  In 2010 it was ranked 158 out of 169 countries compared to 180 out of 182 countries in 2009 based on 
2007 data (UNDP 2009b, 2010). 
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70% of the population live below the poverty line of $1.25 a day, most of them live in 
extreme poverty (UN 2009), among other challenges.64  
 
In addition, the Sierra Leonean state is increasingly becoming polarised along regional and 
ethnic lines, has failed to break away from patrimonial politics, is experiencing pervasive 
governmental corruption and growing inequality as well as continues to be highly dependent 
on external aid. For international actors such as the US and UK, IFIs including the World 
Bank, IMF and African Development Bank (AfDB), DFID, the UN and EU who provide 
support to the state, imagining peace and progress in Sierra Leone outside of the liberal peace 
framework is difficult, if not impossible.  
 
Chapter 4 noted the need to think beyond liberal peace by examining how the locals have 
appropriated, modified, subverted, resisted and accepted it for their own purpose, and the 
forms of peace that are emerging in post-conflict societies. Rather than praising the liberal 
peace as the mainstream scholars have done or burying it, the chapter noted the need to put 
the context back in contemporary peacebuilding, examining the interactions between the 
liberal peace and the local, and the forms of peace that are emerging as the two interact. This 
is precisely what this chapter aims to do. This chapter will show that while internationals 
have played a dominant role in (re)building post-war Sierra Leone and have wanted to 
establish a form of peace that takes a liberal form marginalising or ignoring local forms of 
politics and peacemaking, the dynamics on the ground have hindered the full realisation of 
the liberal peace. For instance, traditional forms of governance and justice are so entrenched 
in the society, particularly, rural societies and cities other than Freetown, and in such places 
                                                           
64
  The Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Samura M. W. Kamara (2010: 5) noted that 
“inadequate infrastructure, especially roads, electricity and [clean] water as well as a low level of basic social 
services” make it difficult for the country to achieve the MDGs by 2015. 
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the liberal peace has often been met with a mix of resistance and partial acceptance resulting 
in hybridity. Hybrid forms of peace and politics have emerged in Sierra Leone - an outcome 
of a mixture of accommodation, resistance and acceptance, tolerance and modification of the 
liberal peace as will be shown in this chapter. Further, the chapter will show that the complex 
nature and dynamics of the local environment resulting in multiple dimensions of 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone including customary peacebuilding, liberal peacebuilding and 
hybridised forms of peacebuilding that incorporate elements of the liberal peace and the local. 
Customary peacebuilding has tended to focus on local aspects and institutions of 
peacebuilding and social cohesion that mainstream peacebuilding has largely ignored such as 
ritual cleansing, secret societies, chieftaincy, the tree, the hut, ancestors, reconciliation, 
customary justice and law, and dispute resolution. In more remote areas, such customary 
peacebuilding has operated in parallel to mainstream peacebuilding.  
 
Sierra Leone a Success Story of Liberal Peace- and Statebuilding? 
The previous chapter has noted the role of disaffected subaltern youths in rural areas and 
cities in the emergence of the civil war in Sierra Leone. In addition, the conflict greatly 
affected the hinterland, especially, the eastern and southern areas.65 Yet, international peace 
support operations have privileged the capital city (Freetown), state elites, statebuilding and 
the construction of a liberal peace over the “margins of the state” such as Kailahun District, 
Sierra Rutile and Mattru Jong whose inhabitants experience poor living conditions, high 
levels of poverty, poor access to safe drinking water, health and education, and poor 
infrastructure. This is despite the fact that, the state is highly contested in Sierra Leone and 
                                                           
65
  For instance, in its 2009-2011 development plan, the Kailahun District Council notes that the 2001 
vulnerability assessment stated that an estimated 80 per cent of the infrastructure in the district required 
reconstruction (2009). It further notes that, “The general standard of living of the populace is very low, with the 
majority having access to meals of poor nutritional status and drinking water that is not safe” and also in small 
communities people live in substandard houses that have “become death traps and therefore dangerous to live 
in” (Kailahun District Council 2009: 8). 
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“indigenous” communities predominantly occupy and control the “up country” space, as 
opposed to Freetown where the state has historically been the strongest, a result of the heavy 
concentration of white and Creole settlers in the pre-independence period. As such, the 
existence of multiple systems of power and authority including informal networks and 
institutions such as chieftaincy, women and youth associations, secret societies, kinship and 
ex-combatant networks, and religious networks (see appendix 3) has allowed for the 
existence of multiple systems of social ordering which either compete for space and power or 
cooperate with each other or both. This has prevented the state from providing a single 
dominant form of social ordering. Yet, in their endeavour to establish a single sovereign, 
internationals are not keen on acknowledging such non-state systems and institutions for 
social ordering in Sierra Leone. 
 
Internationals’ privileging of statebuilding over the building of informal institutions 
particularly, the chieftaincy system, human needs and welfare of most of the population in 
Sierra Leone is reflected in Mohamed Sidie Sheriff (the World Bank’s Communication 
Officer in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone)’s claim that at the end of the civil war Sierra Leone had 
two challenges: 1) statebuilding (“the rebuilding of state institutions”) and 2) state 
transformation (“making it [the state] look better”) (personal interview, 05 December 2009). 
In response to the crisis in Sierra Leone, international donors have taken an institutional 
approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding committing millions of dollars to support 
security sector reform (SSR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, national and local 
government elections, a multi-party political system, local government, institutional reform 
and building the capacity of national institutions for democratic governance, respect for civil 
and political liberties. Internationals have also committed resources to the establishment and 
operation of the country’s Anti-corruption Commission, the establishment of a (neo)liberal 
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economic order, a vibrant civil society, a free, professional and independent media, rule of 
law and human rights. It is thought that through the provision, promotion and establishment 
of these institutions sustainable peace will emerge in Sierra Leone.   
 
Sierra Leone has also witnessed “a wide range and comprehensive governance reform 
measures [...] being undertaken [including] the enactment of the Anti-corruption Act 2000 
[and a new Anti-corruption Act 2008], Anti-money Laundering Act in 2004; a new Public 
Procurement Act 2004; the Local Government Act, 2004; the Budget and Accountability Bill, 
and an Investment Code, 2005” (Government of Sierra Leone 2006: 3). In an attempt to 
improve good governance and accountability, DFID Sierra Leone, the World Bank, EU and 
other international donors have also supported work on strengthening Public Financial 
Management (PFM) systems and civil service reform. Internationals have also supported the 
establishment and operation of a number of core state institutions for democracy and good 
governance including the office of the Ombudsman, the National Commission for 
Privatisation, the National Revenue Authority, the National Electoral Commission (NEC), 
Political Parties Registration Commission, the Decentralisation Secretariat, the National 
Commission for Democracy and the Independent Media Commission, among others. Since 
the end of the conflict, Sierra Leone has held two multi-party legislative and presidential 
elections (2002 and 2007) and two local council elections (2004 and 2008). The 2007 
national elections have been described as overall peaceful and credible, evidence that the 
country is democratising (UN 2009).  
 
Yet, little attention has been paid to indigenous and traditional social, economic and political 
structures, and forms of peace and peacemaking that exist and have deep roots in most parts 
of rural Sierra Leone as well as “local” culture, values, politics, structures of power and 
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authority.66 This has further alienated most of the population from the state with those in the 
hinterland viewing it as being located in Freetown. TAs I interviewed expressed 
disappointment with the state noting that it has failed to meet people’s basic needs and also 
that state elites are privileging Lebanese merchants and contractors from Freetown with 
whom they have established patron-client relations over local contractors and business 
persons (group interview, TAs, 28 November, 2009).67 Further, the TAs were critical of 
internationals such as the EU, who according to them, view the locals as lacking capacity, 
thus, bring “their brothers” (expatriates) to do work that locals are qualified to do. They 
therefore, questioned the logic of spending thousands of dollars in salaries and holiday 
allowances on expatriates when there are locals who are better qualified than such expatriates 
which for them, is corruption: “Most of the money is not coming for us. They are eating it” 
(group interview, TAs, 28 November 2009).68 The TAs also pointed out that, “We are not 
happy. We cannot live as third class citizens”. The TAs further noted that they have raised 
these issues in workshops. Indeed, ordinary people have become disillusioned with the state’s 
failure to meet their basic needs and welfare, and resent internationals’ failure to 
acknowledge their capacity to contribute to local development programs/transformation. 
 
                                                           
66
  For instance, internationals privileged the Special Court for Sierra Leone over the TRC, war victims 
and customary approaches to peacebuilding.  Over US$300 million was spent  on the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone to prosecute nine people who bore “the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law as well as crimes 
committed under relevant Sierra Leonean law in the territory of Sierra Leone” (UN 2000: 1; Hoffman 2008). 
This means that at least $33 million dollars was spent on each perpetrator. Yet, war victims did not receive 
much support including medical assistance and compensation. In 2009 ( seven years after the end of the civil 
war) the President of Sierra Leone launched a trust fund for war victims, however, it has received very little 
international support (personal interview, Obi Buya Kamara, NaCSA, 08 December 2009). 
67
  A local businessman pointed out that, he is finding it difficult to secure a business loan from the 
Central Bank of Sierra Leone and that state elites and bank officials are prioritising Lebanese investors over 
local business persons, particularly local business persons who are not connected to them or who refuse to bribe 
them (personal interview, 23 November, 2010).  
68
  Similar criticisms were raised by a respondent who works for an international NGO who said “They 
[internationals] are spending a lot of money on expatriates while local staff does most of the dirty work” 
(personal interview, confidential source, 01 December 2009). However, ActionAid Sierra Leone was singled out 
for having a country director who is Sierra Leonean. 
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From Freetown to Kailahun to Mattru Jong to Sierra Rutile the general perception among 
ordinary people is that the peace dividend has not been equitably shared and peace remains 
fragile. For them, most of the factors that contributed to the civil war remain unaddressed 
including marginalisation, unequal power relations, social injustice, corruption, exclusion and 
poverty with some saying that the situation is even getting worse (personal interview, Legal 
Officer, Freetown, 08 December 2009; Community Leaders Training, Kailahun, 11 
November 2010). Indeed, these are some of the challenges that TRC report (2004) noted as 
needing urgent attention since a failure to address them might see the country returning to 
conflict. As such, there is an element of anger among the “up country” people, that the state is 
biased towards the centre (Freetown), Lebanese merchants and foreign investors, neglecting 
the periphery (the hinterland).  
 
Yet, state and economic elites, and the World Bank see Sierra Leone as having made a 
transition to a “post” post-conflict phase and are privileging security as well as (neo)liberal 
peace and economics over social peace for addressing the country’s challenges. In order, to 
rationalise the establishment of a free market system in the country, state elites and the 
proponents of (neo)liberal economics have made promises about the benefits that such a 
system would bring not only to the state, but also to poor Sierra Leoneans.69 Such benefits 
                                                           
69
  In rural areas where the state has invited transnational corporations to invest in agricultural land (most 
of which is customary land), the use of concepts such as “agriculture-for-development” (World Bank 2008b), 
employment creation and economic growth has led the state and its development partners to consider such 
investment a key priority. In order to make this more appealing to the rural populace, the use of such concepts 
has also meant the creation of pathologies in rural areas where there are vast tracts of agriculture land, such as 
“under-utilised land” and “food insecure”. Large scale farming is viewed as a solution to such pathologies. 
Since the locals lack capacity to engage in such agricultural activities, multinational corporations are invited and 
would be considered crucial for “transforming” the livelihoods of poor local subsistence farmers. This overlooks 
the fact that such customary land is being kept for future generations. Some of the rural people have come to 
accept these pathologies, for instance, a town chief told me that “We were ignorant about agriculture” and he 
further said that the community supports the idea of “big farms” (personal interview, Chief Pyne, 21 November 
2010). The same town chief noted the lack of basic health services in the chiefdom, particularly a “big” hospital. 
The chiefdom offered 30 acres of land to the government for the purpose of building a hospital however the 
government built a small health centre on 4 acres of land and called it a hospital. Further, he noted that the 
“hospital” has inadequate medicine and bedding, and “babies are finding it difficult”.  
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include economic growth, sustainable development, chiefdom development, an increase in 
food security (in relation to foreign investment in agricultural land70) and jobs. As such, state-
centred and (neo)liberal peace-centred abstractions such as (national)security, investor 
friendly, rule of law, economic growth and development have become dominant, seeking to 
erase the interests, welfare, needs and rights of landowners in rural mining areas as well as 
rural areas where foreign companies such as Addax Bioenergy have invested in customary 
land for the purpose of producing biofuel or oil palm for Western markets. For instance, 
despite promises of development, Imperi Chiefdom (Bonthe district), a rutile mining area, is 
in a deplorable state without running water, electricity and good roads. The host communities 
and landowners face everyday challenges of land and food insecurities as well as extreme 
poverty, land degradation, loss of land to the mining company and the creation of artificial 
lakes due to the use of dredge mining. In addition, most of the people are not well educated 
and have been blamed for this. For example, a local respondent who works for an 
international NGO pointed out that the people are “lazy academically” and are selling their 
land to the mining company so that the company pays them surface rents as owners of the 
land (personal interview, confidential source, 01 December 2009). Yet, in my interviews with 
the locals, they expressed a lot of interest in education citing poverty and corruption as major 
impediments to their education. For instance, a town chief pointed out that recently a 
vocational training school was established in the area, however, most locals have “no cash to 
pay for the tuition fees” and in addition, scholarships are not being granted to the financially 
needy, but to those who are connected or related to senior members of the mining company 
and state elites (personal interview, town chief, 21 November, 2010). Further, the locals are 
bitter that the government sold away their land to the mining company without first seeking 
                                                           
70
  This is despite the fact that such transnational corporations are more interested in biofuel production 
and cash crops such as oil palm than food crops. Yet, the country has a high prevalence of hunger (in 2010 it 
ranked 79 out of 84 countries on the Global Hunger Index). In addition, ordinary farmers complain that the 
government has failed to support and protect the already existing indigenous farmers. 
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their consent. Indeed, poverty, economic liberalisation and corruption are some of the reasons 
why most people in the area lack education and skills, not laziness.  
 
Meanwhile, mining activities have undermined local economies and have also disrupted 
traditional land use practices. As such, there is a lot of anger among the host communities 
that the state and their Paramount Chief have failed to protect their interests and rights from 
Sierra Rutile mining company, one of the largest foreign investors in the country.71 In 
addition, there are also complaints that surface rent payments that landowners receive from 
the company are meagre and that landowners are not consulted, even when it comes to 
deciding how these funds are to be shared between them and the state, the district council, the 
chiefdom development committee and the Member of Parliament (MP) (group interview, 
youth leaders, 21 November, 2010).72 A youth leader pointed out that “The funds belong to 
us [landowners]”, however, “Much [money] goes to the Paramount Chief, Chiefdom Council, 
the District Council, the MP and the state, and little to the people. When extended families 
share cash from surface rents each gets little” (group interview, youth leader, 21 November 
2010).73 He then noted that, “The mining company is using our [landowners] money to 
                                                           
71
  Villagers in Imperi Chiefdom perceive their Paramount Chief as conniving with the government and 
the rutile mining company (as well as that she accepts bribes from the company, such as bags of rice). However, 
national governing structures tend to supersede the authority of the Paramount Chief (see Akiwumi 2011).  For 
instance, part 2.1 of the 2009 Mines and Minerals Act states that “All rights of ownership in and control of 
minerals in, under or upon any land in Sierra Leone and its continental shelf are vested in the Republic not 
withstanding any right of ownership or otherwise that any person may possess in and to the soil on, in or under 
which minerals are found or situated” (Government of Sierra Leone 2009a: 8). This effectively takes away land 
rights of rural farmers in mineral rich areas. Yet, the Provinces Land Act cap. 122, provides that “protectorate 
lands are vested in the tribal authority (now chiefdom councils) to manage on behalf, and for the benefit, of 
community members with land rights” (Akiwumi 2011: 61). 
72
  In its 2011 Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan (PCDP), Sierra Rutile Limited provided the 
amount it disbursed as surface rent payment to affected landowners in five chiefdoms in Moyamba and Bonthe 
Districts. For instance, in Imperi Chiefdom the surface rent payment was disbursed as follows – the payment 
rate was US$12.3 per acre (the figures are quoted in Leones): 1) Bonthe District Development Fund – 
126,546,329.70; 2) Constituency Development Fund – 84,364,219.80; 3) Chiefdom Development fund – 
84,364,219.80; 4) Paramount Chief – 126,546,329.70; and 5) Landowners – 421,821,141.30. However, the 
report does not state how many landowners were paid and how much each landowner received. 
73
  The youth leader pointed out that, due to the extended family system land is not owned by a single 
person. This means that if six million leones is paid to the “land owner” as surface rent, “over 55 family 
members shar[e it], by the end of the day each gets one hundred thousand leones” (group interview, youth 
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satisfy the Paramount Chief, the MP, council and government. It is policing the Paramount 
Chief and she is not raising her voice” (emphasis mine).74 In the absence of adequate 
government regulation, transparency, accountability, consultation as well as the failure to 
involve landowners in decision-making or in shaping mining agreements, there is bound to be 
mistrust, suspicion, resistance and conflict.   
 
Youths in the host communities have engaged in civil disobedience including blocking the 
main road to the dredge, demanding just mining policies and practices that recognise their 
needs, welfare, rights and interests. However, the state has used coercion to stop them from 
engaging in any acts of open resistance, accusing them of wanting to scare away investors 
and sabotaging the state: “The LUC [Local Unit Commander - police] and police officers had 
to be called, threatened us and dismissed people” (personal interview, youth leader, 21 
November 2010). Such complaints and resistance from host communities are direct 
challenges to the legitimacy of the state since the state has failed in its obligation to promote 
welfare and interests of its citizens. This failure of the state to promote welfare of its citizens 
can be attributed to its continued dependency on foreign donors and its adoption of a 
neoliberal agenda which requires it to create an enabling environment for foreign investment 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
leader, 21 November 2010).  During my fieldwork in 2010, a standard 50kg bag of rice (the country’s staple 
food) cost 150, 000 leones which is 66.7 per cent of such landowners’ annual surface rent payment, based on the 
figures the youth leader gave me.  
74
  Yet, the same critics of the Paramount Chief are quick to point out that “we do not disregard the 
Paramount Chief, though respect for her has been reduced a bit” (group interview, deputy youth leader, 21 
November 2010). Further, such critics have acknowledged that she is good in some way, for instance, in the 
absence of ambulance services in the chiefdom she sometimes uses her pickup truck to transport sick villagers to 
the hospital, that she has established a good working relationship with the youths and also that she knows how 
to talk to the people. In my interview with her, she pointed out that she supports the government of the day, 
although some Paramount Chiefs resist this and also that she is working on bringing her followers together 
(personal interview, Paramount Chief Hawa Kpanabom IV, 21 November 2010). This (supporting the 
government of the day), of course, sometimes comes into conflict with the interests of her followers who despise 
central government. In addition, she noted that payments from the rutile mining company for chiefdom 
development have been used to build a guest and a chiefdom cell. However, for critics this is not enough and 
most of the funds meant for chiefdom development are being abused by the “so-called figure heads” – the 
Paramount Chief and Treasury Clerk as well as senior men and women around them (personal interview, 
confidential source, 21 November 2010). 
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including removing restrictions on them at the expense of welfare and rights of its citizens.75 
As such, the state enters business agreements with foreign companies in a weaker position. 
Yet, international state builders want a strong liberal state in Sierra Leone that is supposed to 
offer democracy and security to all its citizens.  
 
In addition, the erasure of welfare, rights and needs through the use of dominant state-centred 
and (neo)liberal peace-centred abstractions I mentioned above as well the existence of a neo-
liberal hegemony implies that the state will continue to favour foreign extractive companies 
that will “help” Mama Salone (Mother Sierra Leone) move out of the least developed 
countries category over ordinary people. In addition, the state regards strikes as threat to 
national security (personal interview, ONS District Coordinator, 20 November 2010). The 
state also views those who engage in strike action as attempting to sabotage the government 
as well as scaring away investors justifying the use of coercion against them (personal 
interview, confidential source, 08 November 2010).76 This has effectively silenced the voices 
of most of the citizens as well as undermined their freedoms including the freedom of 
expression that the liberal peace is promoting in Sierra Leone. Indeed, in the absence of 
consent, for instance, from landowners, state institutions such as the police are called in to 
use force to supress resistance, further undermining the locals’ rights and access to traditional 
land use.  
 
Rather than reducing poverty and inequality, economic liberalisation in Sierra Leone has 
worsened the economic marginalisation of most of the population, particularly, the rural 
                                                           
75
  For instance, in the case of Sierra Rutile mining company, the state has privileged the company’s 
“interests and profits […] through legislation, cheap pricing, tax holidays and reduced royalty payments” 
(Akiwumi 2011:  59). 
76
  The same source told me that he has secretly encouraged mine workers to go on strike as he feared that 
if he openly encouraged them he would get into trouble and at times he encourage them to engage in hidden 
forms of resistance, such as stealing from their employers. 
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populace. Indeed, attempts at creating a (neo)liberal economic order in areas where large-
scale farming and mining operations are interacting with small-scale communal farming in 
which the (neo)liberal economic order is playing a dominant role will not promote a stable 
economic peace. Rural farmers who continue to be marginalised from mainstream economics 
have been resisting this. In this case, the failure of the Sierra Leonean state to develop a self-
reliant development policy and its adoption of an “open door” economic policy will leave 
“Sierra Leoneans in a state of economic dependence on the industrialised states [and IFIs 
such as IMF and World Bank] for most of the satisfactions to which they aspire[...]” ( 
Cartwright 1978: 75).77 State elites’ acceptance of a neo-liberal economic order could be a 
result of their strategic calculation based on their recognition that the costs of resisting or 
rejecting it outweigh the benefits of accepting it. For example, the withdrawal of the much 
needed national budget support from IFIs, such as the World Bank and the weakening of their 
political power could far outweigh the costs of accepting it. In addition, a few state and 
economic elites are using (neo)liberal peace and corruption as instruments for their self-
enrichment with most of the population turning to the informal economy and resisting to pay 
taxes citing corruption and lack of development in their communities. 
 
Peace, in this case, will remain fragile in the country. Given that the state is in a weaker 
position, vis-à-vis, neoliberals, donors and multi-national corporations, and its continued use 
of (neo)liberal peace-centred abstractions such as security, investor friendly, economic 
growth and development will mean the continued attempts at erasing welfare, needs and 
interests of most of the population. This can explain the state and its institutions’ failure to 
                                                           
77
  For instance, a Paramount Chief noted that sustainable peace could only be achieved in Sierra Leone if 
Sierra Leoneans were self-sufficient and accommodated each other (personal interview, Paramount Chief Joe 
Kangbai Macavoray III, Tikonko Chiefdom, 09 November 2010). He further pointed out that self-reliance is 
important since it limits outside interference – which also could mean an interest in local ownership and 
autonomy.   
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address most of the root causes of the civil war. Despite attempts at erasing local agency, 
welfare, interests and needs, the locals have expressed agency through open forms of 
resistance, such as open strikes as well as hidden forms of resistance, for example, workers 
who steal from their employers. Further, they have also been able to take initiatives to deal 
with challenges that are not only related to welfare and needs but, also to the re-establishment 
of community harmony and cohesion, and the creation a form of peace that is relevant to 
them as I will show later in this chapter.  
 
Sierra Leone, a Hybrid Political Order 
A number of respondents, particularly in Freetown noted the need for Sierra Leoneans to 
engage in a nation building project as a means to promote national cohesion and peace. 
However, the central authority that is supposed to play a leading role in the nation building 
project is being resisted by disaffected rural communities which often associate it with 
corruption and Freetown. Although such rural communities want the state to provide them 
with basic services as well as promote their welfare, they have remained loyal to customary 
governance and authority. In addition, such communities have turned to ethnic, church and 
family networks as well as (neo)traditional civil society organisations such as secret societies 
for the provision of welfare, security, peace, reconciliation, individual/community ritual 
cleansing and order, thus preventing the liberal peace from creating impersonal Western-
forms of official relations beyond the capital city. Despite the fact that customary forms of 
governance particularly, the office of the Paramount Chief, were implicated in the outbreak 
of the civil war78, rural communities trust them more than the state. In addition, customary 
governance acts as a balance of power in the country’s domestic politics and remains relevant 
                                                           
78
  All the three Paramount Chiefs and five sub-chiefs I interviewed acknowledged the role of Paramount 
Chiefs for the country’s descent into civil war. 
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to the rural populace with regard to the provision of security, justice and social order since 
the state and its institutions cannot control the entire territory. Such rural communities have 
paid attention to establishing a social peace that meets their everyday physical and social 
needs, and enables the restoration of relationships and community harmony and cohesion as 
well as re-establishing relationships with the supernatural agents such as ancestors/God. In 
these rural communities, the locals have relied much on a different framework of peace and 
politics understood in local terms to address their situation, at the same time they have 
partially accepted some elements of the liberal peace which I will discuss later in the chapter. 
 
In this thesis, I regard Sierra Leone a post-conflict situation based on the definition of post-
conflict that I adopted in chapter 2. It is crucial to make this clear here since state and 
business elites, and the World Bank view the country as having made a transition from a 
post-conflict situation to a development one. State and business elites consider it wrong to 
view Sierra Leone as a country in a post-conflict situation (personal interview, Sierra Leone 
Business Association, 03 December 2009). In this case, states elites’ current response to the 
situation reflects their understanding of it as past the post-conflict phase and their need to 
maintain relations with donor agencies. As such, they have been increasingly privileging the 
(neo)liberal peace aspects of economic development and liberalisation over peacebuilding. 
This has meant enacting or reforming laws in relation to trade and commerce aimed at 
encouraging foreign investors to invest in the country, particularly, in its natural resources 
sector – fisheries, mining, tourism and agriculture.79 According to a respondent, most of the 
people in government are coming from the private sector (personal interview, Sierra Leone 
                                                           
79
  The government of Sierra Leone (2007a: 22) states that the General Law (Business Start-up) 
(Amendment Act), 2007) is an act to “amend certain enactments in order to eliminate barriers to the expeditious 
establishment, growth and development of business in Sierra Leone”; also see Government of Sierra Leone 
(2004a)’s Investment Promotion Act, 2004. Further, the country has set up a national investment promotion 
agency called the Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency, and has also established the Sierra 
Leone Business Forum with the aim of promoting dialogue between the state and private sector. 
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Indigenous Business Association, 03 December 2009). The private sector background of 
many states elites may also explain why they have quickly embraced privatisation and the 
establishment of a free market system in Sierra Leone. Indeed, President Ernest Bai Koroma 
has even gone a step further to declare that he wants to run the “government according to 
private sector disciplines” (International Crisis Group 2008: 10) as prerequisites for peace, 
development and democracy.80 At the same time, such state elites have maintained 
patrimonial relations with influential non-state actors such as chiefs, secret societies heads 
and religious leaders, thus creating space for such local non-state actors, customary law, 
indigenous and traditional approaches to peacemaking. In fact, the liberal peace has not had a 
dominant role on the “margins of the state” where the state has limited power.  
 
While liberal interventionists have adopted a state-centric approach since they need the state 
and states elites as their agents for the creation of a liberal peace, in Sierra Leone, the 
existence of multiple sovereignties and authorities makes it difficult for the state and state 
elites to ignore non-state actors such as chiefs who command a lot of respect and legitimacy 
at the local level. Since the central problem of the Sierra Leonean government is its 
legitimacy, particularly in the hinterland, the state needs such non-state actors for its 
legitimacy and survival. Indeed, despite the liberal peace attempt at creating an impersonal 
political system in Sierra Leone, the institutional culture continues to be influenced by 
traditional patterns and institutions.  
 
For instance, in response to my question about why the state is not keen on abolishing the 
institution of the chief despite abuses associated with Paramount Chiefs before the outbreak 
                                                           
80
  For instance, President Ernest Bai Koroma has experience in the private sector as an insurance broker.  
In 2007, during his presidential campaign he told Reuters that “We have to run [Sierra Leone] like a business 
concern” (Manson 2007). The risk is that if a state is run like a business entity, then it becomes accountable to 
its “shareholders”, the donors and less interested in the welfare of its citizens. 
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of the war, a state official pointed out that the hinterland people will not welcome it since for 
them its “interference in the nature of societies”, and any move to dismantle the institution of 
the chief will be met with resistance which could lead to chaos in the country (personal 
interview, State House, 10 November 2009). He further pointed out that the state’s approach 
to non-state institutions such as the chiefs, religious leaders, village elders and secret societies 
has been to “be friend them” (co-opt), “recognise them” (accept) and “give them their own 
space” (respect their autonomy/accommodate them) as a means to consolidate peace: “if you 
abolish [them] you will be voted out of power [...] leave them where they are and do not 
disturb”. According to him, the state is working “indirectly” with these non-state institutions 
including the chiefdom as a means to consolidate peace, order and security. In addition, a 
Sierra Leonean friend pointed out that, 
 
It will be [...] political suicide for any political party opting for the abolition of the 
institution of paramount chiefs. The institution exists by law, permeated by tradition, a 
legacy of colonial rule. In fact, there are twelve (12) paramount chiefs in the parliament 
of Sierra Leone. They seem to be the keepers of political victory in the country. 
Although they abuse their offices, they love and are loved by the locals (email, 07 May, 
2010). 
 
He further noted that, 
 
It is glaring  for example when in the politics that preceded the 2007 presidential 
election…the leader of the People’s Movement for Democratic Change Charles Francis 
Margai proposed to make the paramount chief’s position an [electable] one after every 
five years, he lost the election hopelessly. Some schools of [thought] believe that it was 
one of the reasons why he was also denied the leadership of SLPP (email, 10 June, 
2010). 
 
State elites’ approach contradicts and is in conflict with the Western notion of the modern 
state (that of a single sovereign) that the British and other internationals want to create in 
Sierra Leone. However, for most rural Sierra Leoneans the chiefdom has remained the most 
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salient political unit (see Manning 2009). Interestingly, in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict, the government of Sierra Leone was able to convince international donors such as 
the DFID to support a Paramount Chiefs restoration programme (the chieftaincy system had 
crumbled during the war) that aimed at restoring chiefdom administration arguing that it 
would help the state re-establish itself in the hinterland. Faced with the realities on the 
ground, internationals such as DFID had to support the government of Sierra Leone’s move 
to re-establish the institution of the chief. Besides recognising the vital role of Paramount 
Chiefs in helping the state re-establish itself in the interior, it was also recognised that 
Paramount Chiefs played an equally important role in enabling rural people to return to 
normal life, and encouraging refugees and IDPs to return to their villages.  
 
In addition, given that most of the population in Sierra Leone has greater access to the 
informal justice and governance systems than the formal ones, rather than calling for their 
elimination, international actors such as the DFID have recognised the importance of 
Paramount Chiefs in the governance of the hinterland communities and have adopted 
strategies aimed at reforming the informal justice system. However, reforms are biased 
towards international human rights norms and governance systems in order to make the 
informal justice system more relevant to the modern state that internationals are building in 
Sierra Leone. For instance, besides sponsoring the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme 
in the immediate aftermath of the war, the DIFD is also sponsoring the Justice Sector 
Development Programme (JSDP) which the British Council manages. JSDP also includes a 
project aimed at enhancing the capacity, efficiency and effectiveness of local courts as well 
as providing professional training to chiefdom police. Similarly, in its joint vision for Sierra 
Leone, the UN family for Sierra Leone noted the need to establish a justice system in Sierra 
Leone that “incorporated more systematically the traditional court system of Sierra Leone 
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that services approximately 70% of the population through increased codification of 
customary law and procedures as well as through better training of local court officials” (UN 
2009: 14).81 This has meant the incorporation of customary law and chiefdom institutions into 
the modern state. 
 
However, critics have pointed out that since the institution of the chief in Sierra Leone has 
been associated with abuse and patrimonial politics which contributed to the civil war, by 
supporting the restoration of Paramount Chieftaincy, the internationals were aiding to the 
recreation of the preconditions for war in the country (Hanlon 2005). Yet, the same critics 
have not argued for the elimination of the state in Sierra Leone which also has been 
associated with abuses that largely contributed to the conflict (chapter 5). Instead, they have 
argued for the need to re(build) it and its institutions making them more effective, strong and 
efficient. This shows the hidden politics of liberal peacebuilding that portrays chieftaincy as 
backward, oppressive, native and barbaric in order to justify its elimination since it is 
competing for political space with the liberal peace. Such critics fail to realise that African 
states like Sierra Leone cannot operate without the institution of the chief since it represents 
the community. As such, the Sierra Leonean state which is dysfunctional has no option but to 
make more visible such “hidden” forms of governance by bringing them on board since it 
needs them.  
 
Indeed, state elites’ use of non-state actors, particularly Paramount Chiefs, to protect regime 
stability as well as promote order and security does not mean that the Sierra Leonean state 
has failed because it has not become a liberal state, but indicates different understandings of 
                                                           
81
  The UN family for Sierra Leone consists of 14 UN agencies and programmes plus UNIPSIL as well as 
three financial institutions – AfDB, IMF and the World Bank. 
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what would promote peace, social order and stability in the country.82  As noted in chapters 2 
and 3, liberal internationalists note that, if liberal institutions and practices are established 
durable peace will ensue. While state elites appear to have consented to the liberal peace 
principles and norms, they have accommodated and maintained neo-patrimonial relations 
with traditional political authorities in a society that does not recognise a single sovereign. In 
addition, state elites are aware of the struggle between the liberal peace and traditional/local 
paradigms, and are also aware that it is impossible to entirely dismantle customary practices 
and institutions without meeting stiff resistance from the hinterland. At the same time, state 
elites must accept the practices and institutions of the liberal system to ensure continued 
international assistance and recognition. Without much local legitimacy, the state needs 
internationals for some form of legitimacy (international legitimacy). The outcome of state 
elites’ facilitation of the institutionalisation of the Western model in the name of creating a 
modern Sierra Leonean state while maintaining close ties with traditional formats is a hybrid 
political order that is quite different from both traditional and liberal forms. Despite the 
liberal peace’s hegemony and attempts at sidelining traditional values and institutions, the 
internal dynamics in Sierra Leone have not allowed adequate political space for the liberal 
peace to do so. Can such a hybrid political order/regime that is based on a neo-patrimonial 
system of governance lead to perpetual peace in the country?  
 
Liberal Peacebuilding and a Multi-ethnic Bipolar Political System 
In addition to the above, international peace initiatives in Sierra Leone have not been 
sensitive to the fact that the country is a multi-ethnic bipolar political system (Bangura 2000). 
A multi-ethnic bi-polar polity exists where two roughly equal ethnic groups dominate a 
                                                           
82
  For example, in the absence of adequate police force in the chiefdoms (some chiefdoms have one or 
two police officers) the police gets support from chiefs to effect arrests (personal interview, LUC, 18 November 
2010).  
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multi-ethnic setting (Bangura 2000: 553). In Sierra Leone, the two dominant ethnic groups 
are the Temne from the north and the Mende from the south and east. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the country’s two main political parties, the APC and SLPP have often 
appealed to northern/Temne interests, and south and east/Mende interests respectively. As a 
result, the re-introduction of multi-party democracy and the existence of winner-takes-all 
politics in such a multi-ethnic bi-polar political system have witnessed a fierce inter-ethnic 
(Mende-Temne) and regional contestation as well as electoral violence between APC and 
SLPP supporters. While the liberal peace has viewed political elites as political engineers 
who can play a significant role in building an inclusive state that is crucial for establishing 
and maintaining sustainable peace, the practice of winner-takes-all politics in Sierra Leone 
has resulted in the opposite: it has excluded the opposition and its supporters, and those who 
have not established patron-client relationships with state elites. Since politics is based on 
regional/ethnic lines, the politics of winner-takes-all has seen a segment of the population 
(those in the south and east – traditionally SLPP stronghold) feeling excluded from the state.  
 
 For those in the southern and eastern areas, the current APC-led government has become 
more synonymous with Temne and northern interests than national interests. Some critics 
have pointed out that the APC government which won most of its seats in the north has not 
done much in terms of promoting national cohesion, but instead has established a cabinet that 
is very northern biased, despite the fact that it did not win the 2007 election by a wide margin 
(personal interview, confidential source, 08 December 2009).83 The feeling of being under-
represented in government has generated bitterness in the southern and eastern areas. This has 
also resulted in the politicisation of Mende identity. The Mende complain about being 
                                                           
83
  In the parliamentary election the APC won 59 seats, SLPP won 43 seats, the People’s Movement for 
Democratic Change won 10 seats and 12 seats were reserved for Paramount Chiefs (National Democratic 
Institute Sierra Leone 2008).  
 204 
 
marginalised and excluded from political power, and are increasingly becoming uneasy over 
what they view as the north/Temne political domination.  
 
The general feeling among the Mende is that they have no stake in the state. For instance, a 
TA pointed out that, “Whatever they do is their business. We will take care of our own 
problems” (group interview, 28 November 2009). A number of Mende respondents and 
journalists raised concerns about the personalisation of government, which according to 
them, has witnessed people being offered jobs based on political affiliation or loyalty more 
than competence. In addition, there are concerns about politically induced sackings of the 
Mende in the civil service sector. The same TA cited above said that the APC-led 
government “thinks that the Mende benefitted from the previous SLPP-led government” and 
as such, “most of them [the Mende] have been kicked out of jobs [senior positions in the 
public sector]” and if someone has an eastern name he or she “gets kicked out of the job” and 
“a northerner gets it” (Group interview, 28 November 2009). For an SLPP official the 2012 
national election is “a matter of do or die” (personal interview, 03 November 2010). He 
further noted that “We will be armed to teeth. Our children will not go to school for the next 
five years. APC is pacifying one region and has to be kicked out by any means”. A state 
official acknowledged that it is true that “many in the government are from the north” and 
justified this on the grounds that “the president has not been in politics for long to know 
people all over […] he was born in the north, went to school in the north and has businesses 
in the north” (personal interview, State House, 10 December 2009). He further pointed out 
that when President Koroma took over power he was in a dilemma about the people to put in 
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government and given his strong northern background, naturally he called people whom he 
knew.84  
 
Post-war Sierra Leone is witnessing the re-ordering of state-society relations along ethno-
regional clientelist lines (see Kandeh 1992). The use of cabinet posts as rewards for APC 
supporters and ethnic clients has also led to an intense struggle for access to state resources 
and jobs between ethnic groups. Indeed, the situation on the ground shows that it is difficult 
for liberal peacebuilding to establish a liberal democratic citizenship that eliminates ethnic 
identity as well as democratise Sierra Leone along liberal democratic lines as the liberal 
peace envisions. 
 
Although Sierra Leone is portrayed as a “success story” of international peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, it should be pointed out that the complex dynamics on the ground (noted 
above) have impeded the establishment of a liberal democratic state in the country that 
liberal-internationalists have envisaged. Rather, a hybrid polity has emerged – an outcome of 
the interaction between liberal peace institutions, and local politics, culture and organisation. 
While political elites have adopted the language of the liberal peace (and embraced neo-
liberal economics) which, as noted earlier, to some extent is aimed at ensuring political 
credibility and the provision of material assistance by internationals essential for their 
consolidation of political power, they have maintained space for autonomous action allowing 
them to engage in local forms of politics, relations and organisation. In this case, rather than 
mobilising citizens through state institutions, political elites have combined both state and 
                                                           
84
  President Koroma could also have learnt a lesson from the previous SLPP government whose demise 
an SLPP official partly blamed on its emphasis on distributing political power evenly in order to avoid regional 
politics and a return to conflict (personal interview, SLPP Official, 03 November 2010). He further pointed out 
that this brought dissatisfaction within the party since some party members felt SLPP leadership was not being 
grateful to those who had fought for the party . In addition, according to the SLPP official, it led to defections 
and also the formation of a break away party, PMDC, under the leadership of Charles Margai.   
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non-state institutions, though giving much preference to non-state institutions and networks, 
particularly the institution of the Paramount Chief, and social and former militia networks.85 
This has meant, either establishing or strengthening political ties with non-state actors such 
as, Paramount Chiefs, former combatants, secret societies and trade union/grassroots 
associations leadership as well as engaging in corruption, ethno-/regional and patronage 
politics, political clientelism and neo-patrimonial politics. As such, such a hybrid polity has 
combined aspects of the liberal peace, neo-liberal economics, and local forms of governance 
and political culture like ethno- and patronage politics, clientelism, indigenous political and 
social organisations and patrimonialism. 
 
 Such dynamics of local agency and institutions, for instance, chieftaincy, secret societies, 
patronage and patrimonialism have come into conflict with the liberal peace. This has 
witnessed liberal peace proponents such as DFID expressing concerns about political elites’ 
use of negative political practices particularly corruption, patronage and patrimonialism 
threatening to withdraw financial support to Sierra Leone (see DFID 2008). Rather than 
engaging patrimonial groups in the country, such internationals have sought to establish a 
“patrimonial free” political system in Sierra Leone – which is not possible.  
 
Indeed, patrimonialism has endured in post-war Sierra Leone. Since it is difficult to eliminate 
patrimonial politics in the country, Bangura (2000) suggests the need to ensure that such 
groups are transparently managed and held to account for their public behaviour. In addition, 
                                                           
85
  Ex-combatants who have faced marginalisation in their communities have moved to cities where they 
have established “new families” consisting of fellow ex-combatants. They have also established their own 
networks – often calling each other “brother” and “sister” or “colleague”. In 2007 elections APC and SLPP 
political elites re-mobilised and co-opted them as well as ex-prisoners and other marginalised youths for the 
purpose of providing security to political elites and also for mobilising votes with violence being used for this 
purpose (Christensen and Utas 2008: 515). According to Christensen and Utas (2008) Ernest Koroma 
(presidential candidate for APC) mobilised RUF combatants while Solomon Berewa (SLPP presidential 
candidate) mobilised West Side Boys. A former RUF commander told me that, “Politicians still need us. We are 
the youths” (personnel interview, 23 November 2010). 
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for him the state system needs to be structured in ways that enable it to provide basic services 
to groups that completely depend on it for such public goods and infrastructure as health care, 
welfare, electricity, sanitation, safe drinking water, education and jobs (Bangura 2000). It is 
crucial to note that, nurturing such a political system can be a source of political stability, 
eventually durable peace. In addition, this can help maintain peace without the need for the 
liberal internationalists to transform Sierra Leone into a political system that fits the liberal 
peace framework. However, the challenge is how to make such a neo-patrimonial system 
transparent (see Taylor 2007). 
 
Another challenge in Sierra Leone, as noted above, is that politics is increasingly revolving 
around questions of ethnicity with some ethnic groups, particularly the Mende, becoming 
restive about central government’s alienation of its interests and are making political 
demands for development, services, jobs and resources – partly a result of ambiguities that 
exist in the democratisation process of Sierra Leone. This can partly be attributed to the 
liberal peace’s failure to engage with local politics as well as its failure to understand the 
complex social dynamics in Sierra Leone which has not led to the creation of a social contract 
that resonates with the local. Rather, the outcome has been a predatory state that fails to meet 
the needs and interests of most of the population, but state elites and their patrons. 
  
“Watermelon Politics” and Ambiguity  
The predominance of ethnocentric/regional politics, clientelist politics, corruption, patronage 
and neo-patrimonial politics above state modernisation and democratisation entails that, as 
the liberal peace supports the state and its institutions in Sierra Leone, whoever controls the 
state wins, leading to a power struggle which again mainly excludes citizens unless they are 
clients. In response to this, those who are being excluded from the state and are not part of the 
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clientelist networks have expressed agency through the politics of ambiguity dubbed 
“watermelon politics”.86 Ordinary people have used ambiguity as a tool for survival, for 
contesting pressure from political elites as well as a means to maintain their autonomy which 
shows their resistance to permanent exclusion. A former CDF commander said the following 
about “watermelon politics”:  
 
Sometimes you see the red [the inside colour of the watermelon, also APC party 
colour], sometimes the green [the outside colour of the watermelon, also SLPP party 
colour]. Sometimes I say I am green. When this man is in power I just remove the green 
and put on the red. Politicians are not stagnant. They are here today. There tomorrow. 
(personal interview, Former CDF commander, 23 November 2010).  
 
For another respondent, it is an “idiomatic expression” which means that “What I express in 
the open is not what I am internally” and in the present context it relates to “stomach politics” 
(personal interview, confidential source, 26 November 2010). Talking about “watermelon 
politics” as “politics of survival” or “politics of the belly”, a local businessman pointed out 
that, people will “openly support a political party which they think will help them earn a 
living though privately they are supporting a different political party” (personal interview, 
local businessman, 23 November 2010).  For instance, a Sierra Leonean contact informed me 
that a nurse in charge of a clinic in the south told him that she is red (APC) so that the clinic 
continues to receive medical supplies from the APC-led government and she will go green at 
election time (will vote for SLPP). He also said that a Paramount Chief who was wearing a 
green vest and a red t-shirt told him that he was red outside and green inside, showing him 
the green vest he was wearing inside – this was after the chief had attended an APC meeting.  
 
                                                           
86
 Christensen and Utas (2008) have observed in 2007 the re-mobilisation of ex-combatants and other 
marginalised saw this as an opportunity to improve their lives and social status.  In order to fully benefit 
from this, former combatants had to make use of “watermelon politics” through “manoeuvre[ing] between 
various influential politicians and thus to receive immediate benefits from different sources”, at times using 
violence against political opponents (Christensen and Utas 2008: 530).  
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In this case, the excluded or weak are utilising the traditional practices of ambiguity and 
secrecy in order to deceive those who have control over state resources into believing that 
they have established patron-client relationships with them. As such, the practice of 
“watermelon politics” can be viewed as a strategy of concealment that those who have been 
excluded from the peace dividend or the state are using in order to access it or gain power.87 
This can also be viewed as a hidden form of resistance to the politics of exclusion and 
dominance that political elites are pursuing which liberal internationalists are unintentionally 
bolstering through their focus on building state institutions and an effective state which up to 
now has remained absent from the people’s everyday lives. The practice of “watermelon 
politics” can be linked to the practices of secrecy/concealment and ambiguity that 
anthropologists like Shaw (2000) and Ferme (2001) have observed in Sierra Leone (see 
chapter 1). Ferme (2001) observes that among the Mende (and Sierra Leoneans, in general) 
the use of the cultural logic of ambiguity and dissimulation tends to govern their political and 
social relations. She writes that in such societies “[…] the effective use of ambiguity has been 
– and continues to be – more productive than the pursuit of social ideals of transparency” 
(Ferme 2001: 2). This also reflects the agency and skills that local actors (including elites) 
have used in response to exclusion, power struggles and instability. In this case, although the 
practice of “watermelon politics” can be viewed in the negative sense as indirectly promoting 
patronage politics and can serve as an instrument of instability, it can also be a strategy for 
political emancipation.88  
 
                                                           
87
  There is a potential danger with regard to the use of “watermelon politics”, such as violence against 
those who practice it, if they are caught which demonstrates the risks associated with the cultural logics of 
ambiguity (also see Ferme 2001). 
88
  During my fieldwork the Temne were often cited as “clever” as they successfully used “watermelon 
politics” to fool the previous SLPP government into believing that it had their support, but voted for APC in the 
2007 elections. This also shows how the central bureaucracies based in Freetown were not aware of the realities 
on the ground, hence, their impression that they had legitimacy in the north.  
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Besides ordinary people’s use of the cultural logics of concealment and ambiguity through 
“watermelon politics” as means to avoid political marginalisation, they have also partially 
accepted some of the liberal peace’s tenets. Although the rural populace appears not to 
understand what the liberal peace is, modern and neo-traditional civil society organisations 
have introduced liberal peace tenets including human rights, democracy, accountability, 
transparency and rule of law through community sensitisation programmes and awareness 
raising campaigns. Political liberalisation has enabled them to find new social spaces such as 
the radio and the street (where vendors also playing protest music), the market and public 
transport, among others to voice their concerns and critique the state and state officials.89 
They have also internalised some elements of the liberal peace demanding good governance, 
respect for the rule of law, anti-corruption, accountability and a state that meets their needs 
and welfare. As a result of the massive sensitisation programs and awareness raising 
campaigns on the radio and at NGO workshops with the grassroots, and government anti-
corruption billboards across the country, the grassroots is well aware of the existence of state 
institutions such as the ACC as well as their functions. For instance, with regard to the ACC 
and corruption, while the current government of Sierra Leone has made efforts to deal with 
corrupt public officials including the enactment of the Anti-corruption Act 2008 that 
empowers the ACC to prosecute and punish corrupt officials, on the street, radio, market and 
public transport as well as through protest music critical voices have emerged that question 
why some “big fish” are being left off the hook and treated as “sacred cows”. Civil society 
organisations have at times sought the help of UN and the British’s International Military 
Training Team-Sierra Leone (IMATT-SL) when state elites make efforts to co-opt their 
committee members or use coercion or threats as means to get support from them. Resistance 
                                                           
89
  Ordinary rural respondents often compared the past in which Sierra Leone was a one party state and 
authoritarian with the post-war multi-party system has created opportunities for them, but their acceptance of 
political liberalisation does not necessarily mean a rejection of their traditional political institutions. 
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in this case, is more to elite predatory behaviour rather than the liberal peace, though the 
purpose is for their own benefit. As such, the excluded locals want to use elements of liberal 
peace that they have partially accepted to their own advantage and at the same time, they 
have remained protective of their culture, institutions and custom. 
 
In addition, at the local level citizens in rural areas, particularly youths with the support of 
liberal civil society organisations such as CGG and Network Movement for Justice and 
Development have argued for the democratisation of the Paramount Chieftaincy (at the same 
time, retaining the idea of ruling houses which they regard as their “tradition”) as part of 
reforming the institution of the chief.90 This includes elections based on universal sufferage 
as well as the use of 5 year terms for Paramount Chiefs. It is believed that doing so will make 
Paramount Chiefs more accountable to their followers as well as be able to meet their 
interests and needs (group interview, youth leaders, 21 November 2010).  
 
Political elites and the Cultural Logic of Ambiguity 
In addition to the above, it is crucial to note how political elites have also adopted the cultural 
logics of ambiguity and concealment in response to liberal internationalist calls for political 
liberalisation and also in order to deal with competing demands from local and international 
actors. In this case, state elites have partially accepted the liberal peace precepts, at the same 
time, subverting them through maintaining traditional institutions, customary law, informal 
networks and patronage politics. This has been the case with interactions that are happening 
at the local governance level (chiefdom authorities and district councils). In response to 
international demands for political decentralisation and local resistance to the sidelining of 
                                                           
90
  Calls for the democratisation of the chieftaincy are not new in Sierra Leone. The APC government 
under Siaka Stevens also made similar proposals to democratise the chieftaincy system, though this was a top-
down approach as opposed to the recent calls (see APC 1982). 
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the institution of the chief, political elites have adopted the cultural logic of ambiguity. Since 
the liberal peace has attributed the civil war to the chieftaincy system, it has prioritised 
political decentralisation over the restoring, maintenance and reforming of the chieftaincy 
system. This is could be partly due to the internationals’ view of custom as illiberal and 
antithetical to democracy as well as a tool for the oppression of rural Sierra Leoneans. As a 
result, custom is viewed as a threat to the democratisation process and the creation of 
conditions for sustainable peace in the country.  
 
In 2004 the previous SLPP government (with the support of international agencies such as the 
World Bank) adopted decentralisation by re-establishing elected town and district councils as 
a way of addressing issues of exclusion and marginalisation from political power of people in 
the hinterland. At the same time, the SLPP government remained protective of the chieftaincy 
system. The adoption of decentralisation would in this case mean bringing democracy to the 
rural people. As noted earlier, international support of the restoration of the chieftaincy 
system was for instrumental purposes – the state needed Paramount Chiefs to restore order 
and secure the return of the displaced to their rural homes.  
 
Despite the above criticisms, the institution of the chief has continued to command support 
from the rural populace. Although a number of rural interviewees grumbled about chiefs’ 
abuse of chiefdom development funds, among other things, they expressed more loyalty to 
their chiefdoms than local councils. For such people, the chieftaincy system is “our tradition” 
(group interview, youth leaders, 21 November 2010). Further, a councillor pointed out that 
rural people are more loyal to their chiefs than councillors since chiefs are in office for life 
and councillors for four years, and as such, the rural populace had rather maintain their 
relations with their chiefs than councillors (personal interview, 28 November 2009). 
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However, for some, most rural people’s continued support of chiefs is a result of a lack of 
education and the nature of power that tradition allows chiefs to have in Sierra Leone. As a 
Sierra Leonean friend noted: 
 
[...] the rural community people who are direct subjects to these chi[efs] are grossly 
illiterate, and therefore can hardly even identify their rights. In most cases, this renders 
them gullible and unable to challenge the excessive authority of their [chiefs]. The 
institution is historic and now permeates the tradition of the people who seem not to 
live without it. A paramount chief in the Mende land for instance is called Maada, 
[m]eaning Grand Pa, or better still father of the chiefdom whose authority no one will 
dare. Because of this, the people are made to accept that they must do and accept what 
he decrees [...] (email, 10 June 2010, emphasis mine). 
 
Such claims tend to overlook the following: 1) the agency of the rural communities – their 
capacity to resist and influence their chiefs; 2) their desire for autonomy from the state; and 
3) their need to maintain their tradition, culture and customs. 
 
Besides the above, the institution of the chief continue to play a role in chiefdom 
development (for example, road maintenance) justice, customary law, social order and 
security. All the five town chiefs I interviewed pointed out that their roles and responsibilities 
included mediating and settling domestic and land disputes, supervising community labour 
(development work), and making and enforcing chiefdom bye-laws which have also 
incorporated human rights.  
 
Given these interests (often competing) of the various domestic groups – chiefs, councillors, 
citizens and political elites – and internationals, state elites face dilemmas that they need to 
deal with. In the context of political decentralisation, state elites have been caught up in such 
conflicting interests since internationals have an interest in building liberal local government 
institutions through political decentralisation while the hinterland people are interested in the 
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continued existence of their customary institutions. The dilemma here is that if politicians 
publicly resist or reject international calls for political decentralisation that undermines or 
weakens chiefdom governance, then as noted earlier, they will lose donor support and 
credibility essential for their consolidation of power. However, if they eradicate the 
chieftaincy system, they will face stiff resistance in the hinterland which may create chaos in 
the country, thus threatening their power and the establishment of durable peace in the 
country. In order to avert this and in response to the competing interests from various actors 
(local and international) political elites establish institutions, policies and legal documents 
which are ambiguous or introduce new laws without political will to enforce them91 or delay 
enacting new laws.92 For instance, as noted earlier, the previous SLPP government adopted 
political decentralisation – which the current APC government has also endorsed – at the 
same time remaining protective of the chieftaincy system. However, ambiguity exists in 
                                                           
91
  Post-war Sierra Leone has produced a number of new laws in response to the liberal peace’s demands 
for good governance, transparency, political and economic liberalisation, gender equality and anti-corruption. 
These laws include the three gender acts  – the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act (amended 
in 2009) (2009b), the Domestic Violence Act (2007c) and the Devolution of Estates Act (2007d), the Child 
Rights Act (2007e), the Anti-Corruption Act, 2008 and The Local Government Act, 2004. However, a number 
of respondents, including women activists and leaders pointed out that political elites lack commitment to 
enforce most of these laws which also have come into conflict with customary law. As with anti-corruption 
campaign, a respondent pointed out that the absence of mechanisms to protect witnesses has resulted in people 
not willing to testify against corrupt public official since in the past some have received deaths threats (personal 
interview, confidential source, 02 December 2009). As with regard to institutions of law and justice, such as the 
Attorney General (AG) and the Ministry of Justice, there is no separation of power. It is an ambiguous 
institution in which the Minister of Justice is the AG. State elites have not been willing to reform it. According 
to the same respondent I cited above, there are fears that the Minster of Justice as an AG interferes with the 
work of the ACC, particularly when it is dealing with the “sacred cows”. Examples of such “sacred cows” 
include former Minister of Energy and Power, Haja Afsatu Kabba who awarded a contract to Income Electrix, a 
Nigeria Company without going to the National Public Procurement, but was neither indicted nor sacked. Rather 
she was transferred and appointed as Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources (a lucrative ministry). In 2010, 
she got sacked and fined for abusing her new position. In 2008 the government enacted an Anti-corruption Act 
which empowered the ACC to independently prosecute and punish corruption, but has not separated the powers 
of the AG and the Minister of Justice. 
92
  For instance, the state has continued to use “the seditious libel provisions of the Public Order and 
Security Act of 1965 [...] against journalist[s]” (HRCSL 2009: 48). Since 2003 there has been local and 
international pressure on the state to de-criminalise libel. In addition, internationals actors including the World 
Bank, UN and EU and local civil society organisations have put pressure on the government to enact a Freedom 
of Information law that would allow citizens to have an unhindered access to information which public officials 
hold, enabling Sierra Leoneans to hold them to account for their actions. It is believed that this is essential for 
promoting participatory democracy as well as good governance, transparency and accountability of public 
officials. Although in June 2010, the cabinet approved the Freedom of Information Bill (FOI), Sierra Leonean 
parliament is yet to endorse it. 
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relation to the powers of Paramount Chiefs and district council chairpersons, as well as the 
roles and responsibilities of chiefdoms and councils. Part 20(1) of the Local Government Act 
states that, 
 
A local council shall be the highest political authority in the locality and shall have 
legislative and executive powers to be exercised in accordance with the Act or any 
other enactment, and shall be responsible for promoting the development of the locality 
and the welfare of the people in the locality […] (Government of Sierra Leone 2004b: 
16). 
 
However, the state’s failure to define the powers of Paramount Chiefs vis-à-vis local 
councils has resulted in a struggle for power between councils and chiefdoms. Paramount 
Chiefs have declared that they are the highest traditional authorities in their respective 
chiefdoms refusing to recognise the authority of district council chairpersons. As a 
respondent pointed out, “The district council chairman is the overall authority. Chiefs are 
not accepting the role of council chairmen. They say this is my small boy. The roles have 
been clearly defined” (personal interview, district council chairperson, 19 November 
2010). Yet, chiefs have pointed out that they have overall authority in their respect 
chiefdoms. As such, the lack of clarity on how power should be distributed between 
councils and chiefs has witnessed the two groups clashing over development projects and 
revenue collection (including local tax and market dues). This, according to one 
Paramount Chief, is creating a lot of problems in the entire country since the government 
gave a lot of powers to councils in haste (personal interview, Paramount Chief, 18 
November 2010). He further pointed out that the government is revising the local 
government act and it will repeal the powers of the council to collect revenue. Yet, a local 
council Chief Administrator pointed out that the revised act will be in councils’ favour 
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(personal interview, 18 November 2010) – evidence that politicians have preferred to rely 
on ambiguity  in order to manage competing interests of various groups.  
 
Ambiguity is also reflected in the state’s recent move to reintroduce the office of the 
District Officer (DO). Questions have been raised about the lack of clarity on how DOs 
are going to share power with district council chairpersons and Paramount Chiefs 
(personal interview, SLPP official, 03 November 2010). The SLPP is critical of the APC’s 
attempts to re-establish the DO system since based on past experience93, it views the 
system as “a hallmark of the centralised system” (personal interview, SLPP official, 03 
November 2010). Since pre-war DOs acted as agents of central government, their re-
introduction is viewed with suspicion. Critics also view the re-establishment of DOs as 
state elites’ attempt to subvert political decentralisation. However, for state elites, the re-
introduction of DOs is “part of the decentralisation process which has received much 
attention today” (The New Citizen, 25 June, 2010). The roles and responsibilities of DOs 
include settling disputes in chiefdoms and supervising chiefdom institutions and NGO 
activities. Critics are concerned about an overlap of responsibilities between DOs and 
local council chief administrators and Paramount Chiefs which might create chaos at the 
local level. For some, the re-establishment of the institution of the DO is a step in the right 
direction since it is a form of employment creation and as such, they have dismissed SLPP 
concerns (informal conversations). However, this raises questions about whether this will 
result in significant changes in the rate of unemployment in the country and who will 
benefit from the DO system.  
 
                                                           
93
  During the colonial period, DOs (then District Commissioners) acted as agents of central government. 
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Indeed, state elites have been able to frame the contentious issue of DOs in such a way 
that it appeals to the unemployed, though the main motive could be to re-centralise power 
and authority, and even to extend their patronage networks. In addition, by manipulating 
the language of the liberal peace, such as decentralisation, and creating ambiguous power 
and legal structures/institutions (in addition to deceiving and resisting internationals), state 
elites could be doing this for their own purposes including the need to maintain their 
autonomy and to consolidate power.94 As such, it is crucial to note that in the context of 
post-war Sierra Leone the “actual” state policy might not be the one that appears on the 
surface (that the liberals have imposed on the state), but that which is “underneath” it. 
Indeed, these ambiguities should not be viewed as expressions of dysfunctionalism which 
need more liberal peace “doses”, but as forms of resistance to external impositions or 
deliberate rejection of the liberal peace project – as “local” claims for autonomy and 
indigenous forms of peace-making through the management of competing interests of 
various local groups through the cultural logics of ambiguity which if ignored can be 
sources of instability. In other words, rather than rejecting such practices of ambiguity and 
concealment in Sierra Leone,95 it is significant to view them as having potential in 
peacebuilding and that these can also be used to realise “local” agency that can result in 
hybrid forms of peace – if carefully managed and without much interference from the 
liberal peace.  
 
                                                           
94
  In their framing of the issue of DOs as part of decentralisation (which resonates with the liberals), state 
elites expect support from them. In this case, state elites’ efforts are likely to be effective when they use the 
language of the liberals. Literature on social movements has shown that this is an effective strategy for social 
movement activists to achieve their goals (see Keck and Sikkink 1998).     
95
  For instance, in order to promote transparency, a Sierra Leone working for an international NGO 
pointed out that his organisation organises activities that are open to everyone in the society and that there is no 
secrecy in these activities since it is negative and counter-productive (personal interview, confidential source, 02 
December 2009) . As such, his organisation has supported “good” cultural activities that include people beating 
drums, wearing masks and dancing openly in an attempt to promote openness – interestingly anthropologists 
such as Ferme (2001) have associated masks with the cultural practice of concealment.  
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An Emerging Hybrid Local Government System 
As noted above, political decentralisation and the restoration of the chieftaincy system has 
resulted in ambiguous institutions (local councils and chieftaincy) at the local level. In 
addition, it has undermined the power of Paramount Chiefs. Despite the clashes between 
local councils and chiefdoms, especially over revenue collection and its usage, a lack of 
clarity on how chiefs and councillors share power and the rural populace’s mistrust of 
local councils, there appears to be an improvement in the relations between local councils 
and chiefdoms. All the Paramount Chiefs and sub-chiefs I interviewed pointed out that 
there has been a significant improvement in their relationship with councils, though 
conflict over authority, revenue collection and its usage remains. This improvement in 
their relations can be partly attributed to the various groups’ attempt to manage their 
conflicts by drawing lessons from their culture (for instance, councillors are reminded to 
respect their chiefs/elders as in “you are my small boy”)96 and the use of indigenous and 
traditional approaches to peacemaking as well as the informal relationships that exist 
between councillors and chiefs.  For instance, the Paramount Chief of the Jong Chiefdom 
and the Bonthe District Council Chairman have often clashed over issues of tax collection, 
its usage, and power. On the 19th – 21st of November, 2010, a local NGO, Hope Sierra 
Leone, facilitated a “heart to heart dialogue” in Mattru Jong which brought chiefs from 
Bombali District (northern Sierra Leone) and Bonthe District (southern Sierra Leone) to 
engage in a dialogue aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation between the two 
regions.97  
                                                           
96
  A local human rights activist told me that the council chairman needs to respect the chief. Since the 
Paramount Chief is the overall traditional ruler in their respective chiefdoms and also host district councils, 
councillors are expected to respect them. In addition, among the Mende, a Paramount Chief is addressed as 
Maada (grandfather) and as such, he should be respected. In this case, despite that a council chairperson holds a 
powerful political position he/she is expected not to lose track of the society’s traditions and culture of respect 
for chiefs/elders.  
97
  While Hope Sierra Leone calls its peace initiative “Moral Foundation for Democracy” and uses the 
language of the liberals such as democracy, human rights and rule of law in its campaign for the promotion for 
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This also provided an opportunity for the Bonthe District Council Chairman and the 
Paramount Chief of Jong Chiefdom to reconcile. According to the district council chairman, 
despite the intervention of the Provincial Secretary, there were still problems between him 
and the chief, and as such, he decided to raise the issue at this public meeting for the sake of 
reconciliation and peace. The district council chairman who was critical of the chief pointed 
out that “the chief should be the unifier of the people” and should not take sides, and later 
begged for forgiveness: “Chief if I offended you, I’m sorry” and further said, “If I have done 
wrong to anyone, I beg you to forgive me”. After his speech, he shook hands with the chief 
and both embraced to jubilant cheering and clapping of hands from the audience – a form of 
traditional approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation which in this case was used to deal 
with a conflict over political authority resulting from the ambiguous institutions.98 
Interestingly, the council chairman was from a ruling house and had campaigned for the chief 
after the council chairman’s brother withdrew from the paramount chieftaincy contest.  
 
As Manning (2009) has observed, there is a link between local councils and traditional 
sources of power and authority in rural Sierra Leone – some councillors come from ruling 
houses and some have lived in the chiefdoms most of their lives.99 In this case, the locals 
prefer that those appointed in the councils are indigenes (locals) and not outsiders, and this is 
not what the liberal peace wants. As such, the liberal peace is being co-opted for the locals’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tolerance, nonviolence and respect for diversity and cohesion, traditional ways of resolving conflicts dominated 
the process including chiefs offering prayers to God through ancestors for unity, protection and durable peace. 
At this “Heart to Heart Dialogue”, Hope Sierra Leone pointed out that it believed in tradition, that “we do not 
lose focus”, that “We are not Britain or America” and “we need to deal with the issues between ourselves” 
(Hope Sierra Leone, 20 November 2010).   
98
  Initially the chief appeared to be unhappy with what the district council chairman had said as this 
contradicted what the chief had said earlier in his speech to the public – that he was a democrat and had a sense 
of fairness. The chief walked out of the meeting with everyone disapproving, after a few minutes he came back 
to embrace the district council chairman since the district council chairman had apologised to him and everyone 
he had wronged.  
99
  The same also applies to some political elites, for instance, the Vice President of the country comes 
from a ruling house, and even former Prime Ministers such as Milton and Albert Margai were from ruling 
houses. In this case, there is a link between some state elites, councillors and traditional sources of power and 
authority in Sierra Leone. 
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own purposes including the need to safeguard their autonomy and interests considering that 
in Sierra Leone relationships (including obligations to the community and extended family) 
are strong. Manning has further noted the heavy reliance of local councillors on chiefs on 
collection of tax, mobilisation of labour for community development work and the chiefs’ 
ability to enforce compliance from rural people to participate in development work through 
communal labour. It is difficult for local councils and development agencies to start or 
succeed in doing development projects in the communities without prior permission from the 
chief. Although local councils and NGOs have at times imposed projects, this has often been 
met with local resistance including villagers’ refusal to contribute their labour and 
construction materials such as quarry stones and sand for the project, citing lack of 
consultation and ownership. As a result, “such projects do not go anyway” (group interview, 
TAs, 28 November 2009; also see Manning 2009).100 Resistance in this case, should not be 
taken to imply that the rural populace is not committed to the concept of development,101 but 
as an attempt on their part to express their agency. In addition, it relates to the agents of the 
liberal peace’s unwillingness to genuinely engage with the local. Faced with local resistance, 
councillors (and development agencies) have no option, but to engage with Paramount Chiefs 
and communities before starting a development project. By so doing, councillors are able to 
mobilise community labour via Paramount Chiefs and in most cases, do so on community 
labour days which resonates with local custom and chiefdom bye-laws. Manning has 
observed that, “Councillors also engage extensively and often constructively with chiefs and 
                                                           
100
  Such imposition of development projects on the locals contradicts the idea of local participation as a 
means to promote democratic governance that the liberal peace intends to promote in rural Sierra Leone through 
political decentralisation. 
101
  At a Community Leaders workshop that I attended in Kailahun, participants showed commitment to 
development including hospitals, roads, adequate sanitation and schools. This is a general feeling in the rural 
areas I did fieldwork since development resonates with their everyday life. Whilst proponents of the liberal 
peace advocate accountability, transparency, rule of law, good governance and so on as means to promote 
democracy and peace, for most of the rural poor, democracy makes sense if  their welfare and needs are met.  
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other local leaders, both as a matter of pragmatism and because they share with the majority 
of Sierra Leoneans an acceptance and respect for the legitimacy of chiefs” (2009: 19). 
 
In addition to the above, the introduction of political decentralisation has resulted in hybrid 
chiefs with a number of them seating on council meetings – some with decision making 
powers, while others are nominated as ex officio members and seating on ward development 
committees. This provides them with an opportunity to represent the interests of their 
followers as well as protect their own interests. For instance, in Kenema, a chiefdom co-
exists with both district and city councils. This forces both councils to make decisions in 
consultation with chiefs (personal interview, town chief, 23 November, 2010).  
 
Indeed, in Sierra Leone the rural populace and chiefs’ resistance, partial acceptance and 
refusal to cooperate with local councillors in order to maintain some form of local autonomy 
and power as well as the persistence of the chiefs’ legitimacy in rural areas, chiefs’ ability to 
infiltrate the structures of a “rational” local council and the mutual accommodation between 
chiefdom authorities and councillors have created space for the emergence a hybrid form of 
local government which integrates traditional and modern forms of governance that 
internationals had not envisaged. This “local-local” level arrangement has seen relations 
between councillors and chiefs improving thus, undermining the state-centric model of local 
governance that the liberal internationalists want in Sierra Leone.  
 
Indigenous/Customary Means to Peace in Rural Sierra Leone 
The Sierra Leonean civil war was largely fought in the villages among neighbours and 
relatives who shared everyday life, culture, customs and needs. This negatively affected the 
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various webs of social relations that existed in such rural communities. After the end of the 
civil war such societies needed to commit themselves to restoring relations and social 
harmony in order to establish peace at community as well as inter-community levels. The 
liberal peace has not been keen on supporting such communities engaging in peacebuilding 
activities aimed at restoring social harmony through reconciliation, cleansing ceremonies, 
appeasing ancestors, truth telling, forgiveness and healing. As noted earlier, its main focus 
has been on building an effective state and strong state institutions with the assumption that 
peace will trickle-down from the top to the bottom. As such, the liberal peace has distanced 
itself from such “local-local” contexts giving the “local-local” an opportunity to deal with 
their situation in accordance with their traditions, culture, custom and processes. These 
processes that the liberal peace has largely ignored are essential for such communities to 
build peace and restore social harmony.  
 
Sites for Creating Peace and Managing Conflicts 
In rural sites I visited emphasis was placed on societal relationships, welfare, human needs 
and governance. In addition, “community” was considered to be the most significant social 
unit, not the individual. The liberal peace’s failure to have a strong influence “up country” 
(despite the presence of local and international NGOs which are acting as its agents) and its 
lack of interest in customary law and governance, and traditional forms of peacemaking as 
well as the failure of the state to provide basic services, particularly, in rural areas, has seen 
people despising the state and relying on local customary institutions such chieftaincy and 
secret societies for social order, justice, security and the promotion of community harmony. 
In other words, certain post-conflict peacebuilding processes are happening at the “local-
local” level in defiance of the liberal peace precepts. As noted above, such peacebuilding 
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initiatives in rural communities include community-based reconciliation, cleansing 
ceremonies and the establishment of local mechanisms for peacebuilding (with the support of 
NGOs) such as “peace committees”, “peace trees”,102 “peace huts” (or palava huts), court 
barrays103, “peace mothers’ farms” and “peace clubs”. While in rural Sierra Leone concepts 
such as “peace hut” and “peace tree” are new/post-war concepts which NGOs introduced in 
order to establish sites for bringing villagers/community together to make and sustain peace, 
these concepts resonate with traditional practises of settling disputes and discussing important 
community/village issues in a palava hut and under the shade of a traditional village tree, 
such as a cotton tree.  
 
As a respondent pointed out, traditionally, villagers/communities met and sat under the shade 
of a cotton tree to settle disputes, engage in open dialogue over critical community issues, 
appease their ancestors and discuss secret society issues (personal interview, Alpha Ndoleh, 
town chief and Kailahun District Chairman for Fambul Tok, 12 November 2010). In post-war 
Sierra Leone, according to chief Ndoleh, “People sit under a peace tree and discuss problems 
in their community instead of going to the court”. He further pointed out that after the civil 
war NGOs revived this traditional practice through “transform[ing] the cotton tree to a peace 
tree”, particularly in rural communities that had court barrys destroyed during the war and 
had no funds to rebuild them. The same applies to the palava hut which prior to the war was a 
place where villagers or the community met to settle individual or community palavas 
(disputes) and also to discuss important community issues. In the post-war period the palava 
hut has been transformed into a “peace hut”. This has become a site for reconciliation, 
                                                           
102
  Some NGOs such as Hope Sierra Leone call them “peace and reconciliation trees” and such trees have 
been/are being planted in the middle of the village/“town” after a reconciliation ceremony. These “peace trees 
include cocoa, kola nut and mango trees.  
103
  A court barry is a building where the local court sits and official meetings take place. In addition, 
offices for chiefdom administrators such as the Paramount Chief and Chiefdom Speaker are housed at the court 
barry. 
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building and maintaining peace/community cohesion and planning issues such as 
development which are crucial for sustainable peace. 
 
Whereas, the cotton tree was located closer to the bush, the peace tree is located in the middle 
of “town”. The idea of locating the “peace tree” in the middle of “town” could be viewed as 
an attempt by NGOs to remove such dialogues from close to or from the bush which is 
associated with secrecy/secret societies. This could be for the purpose of enhancing 
transparency, openness, accountability, inclusion and participation of various stakeholders in 
the community including women and children as understood in liberal terms. However, as a 
TA pointed out, there are certain traditions and practices that they cannot do in town, but in 
the secret society bush (group interview, 28 November 2009). For instance, secret societies 
continue to hold secret courts (if disputants are members of the same secret society) as well 
as conducting cleansing rituals in the bush that are essential for reconciliation and social 
peace.104 This could be an expression of such locals’ autonomy and agency since it is difficult 
for the liberal peace to influence them when they engage in such activities in places where the 
liberal peace cannot reach. Or it can be viewed as an attempt to create space that enables 
them to create their own peace which allows them to hold secret knowledge that is essential 
for social control and order (see chapter 1). 
 
It is also crucial to point out that, since the post-war practice of discussing issues such as 
peace, democracy and development under the shade of a “peace tree” fits into the traditional 
practices of engaging in dialogue, consensus-building, mediating and resolving disputes 
                                                           
104
  Despite the onslaught from the liberal peace, secret societies remain significant ritual cleansing experts 
essential for transforming the wrongdoer and the victim, thus allowing individual/social healing to happen 
crucial for communal peace. As such, such societies could be viewed as also representing local understandings 
of peace. This does not mean to romanticise them, but to also bring out certain positive aspects of them essential 
for peacebuilding.   
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under the shade of a cotton tree, the idea has been well received in rural areas. The locals own 
such peace processes with NGOs acting as facilitators and also providing modern equipment 
such as the public address system (PA). This highlights the existence of “local-local” agency 
and capacity for peace.  
 
Indeed, rural Sierra Leoneans have been able to reassert their traditional practices of 
peacemaking such as “hanging heads” (consensus-building), dialogue and community 
participation as well as settling disputes under a cotton tree or at a court barry or a “secret 
society bush/court” (though this one has a limitation that it is only accessible to members of 
the secret society). As such, the “peace tree”, “secret society bush/court” and “peace hut” (or 
“court barrys”) have become sites for creating and maintaining peace, open dialogue aimed at 
mediating and resolving conflicts, participatory democracy, rebuilding and strengthening 
relationships, and promoting community development as well as social harmony and order. 
This has enabled the interaction between the local and the liberal peace tenets of 
development, human rights, democracy and good governance. The liberal peace has relied on 
civil society organisations/NGOs to promote its agenda. Such civil society organisations, 
particularly the neo-traditional ones which understand the local context and culture are 
engaging in a conversation with custom, culture, local politics and tradition.  
 
Besides the sites I have mentioned above, a Sierra Leonean human rights NGO called Forum 
for Conscience which works in partnership with the Catalyst for Peace, a US-based 
organisation recently established “peace mothers” farms for rural women. “Peace mothers’ 
farms”, according to Chief Ndoleh, were established in response to the marginalisation and 
stigmatisation of women for publicly speaking about being raped or subjected to other forms 
 226 
 
of sexual abuse during the war (personal interview, 12 November 2010).105 The organisation 
decided to group the women and called them “peace mothers” and established “peace 
mothers” farms for them, helping them as a group and contributing to their empowerment and 
respect within their communities as well as food security and development. This, according 
to Chief Ndoleh, has also witnessed their communities changing their attitude towards them. 
Indeed, “peace mothers farms” have become sites for relationship building, promoting local 
peace, dialogue, restoring the dignity of women victims, enhancing community development 
and food security, tolerance and acceptance. In addition, the concept of “peace mothers” farm 
resonates with the communitarian values of rural communities.  
 
Cases of “Local- Local” Peace Processes 
This section will provide two interesting examples of “local-local” peace initiatives. It is 
significant to note that civil society organisations have also been involved in peace processes 
in rural communities without taking a leading role. In such rural sites, peace initiatives have 
taken place without the state being involved or in the presence of state officials who are 
marginally involved. For instance, in 2008, Forum for Conscience developed the Fambul Tok 
(a Creole term which means “family talk”) project that draws from traditional approaches to 
conflict resolution and community healing through family dialogue. The project is being 
conducted in the hinterland. Fambul Tok is a response to the failure of the TRC and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone to reach those who live on the margins of district headquarters 
and the state, but constitute the bulk of war victims. Forum for Conscience facilitates 
traditional cleansing ceremonies (done according to the traditions and norms of the 
community in question) and brings perpetrators, victims and other members of community 
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  In rural Sierra Leone there are social taboos against speaking publicly about sexual violence such as 
rape. 
 227 
 
together to engage in bonfire truth-telling and “family talk” aimed at promoting forgiveness 
and reconciliation, and addressing the root causes of conflict at local level as well as restoring 
the dignity of war victims (personal interview, Chief Alpha Ndoleh, 12 November 2010). The 
programme involves traditional and religious leaders, secret society leaders including the 
“mummy queen” (leader of the female secret society) and a village youth chairperson who 
continue to play mediation roles in their communities after the reconciliation ceremonies 
(personal interview, Chief Alpha Ndoleh, 12 November, 2010). Such people are also trained 
in human rights and conflict resolution indicating the interface between the local and the 
liberal peace.  
 
As with regard to women participation, Chief Ndoleh pointed out that, the “mummy queen” 
cannot be excluded from participating or from being part of the decision-making process in 
such significant processes since women resist if she is sidelined. This includes boycotting the 
peace processes. In this case, the involvement of the “mummy queen” is crucial in the sense 
that it encourages other women to participate in public decision-making processes and is also 
an indication that women are not totally marginalised in Sierra Leone as is often portrayed in 
the literature. Proponents of the liberal peace have portrayed Sierra Leonean women as 
having a weak social position and victims of custom. In this regard, using the language of 
universal human rights, internationals have depicted black women in need of saving from 
black men and custom, to paraphrase Spivak’s statement: “White men saving brown women 
from brown men” (1988: 297). Indeed, saving black women has become one of the driving 
forces against custom in Sierra Leone. This has seen internationals pushing for laws that 
protect the rights of women, for example, the recent “three gender laws”, I noted earlier. In 
addition, internationals have funded human rights NGOs that monitor local courts and offer 
programs on gender based violence (GBV), as well as push for the inclusion of women into 
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the structures of local courts and other customary power structures. In addition, NGOs have 
emphasised women’s rights over those of men resulting in men resisting the values that the 
international human rights discourse is promoting.106 This has also meant the relocation of 
rural women from their communities into the international arena which does not resonate 
with their everyday life.107 Internationals have failed to look at the implications of eliminating 
patriarchy since in such societies patriarchy comes with responsibilities. In rural Sierra Leone 
this is creating a whole range of problems including the disruption of marriages and family 
life with the state and internationals not keen on building on existing customary law that 
protect women, for example, from rape, beating and deprivation. For instance, traditionally, 
the Mende regarded rape as a taboo and perpetrators were banished; men who beat their 
wives were fined and people who deprived their families where summoned to the chief’s 
court (personal interview, 04 November, 2010). However, this does not mean that 
patriarchy’s negatives should not be exposed and dealt with.  
 
In this regard, internationals have raised gender (as well children) issues as a means to 
delegitimise custom obscuring Sierra Leonean women’s agency (see Shaw 2000; chapter 1) 
and customary institutions that are already in place including female secret societies and the 
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  Men point out that such rights are an imposition from outside noting that “human rights are for whites” 
or “its Western culture” and also as an attempt to undermine their custom. Local and international NGOs’ 
sensitisation programmes and training workshops on issues such as gender equality, property rights and  some 
aspects of children’s rights that have targeted men and community leaders have at times witnessed men resisting 
them by either walking out of the workshops in protest or disagreeing with the NGOs (group interview, TA, 28 
November 2009). At a community leaders workshop that I attended in Kailahun District in November 2011, all 
14 male participants were opposed to the new laws. 
107
  A woman leader pointed out that poverty is a big challenge for women and it is one of the main causes 
of domestic violence (personal interview, Theresa Tucker, church and community leader, 21 November 2010). 
She further noted that women have not received much support from the state and NGOs to meet their material 
needs. In order to survive, according to her, women have adopted strategies aimed at advancing their 
productivity and welfare as well as the survival of their families, including, creating rotating credit associations. 
In addition, she pointed out that peace between husbands and wives can only be built if wives are productive 
and helping support their families. In this case, there is the need for liberal peace and state elites to put more 
emphasis on women’s socio-economic needs than rights. This also shows internationals’ failure to understand 
the local realities in relation to violent conflict in the home. 
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institution of the “mummy queen” that provide space for women to express their agency as 
well as act as checks on patriarchy. In addition, such institutions act as women’s means to 
counter social and political exclusion. This shows the complex nature of the social position of 
women in Sierra Leone.  
 
A TA pointed out that the government want to abolish secret societies (group interview, TAs, 
28 November 2009). This could be a result of pressure from international actors who criticise 
secret societies for encouraging “harmful” traditional practices, particularly female 
circumcision and see them as vehicles for the abuse of the rights of the girl child. However, 
such internationals have not given attention to the positive aspects of female secret societies 
and the institution of the “mummy queen”. Abolishing them will also mean disempowering 
women as well as undermining their agency which is expressed through the powerful position 
of the “mummy queen” and the institution of female secret society which bring women 
together and resonates with the communitarian values of their society. Anthropological 
research in Sierra Leone (West Africa, in general) has shown that women are effective when 
engaging in collective action (Shaw 2001; Ferme 2001; Moran 2006).108 In other words, 
women in rural Sierra Leone have used such established customary institutions and engaged 
in collective action to defend their rights as well as express their needs and interests (also see 
Shaw 2001; Moran 2006).  This explains why they are able block processes that exclude the 
“mummy queen” who is there to represent their interests.     
In addition to the above, a counsellor for a local NGO, Community Association for 
Psychosocial Services (CAPS) told me a case of Sengema village in Kailahun where serious 
local tensions had remained in the post-war period (personal interview, 12 November 2010). 
                                                           
108
  A respondent told me that youths in his community have devised a strategy of using “our sisters” 
(female youths) to air their grievances in their community since “Wherever there is a group of women their 
voices are heard” (personal interview, confidential source, 21 November 2010). 
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In 2010, more than eight years after the official end of Sierra Leone’s civil war and the 
introduction of the liberal peace project in the country, villagers invited CAPS to facilitate a 
cleansing ceremony in the village in order to end civil war-related tensions among 
community members. CAPS, a neo-traditional civil society organisation, offers psychosocial 
services to victims of war, rape and domestic violence through the utilisation of 
modern/Western and traditional mental health practices. The organisation has played a 
critical role in promoting reintegration and reconciliation as well as the restoration of the 
well-being of war victims which the liberal peace has not paid much attention to. CAPS also 
sensitises people on human rights as a means to deal with rape and domestic violence, and 
uses modern/Western mental health techniques that provide medical solutions to human 
suffering. In addition, it has also adopted a strategy that involves the use of traditional healing 
ceremonies such as culturally appropriate community cleansing ceremonies as means to 
promote reintegration, reconciliation and psychosocial healing.  
 
According to the CAPS counsellor I cited above, in 2010 villagers from Sengema village 
asked CAPS to facilitate a community cleansing ceremony aimed at ending local tensions. 
The locals linked the tensions with the intra-village conflict that erupted during the war. This 
witnessed atrocities and violations of social norms being committed in the village including 
the shading of blood, incest, “violating the bush” by having sex in the bush and mass graves 
(personal interview, CAPS Counsellor, 12 November 2010). This localised sub-war that 
developed in Sengema village was due to the fact that its inhabitants had joined rival militia 
groups, particularly the CDF and the RUF. According to CAPS counsellor, since the village 
was not close to the highway, villagers felt safe and decided not to flee their village during 
the war. However, the village became a battleground between Kamajor warriors (CDF) and 
RUF rebels who came from that village. Since post-war peacebuilding initiatives in Sierra 
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Leone privileged the state and its institutions over such localised sub-wars, it meant that such 
conflicts as in Sengema could not be addressed. As such, local tensions continued after the 
civil war was officially declared over in 2002. In the post-war period warring parties would 
fight against each other, even over minor issues.  
 
In 2010, a group of young men from the village approached CAPS for support. The 
organisation visited the village and engaged in a community dialogue in order to identify the 
root causes of the tensions. Villagers identified the civil war and its consequences as the main 
causes of tensions within the village. In addition, villagers attributed their problems, 
including poor harvests, to angry ancestors. In most African societies ancestors or what Mbiti 
(1969) calls the “living-dead” are believed to actively participate in the world of the living 
creating “communities of both the living and the dead” (Kopytoff 1971: 129). Ancestors are 
believed to act as guarantors and the basis of peace and security. It is crucial to note that the 
relationship of ancestors to the living is often described as ambivalent, “both punitive and 
benevolent and sometimes even capricious” (Kopytoff 1971: 129). In general, in order for 
ancestors to guarantee individual and social peace as well as security, the living ought to 
maintain harmonious relationships with fellow members of the community ensuring that they 
do everything possible to address threats or breaches for the purpose of maintaining such 
relationships. In addition, it is crucial for community members to respect social norms and 
values. Failure to do so is believed to attract punishment from ancestors. Peace in this case is 
conceived as a gift from ancestors. 
 
As noted above, during the war Sengema villagers violated established norms and rules 
including committing incest, killing and “violating the bush”, thus, undermining social 
harmony. The villagers noted a causal link between social enmity and misfortune. They 
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believed that ancestors punished them for the various violations that happened during the 
war, hence the poor harvests and violence in the village. As such, for the villagers the 
solution lied in conducting cleansing ceremonies and reconnecting with the ancestors who, as 
noted earlier, are believed to be the custodians of peace and security. Doing so would mean 
replacing social enmity with social harmony. As a result, they invited CAPS to facilitate 
community cleansing ceremonies with various stakeholders attending including their 
Paramount Chief, section chiefs, NGO workers and women. CAPS also provided a PA 
system upon the request of the villagers to be used at the cleansing ceremonies. CAPS 
counsellor I cited above, pointed out that the cleansing ceremonies included perpetrators 
being asked to publicly confess their wrongdoings, showing remorse and seeking forgiveness 
from their victims, appeasing ancestors and offering libation. For example, he pointed out 
that a former RUF confessed that he committed atrocities under the influence of drugs, and 
asked for forgiveness from those he wronged. For such communities forgiveness is prioritised 
since it is essential for building peace and the restoration of harmonious relationships. 
However, the liberal peace has not paid sufficient attention to this, thus has failed to have 
much impact on the “margins of the state” where culture, tradition and custom are prioritised. 
 
Three months later, CAPS visited the village to assess the situation and found out that 
tensions had ceased and there was some cohesion in the village. In addition, the villagers had 
established a “peace hut” where villagers now meet to discuss issues affecting them and their 
community as well as settle disputes instead of resorting to violence. The villagers did not 
appeal to the liberal peace to establish peace, but drew from their customary institutions and 
ways of dealing with conflicts which allowed them to enter a social contract amongst 
themselves as well as their ancestors for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
harmonious relations. In addition, after the cleansing ceremonies they accommodated modern 
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mental health practices since CAPS has established three psychosocial counselling groups in 
the village. This has allowed modern/Western and traditional mental health practices to 
interact, though the traditional one tends to dominate enabling them to retain agency, 
autonomy and ownership. It is crucial to note that peace for such a community is not just a 
moral value, but also a spiritual one and is perceived in relation to both social and spiritual 
harmony.  
 
In summary, contrary to the liberal peace proponents’ view of the “local” as lacking capacity 
for peace, these initiatives that involve the “local-local” (with the support of civil society 
organisations) actively finding solutions to their problems are evidence of local capacity, 
ownership and non-state agency as well as resistance to the liberal peace. Traditional leaders 
take a leading role in such peace initiatives with politicians attending as invited guests and 
local NGOs such as CAPS, Forum for Conscience and Hope Sierra Leone acting as 
facilitators. In such processes, the community initiates, organises and controls the peace 
process, and at the same time, accommodates “outsiders” such as civil society organisations, 
thus making them part of the process as facilitators. In addition, NGOs, particularly neo-
traditional ones are playing a significant role in encouraging and facilitating informal dispute 
resolution, holding awareness raising campaigns and sensitisation workshops, and at times 
have acted as arbiters through their alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs and free 
justices services generating resentment from chiefs. The next section is the concluding 
section of the thesis. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I set to investigate the practical application of the liberal peace in Africa using 
Sierra Leone as a case study of liberal peace transition. For the past two decades external 
peace interventions in war-torn societies have been liberal peace-oriented emphasising on 
political and economic liberalisation, and statebuilding with insufficient attention to 
inequality, resource distribution, culture, localised forms of peacebuilding and welfare, 
among others. The liberal peace has been transplanted from the West to troubled parts of the 
developing world with the hope that it will create sustainable peace in these countries. 
Despite the liberal peace’s flaws (discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 6), it merits study because 
today we have violent internal conflict situations, and liberal internationalists who are willing 
and able to go in. In this thesis, the aim has not been to undermine the liberal peace model 
since it has played a crucial role in ending overt violence in societies emerging from violent 
conflict, but instead to open it up and expand on it by looking at other forms of peace and 
also taking into account the agency of local actors in post-conflict environments. The thesis 
has used the liberal peace as its primary frame of reference. The notion of hybridity has been 
employed to help us to pay attention to custom, culture, the “subaltern” who live on the 
“margins of the state” and to show how local actors in Sierra Leone have challenged the 
hegemony of the liberal peace. Local actors have not necessarily acted according to the 
demands of internationals.  
 
This thesis examined the interface between liberal peacebuilding and existing political and 
cultural systems, identifying forms of agency that local actors are exercising and the forms of 
peace resulting from these dynamics on the ground. It built from an emerging critical 
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literature on the liberal peace that is increasingly focusing on “locally-grounded non-state 
agency and mechanisms of recovery and order” that are of “significance for understanding 
the empirical conditions for political order and peace” (Moe 2010: 7). This study was largely 
inspired by the need to observe and engage local actors in Sierra Leone including those who 
live “on the margins of the state” whose cultural, political and peacebuilding practices the 
liberal peace has made invisible. I use invisibility, in this case, to refer to the West’s denial of 
the presence of local capacity to build peace as well as a denial that local actors can provide, 
for example, security, democracy, human rights and gender equality without external 
direction. This saw me conducting fieldwork in multiple sites of Sierra Leone including three 
rural sites (Kailahun, Mattru Jong and Sierra Rutile), and living with and interacting a lot 
with ordinary people in Freetown, Kenema and Bo in December 2009 and November 2010. 
The fieldwork aspect of this study helped me to uncover the complex dynamics on the ground 
which make it impossible for the liberal peace to take root in Sierra Leone. It also helped me 
to discover the disconnect between priorities of internationals and locals, particularly those 
who live in the hinterland. For instance, while the internationals prioritise the state, its 
institutions, state elites, political and economic liberalisation, locals prioritise community, 
custom, tradition, needs, welfare, customary governance and social harmony. Based on this, 
the liberal peace’s failure to pay sufficient attention to such “local” priorities and also its 
failure to understand the dynamics on the ground has resulted in it not having much impact in 
terms of achieving its objectives in Sierra Leone.  
 
By providing such insights on the interactions, and political and cultural dynamics in Sierra 
Leone, this study aimed at contributing to the emerging debates on the need to go beyond the 
liberal peace using concepts such as hybridity and “post-liberal peace” as “a way of 
understanding contemporary contexts defined by civil war and peace interventions” (Mac 
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Ginty 2011: 11; see chapter 4). Further, it helped me identify other types of peace and ways 
of addressing local level sources of conflict.  
 
It is crucial to note that during my fieldwork there were a number of limitations including 
language and cultural barriers as most people in the hinterland spoke either Creole or Mende, 
even at public meetings. In order to get a picture of the issues discussed at such public 
meetings I often asked a participant seating close to me to re-count it for me. I also made use 
of Mende and Creole interpreters. In addition, I analysed text books and multiple documents, 
including news articles, legal and policy documents in obtaining data. Below I will 
summarise the structure of the thesis and research findings, then reflect on the findings and 
finally, state areas of future research. 
 
The introduction of this thesis outlined the liberal peace debates in which the thesis is located, 
and the theoretical and methodological approaches that it draws on. In chapter I provided a 
general historical analysis of political organisation in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial periods and the challenges that a number of post-colonial African states are facing 
including that of building viable states and sustainable peace. By so doing, I acknowledged 
the significance of history and set the context for understanding local agency, multiple 
authorities in most African societies including Sierra Leone and the role of customary 
governance and law in social order, welfare and stability. In addition, I discussed legacies of 
the past such as, external intervention in Africa and its negative effects on the continent 
including the destabilising effects of trade liberalisation on fragile states which has been 
brought back through liberal peacebuilding, and the creation of states without legitimacy that 
saw political elites engaging in authoritarian politics resulting in instability in a number of 
states on the continent.  
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In chapter 2, I discussed and offered definitions of peacebuilding, statebuilding, post-conflict, 
liberal peacebuilding and liberal peace. I noted that the concepts of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding are distinct and should not be conflated. Drawing from Richmond (2005, 2006), 
I provided a framework of the liberal peace in the same chapter. Chapter 3 was a critical 
review of literature on the liberal peace agenda in post-conflict environments bringing out the 
polarisation between mainstream and critical scholars. Chapter 4 discussed the emerging 
critical literature that argue for the need to shift from merely criticising the liberal peace to 
examining local and contextual responses to the liberal peace including identifying the forms 
of peace that are being constructed as a result of the interactions between the liberal peace 
and local social forces. Such contextualisation is crucial mainly because it helps to show that 
there is no such thing as universal peace, but various forms of peace. This also provides for a 
better understanding of the complex dynamics in post-conflict/conflict zones. The chapter 
adopted the concept of hybridity as way of understanding the agency of local actors in 
peacebuilding from state elites to chiefs to civil society to ordinary people on the “margins of 
the state” as well as challenging the hegemony of the liberal peace.  
 
In Chapter 5, I discussed historical factors that laid a weak foundation for the modern state in 
Sierra Leone. This chapter related with chapter 1 which offered a general historical 
background on Africa. It also offered a critical account of scholarly debates on the immediate 
causes of state failure/collapse and the civil war and its aftermaths. It noted the need to 
understand the crisis in Sierra Leone in terms of the long-term and short-term causes, and 
state and community failure in order to deal effectively with the situation. In chapter 6, 
drawing on the theory chapters and fieldwork I discussed the practical application of the 
liberal peace in Sierra Leone, the complex local dynamics, the interactions between local 
political and social forces and local forms of peace. I noted that dynamics on the ground have 
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hindered the full realisation of the liberal peace with more remote areas having some aspects 
of customary peacebuilding such as cleansing ceremonies operating independent of the 
liberal state institutions that the liberal peace has established and parallel to mainstream 
peacebuilding. By so doing, such local actors have expressed “critical agency” and their 
desire for autonomy.109  
 
Hybrid Forms of Peace in Sierra Leone 
My findings are similar to that of critical literature about liberal interventionism being 
partially counter-productive in post-war societies (see chapter 3) and also that, interactions 
between the liberal peace and local social and political forces are resulting in hybrid forms of 
peace in such societies (see chapter 4). At the same time, it is crucial to note that not all forms 
of peace that are emerging in Sierra Leone are hybrid since as noted in the previous chapter 
there are other peace processes that are operating in parallel to the liberal peace, particularly 
in rural areas. It is also crucial to note that, there are positive outcomes of liberal 
interventions in Sierra Leone including an end to overt violence and the establishment of 
basic security and order. For internationals, “peace” and stability have been understood in 
relation to elections, particularly the 2007 elections that saw a smooth transition of power and 
the government’s control over Freetown. Yet, this understanding of peace has resulted in 
state elites and internationals failing to adequately address the underlying causes of the 
conflict resulting in dissatisfaction, particularly in rural societies. The state that internationals 
have created in Sierra Leone has not engaged much with the population based outside 
Freetown and such population continue to struggle for survival. Its liberal-oriented 
                                                           
109
  Richmond (2011b: 17) refers to critical agency as “implying a local, contextual subaltern (meaning 
civil society and the local-local beneath it) capacity to mobilise non-violently, either visibly and in a coordinated 
manner, or in hidden and fragmented ways”. 
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institutions cannot relate much with the hinterland rendering the liberal peace less effective in 
the hinterland. Further, the re-introduction of multi-party politics has polarised Sierra 
Leoneans since democratic political competition is being practised along regional/ethnic lines 
making it difficult for politics of inclusion to take root in the country. As with, the externally 
imposed (neo-)liberal economics, it has ignored welfare, rights, interests and needs of 
citizens. In addition, (neo)-liberal economic policies have undermined the livelihoods of 
subsistence farmers in resource rich rural communities since mining companies are 
displacing people from their customary lands. This has generated grievances among affected 
groups. The state’s failure to protect affected groups from such companies makes it 
increasingly irrelevant to affected communities.  
 
It is crucial to note that in Sierra Leone local actors have not been passive recipients of the 
liberal peace and that local dynamics are not only resulting in its hybridisation, but also the 
hybridisation of customary mechanisms of peacemaking such as the tree (which has been 
transformed to a peace tree) and the palava hut (which has been transformed to a peace hut). 
Besides being spaces for re-establishing social cohesion, the rebuilding of relations, dispute 
resolution, dialogue and “hanging heads”, the peace hut and peace tree have become spaces 
of resistance, autonomy and partial acceptance of the liberal peace. Civil society 
organisations have been able to utilise them in their human rights, rule of law, gender and 
democracy awareness raising campaigns. It is in these spaces that hybridisation at the “local-
local” level is taking place as the “local-local” has managed to maintain its autonomy and 
agency. In addition, “local-local” actors have used these spaces to their own advantage or 
needs. As with regard to international actors, the situation on the ground has forced them to 
accept and attempt to modify customary law and justice as well as chiefdom police through 
the JSDP funded by DFID, though much emphasis has been on the liberal peace. By so 
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doing, the internationals have been able to accommodate custom, though biased towards the 
liberal peace. In this case, there is some recognition on their part of the crucial role of 
customary law in peacebuilding since the state remains largely dysfunctional. In this regard, 
the situation on the ground in Sierra Leone shows that the liberal peace and local actors 
should not be perceived as essential and fixed entities, but reshaping each other in ways that 
are leading to hybrid forms of peace.    
 
The state’s limited control of “up country spaces” has seen other forms of authority such as 
chiefs predominantly controlling these spaces and claiming sovereign authority to them. The 
rural populace has continued to view such non-state forms of authority as more legitimate and 
important than the state as well as responsible for order, security and welfare in rural 
communities. In Sierra Leone, the state and state elites who are crucial to the liberal peace 
project cannot do without these forms of authority resulting in state elites being caught up in 
relationships of interdependence with chiefs and forging informal alliances and establishing 
patronage networks with them and other influential non-state actors such as secret society 
leaders. In this case, state elites are adept at appearing to conform to the liberal peace 
framework while continuing to pursue illiberal forms of politics and their personal interests. 
Given that the state has limited power and authority in the hinterland, it is difficult for the 
liberal peace to assert itself in rural Sierra Leone and it is also hard to build the Sierra 
Leonean state without non-state actors such as chiefs.  
 
As such, the state in Sierra Leone has remained fragile with a hybrid political order that 
combine basic tenets of the liberal peace, neo-patrimonialism, ethno-politics and customary 
governance. Can such a hybrid political order be able to build durable peace? As noted in 
chapter 6, this form of hybrid political order has tended to exclude a large segment of the 
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population particularly those in the southern and eastern areas who are either not part of the 
patronage networks or are not supporters of APC further fragmenting the Sierra Leonean 
society. This segment of the population that has been excluded from the peace dividend has 
increasingly become suspicious of the state and state elites utilising the cultural logics of 
ambiguity and concealment in order to access the peace dividend as well as to gain 
autonomy. In addition, some local actors who cannot access the peace dividend have engaged 
in deviant subsistence strategies such as trading sex, stealing and drugs.  In Sierra Leone, the 
political system that is being created tends to resemble the pre-war one which gave rise to the 
civil war in the country (see chapter 5) – the exception being that locals have noted that the 
post-war APC government is not as authoritarian as the pre-war one which has been partly 
attributed to the presence of internationals in the country. In addition, the liberal peace’s 
failure to connect to most of the population’s needs and welfare has resulted in its continued 
support of state elites, statebuilding and neoliberal economics. This has resulted in the further 
marginalisation and suffering of citizens. Indeed, in Sierra Leone a “virtual peace” has been 
generated making it hard for an emancipatory variant of the liberal peace to be achieved.  
 
Besides the above, the research findings have shown that there has been a partial acceptance 
and internalisation of the liberal peace by ordinary people. This should be viewed as a 
strategy by them to challenge their exclusion, marginalisation and state elites’ abuse of state 
resources and corruption. Ordinary people have shown awareness of the existence of state 
institutions such as the Anti-corruption Commission as well as an understanding of the 
precepts of the liberal peace including human rights, good governance, accountability and 
rule of law. In addition, at the local governance level ordinary people have resisted 
councillors as legitimate local authorities, but have accepted their role in development. 
Further, they have continued to view chiefs as their legitimate authorities. It is also crucial to 
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note that ordinary rural people, particularly youths with the support of local civil society 
organisations have demanded the democratisation of the institution of the chief. This would 
include shifting from an Electoral College system to chieftaincy elections based on universal 
suffrage and limiting the term of office for Paramount Chiefs and sub-chiefs to 5 years. 
Currently, chiefs rule for life. By transforming chiefdom authorities, it is hoped that chiefs 
will focus more on serving their followers’ interests than those of state elites since failure to 
do so will see them being voted out of office. At the same time, such people have resisted the 
abolition of the chieftaincy system pointing out that it is “our tradition”. This not only shows 
partial acceptance and internalisation of the liberal peace, but also attempts at its modification 
to produce a liberal-local hybrid that includes custom, traditional governance and culture 
aimed at promoting the locals’ interests and needs. It is these responses of the grassroots to 
state elites’ abuse of state resources and their desire for chiefs to focus more on their needs 
and interests than those of state elites, their partial acceptance of liberal peace and alliance 
with the internationals and civil society that may eventually force both local and national 
elites into reform that may lead to a “liberal-local” hybrid form of peace. 
 
Sierra Leone’s civil war devastated the lives of most of the population, especially in the rural 
areas seriously impacting families and community cohesion. In post-war Sierra Leone, the 
peasantry continue to live precarious lives experiencing extreme poverty, a lack of basic 
services and infrastructure. In addition, the state is very distant from them. Yet, the liberal 
peace with its top-down approach and bias towards (neo)-liberal economics, state elites, the 
state and its institutions has paid insufficient attention to culture, custom, welfare and basic 
human needs of most of the population. For many rural Sierra Leoneans, the causes of the 
civil war remain including marginalisation, poverty, uneven distribution of state wealth, 
corruption, bad governance, injustice and a lack of accountability.  
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It is crucial to note that although their role in peacebuilding is often minimalized, the rural 
populace has used custom and other cultural resources to deal with their situation, particularly 
post-war challenges such as restoring social relations while demanding the state to meet their 
basic needs. In addition, the restoration of social relations is also understood in relation to 
establishing and maintaining good relations with ancestors with the belief that ancestors are 
the custodians of peace. This has witnessed the “local-local” engaging in “a number of more 
localised and contextual non-elite processes” (Richmond 2011b). Such processes include 
reconciliation and community cleansing ceremonies in which secret societies have acted as 
ritual experts. Despite, the liberal peace’s attempts to eliminate secret societies citing 
“harmful traditional practices”, particularly female circumcision ignoring their role in 
promoting social harmony, peace, security and social order, the rural populace have 
continued to rely on them. In this case, this has seen them continuing to conduct ritual 
ceremonies aimed at promoting social harmony as well as harmony with ancestors. These 
rituals are conducted in secret society meetings beyond the reach of the liberal peace. In this 
case, the form of peace that results is locally-oriented. In these local contexts, customary 
peacebuilding has put much emphasis on restoring relationships and building a 
social/communitarian peace. Peace, in the case, is conceived as social cohesion as well as 
harmony between the individual, community and the invisible world of ancestors. 
 
In addition, where state elites have attended such processes, they have done so as invited 
guests without taking a leading role in the processes allowing the rural populace to exercise 
its autonomy. And also where NGOs, particularly neo-traditional ones have been involved, 
they have played a subordinate/facilitative role allowing locals to take a leading role. By 
being part of the local peacebuilding process, such NGOs have been able to impart liberal 
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peace precepts including democracy, human rights, accountability and equal participation in 
decision-making while not undermining custom and local ways of operating. As such, such 
neo-traditional organisations have managed to establish legitimacy both locally and 
internationally due to their ability to speak the language of internationals and locals. In 
addition, this has allowed them to combine elements of the liberal peace and customary 
peacemaking with some success. It is this form of engagement on the “margins of the state” 
that might lead to “local-liberal hybrid” forms of peace in the country. Indeed, the “birth” of a 
“post-liberal” peace in Sierra Leone. Such a “post-liberal” peace will be more local than 
liberal since customary peace processes in the hinterland tend to dominate with civil society 
organisations bringing in some aspects of the liberal peace, particularly human rights, 
development and democracy. However, the “local-local” will still need the state for the 
provision of welfare and needs, if a durable peace is to be established.  
 
My findings challenge the liberal internationalist assumptions and assertions about “the 
local”, particularly ordinary villagers, as lacking capacity and being powerless. Rather than 
privileging state-centred and liberal peace-centred approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding, 
a critical theoretical and methodological approach that I adopted in this study as well as 
research methods that are ethnographic in nature which allowed me to interact with 
individuals at the lower rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy, provided a useful 
understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone as discussed in chapter 6. The 
post-conflict experiences of ordinary Sierra Leoneans in villagers and the mining town of 
Sierra Rutile also provided significant insights on why it is crucial to move/think beyond 
liberal peacebuilding and think about local peacebuilding initiatives and “post-liberal 
peace(building)”. In addition, such lived experiences of ordinary Sierra Leoneans discussed 
in chapter 6 provide important insights on why it is crucial not to think of Sierra Leone as 
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having moved out of the post-conflict phase into an economic drive as economic and state 
elites, and internationals such as the World Bank claim. This has led them to blindly adopt 
neo-liberal economics without much concern about its impact on ordinary Sierra Leoneans. 
As such, this tends to reinforce the power of internationals, state and economic elites, at the 
same time, erasing the welfare, interests and needs of the poor. Further, my findings dispute 
the assumption that the liberal peace is all that there is to peace which mainstream scholars, 
particularly Paris (2010) and Begby and Burgess (2009) tend to hold (see chapter 3). Such an 
assumption, I would argue is just incorrect or ill-founded as chapter 6 has shown. Ordinary 
Sierra Leoneans and political elites have shown their capacity to resist, partially accept, 
modify and subvert liberal peacebuilding as well as the capacity to build peace independent 
of the liberal peace based on their own understandings of the social, economic and political 
situation in which they find themselves. It is also crucial to note that peace research that 
brings various actors including the marginalised into the picture is crucial for the conceptual 
development of “post-liberal peace”.  
 
Areas of Future Research 
 Since all but, one site (Freetown) in which the fieldwork was conducted are in the south and 
eastern areas (opposition stronghold) further research needs to be done in the northern area 
(the ruling party’s stronghold and also a region that considers the institution of the chief to be 
sacred) to find out whether this is the case in the region or grassroots responses in the south 
and eastern regions targeting state elites and chiefs are merely resulting from exclusion at the 
state and local level, respectively. It would also be interesting to do a comparative analysis of 
Sierra Leone and other post-conflict environments in Africa, such as Liberia that operate on 
patronage politics and have witnessed international attempts at imposing the liberal peace. It 
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is also crucial that further research be done on the role of neo-traditional civil society 
organisations in hybridisation and their relationship with internationals. 
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Appendix 1 
Interviews (Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Kailahun, Mattru Jong & Sierra Rutile) 
Informants Interviewed  
Government 5 
Local NGOs 12 
International NGOs/Bilateral Org./UN/IFIs 6 
Police 1 
Ex-combatants 3 
Individuals 7 
Associations 7 
Paramount Chiefs/sub-chiefs/TAs 11 
Members of Parliament 1 
Political Parties 3 
Local Government 3 
Media 5 
Academics/Teachers 2 
Youth leaders 2 
Sierra Leone Commission for Human Rights 
Staff 
1 
Women Leaders 2 
Total 71 
 
Please note:  
1. Group discussions (3) were conducted at a leadership training workshop in Kailahun 
on 12/11/2010. 17 participants and two facilitators were at the workshop. 
2. Group interviews are counted just once. 
3. A number of respondents, especially in rural areas and some local NGOs were 
interviewed with others present. Such interviews sometimes developed into group 
interviews. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Leadership Training – 12 November 2010, Kailahun District Council Canteen 
 
Q1. What do you understand by the word peace? 
 
Q2. What were the causes of the Sierra Leonean war? 
 
Q3. As community leaders how are you promoting peace in Kailahun District? 
 
Q4. How have people responded to the peace initiatives? 
 
Examples: 
1. Human rights 
2. Rule of law 
3. Democracy 
4. Traditional approaches 
 
Q5(a) Which approaches have the people of Kailahun 
1. Resisted? 
2. Accepted? 
3. Modified? 
 
b) Where the people have resisted, as a leader how do you deal with this? 
 
Q6. Have you experienced any interface between the local and international peacebuilding? 
 
Please note: the workshop organiser had an input in the research questions. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Source: Manning (2009: 4) 
  
Most Important Institutions and Actors in Local Governance from a Villager’s Perspective 
“INFORMAL”         “FORMAL” 
         Supreme Court 
FREETOWN     Central  
      Government 
         Court of Appeal 
 
 
PROVINCE        High court 
 
         Magistrate Court 
DISTRICT      Local Council 
          Customary 
          Law Office 
      
    Paramount Chief 
 
CHIEFDOM  Chiefdom    Councillor 
   Speaker 
     Section     Local Court 
     Chief 
   Chiefdom 
          Youth Leader 
Chiefdom 
Women’s 
Leader 
     Section 
Society Heads “Big Men”  
  
 Pastor/Imam  Village  Tribal 
    Headman Authorities 
 
 
 Women’s Youth  
 Leader  Leader 
     Compound/ 
     Family Head 
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